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Abstract 
Macroeconomic stability is one of the most important national objectives in any 
country. However, economies are often subjected to a number of shocks 
(internal and external), which can be destabilising, produce volatility and make it 
difficult to achieve and maintain economic stability. Consequently, various 
policies are used to help deal with the various shocks that may affect the 
economy. Of all the available policies, monetary policy appears to have been 
ever more at the centre of macroeconomic policymaking. Meanwhile, for 
monetary policy to be effective, there is a need for a better understanding of the 
transmission mechanism, i. e., the process through which monetary policy 
decisions are transmitted into changes in real output and inflation. 
Whereas extensive research on the transmission mechanism has been conducted 
in developed countries, such work in developing countries, especially in Africa is 
lacking. This could be due to the fact that it was not long time ago, around the 
1990s that countries in Africa started adopting the more modem central bank 
operations in a market-based economic and financial system characterised by 
indirect monetary policy. Such operations require an understanding of the 
transmission mechanism. Lack of empirical analysis of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Botswana and developing countries of Africa in 
general, is the main motivating factor behind this thesis. TI-ie main objective of 
this thesis is, therefore, to estimate the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy in Botswana. Three different, but complementary techniques (the 
Narrative Approach, Vector Autoregression (VAR) analysis and the Structural 
Approach involving the estimation of a small structural model for Botswana 
economy) are used. Results from these methods tell a consistent story and 
indicate that monetary policy in Botswana affects real output and inflation 
through the interest rate channel, while the exchange rate channel is not 
operational. The credit channel is also active but not strong. The structural 
approach also indicates that devaluation is contractionary in Botswana, but more 
research is necessary before firmer conclusions could be made. 
Key Words: BOtS71, ana; Macroeconomic Stability; Monetanj Policy; Transmission 
Mechanism; Real Output; Inflation; NarratiVe Approach; Vector Autoregression; 
Macroeconomic Model; Shocks. 
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CHAPER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is always the desire of every country to attain and maintain economic stability. 
High and sustainable economic growth combined with a low and stable rate of 
inflation, which shall hopefully translate into more jobs, is the dream of any 
national government There is however, a wide recognition of the fact that 
economies are from time to time subject to a variety of both monetary shocks, e. g. 
exchange rates, money demand, etc., and shocks that affect the real side of the 
economy (see for example, Taylor, 1996). Developing countries, whose 
economies are reliant on primary commodity exports such as coffee, cocoa, and 
tobacco, etc., are prone to the terms of trade shocks. Mullins, Jr., (1996) states 
that, "shocks by their nature, are destabilising, producing volatility, which alone 
can be damaging". It is therefore, upon this realisation that governments do 
acknowledge the importance of some policy interventions to counter the 
negative impact of the shocks to attain economic stability. Recognising the fact 
that something needs to be done is one thing, but what needs to be done is 
another. Consequently, what policies are needed to attain and sustain such 
economic growth has been a matter of both economic and political debate for 
decades. There are, however, a variety of economic policies that could help 
achieve stabilise such economies. To this end, both fiscal and monetary policies 
have been used ever since. 
There are, nevertheless, some debates with regard to the importance and the 
effectiveness of these economic policies. Fortunately, such debates have 
narrowed down over the years as more data and evidence emerged to support 
one or more of these policies to the extent that most economists agree that both 
fiscal and monetary policy have a role to play in economic stabilisation. 
However, it is now generally agreed that monetary policy is best suited for 
economic stability. Even though fiscal policy still has a role to play in economic 
stabilisation, the problem with fiscal policy is that its timing and impact, more so 
in the face of budget deficits, is doubtful. This consensus view was best 
summarised in an important paper by Mishkin (1995)1, who noted that, "both 
economists and politicians have been heard to advocate in recent years that 
stabilisation of output and inflation be left to monetary policy". He further noted 
that, "fiscal policy has lost its lustre since its heyday in the 1960s, partly because 
of concern over persistently large budget deficits and partly because of doubts 
that the political system can make tax and spending decisions in a timely way to 
achieve desirable stabilisation outcomes". In conclusion, Mishkin notes that, 
"... monetary policy has been ever more at the centre of macroeconomic 
policymaking". 
In this thesis, we are concerned with the conduct of monetary policy in 
Botswana. We want to find out how far the conduct of monetary policy has 
evolved over time in Botswana and the framework within which monetary 
policy is conducted. Of particular importance is how monetary policy actions are 
transmitted through the economy. This brings us to the question of the 
transmission mechanism that is discussed below. 
Taylor (1995) defines the transmission mechanism as "the process through which 
monetary policy decisions are transmitted into changes in real GDP and 
inflation". Meanwhile, Mishkin, states that "monetary policy is a powerful tool, 
but one that sometimes has unexpected or unwanted consequences", and that "to 
be successful in conducting monetary policy, the monetary authorities must have 
an accurate assessment of the timing and effect of their policies on the economy, 
Mishkin (1995) presented introductory remarks at "The symposium on the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism" and also provided an "overview of the main types of monetary 
transmission mechanisms found in the literature and a perspective on how the papers in the 
symposium relate to the overall literature and to each other". 'Me symposium had brought 
together important and very influential researchers in the field of monetary policy and the 
transmission mechanism. 
thus requiring an understanding on the mechanisms through which monetary 
policy affects the economy". The views of Mishkin point towards both the 
difficulties that monetary authorities have to deal with and also the importance 
of understanding the transmission mechanism. For example, monetary policy 
may not always produce the desired results probably due to unforeseen shocks 
or due to policy errors. For instance, Taylor (1996), states that, "if monetary 
policy is tightened sharply with short-term interest rates rising by a large 
amount, the inflation rate will return to target quickly, but the economy will slow 
down and perhaps go into a recession. Alternatively if policy does not tighten so 
much, the inflation rate will return to target more gradually, but there will be a 
smaller slowdown in real GDP. " Furthermore, monetary authorities may choose 
an inflation rate that exceeds what is optimal for the economy. From the 
foregoing discussion, it is evident that the importance of understanding the 
transmission mechanism cannot be overemphasised. At the heart of the 
transmission mechanism is the credibility of the monetary authorities. In order 
for monetary policy to function smoothly, the public, financial markets and an 
the stake holders should have faith and trust in the policy actions of the 
monetary authorities (i. e., central banks). To enhance its credibility, the 
monetary authority ought to be able to clearly explain its actions and the impact 
of such actions on the overall economy. This calls for a thorough understanding 
of the transmission mechanism on the part of the monetary authorities. 
Even though it is widely accepted that the transmission mechanism is difficult to 
estimate, it is nevertheless necessary that monetary authorities have some degree 
of confidence in the transmission mechanism of their monetary policy. 
Knowledge of the transmission mechanism will go a long way in reducing policy 
errors, which may tarnish the image and reputation of the authorities. The 
difficulties in estimating the transmission mechanism are mainly due to the 
unstable relationships between the economic variables of interest. As the 
structure of the economy changes, the economic relationships are bound to 
change or there occur some structural breaks which affect the stability of the 
economic relationships. The other problem is related to data. h-i some instances, 
either data are not available, or even if they are available, they are not reliable; 
either we have short series or the accuracy of the data is questionable, or both. 
Data problems are more pronounced in less developed countries like Botswana. 
This obviously complicates the estimation of the transmission mechanism. 
Furthermore, there is reverse causality between variables, so that it is difficult to 
differentiate between cause and effect (the endogeneity problem). For example, 
exogenous shocks to real activity and inflation may prompt monetary authorities 
to react and their reactions also, in turn, impacts on real activity and inflation. 
Romer and Romer, (2004), further note that, "conventional measures of monetary 
policy have some flaws, one of which is the likelihood of endogenous 
movements". They give an example of money supply that "tends to rise in good 
times because the money multiplier rises" and that "even the federal funds rate, 
which has become the standard indicator of monetary actions in studies of the 
effects of monetary policy, moves a great deal from day to day for reasons 
unrelated to monetary policy". In this context, it is difficult to disentangle causes 
and effects of monetary policy on real activity and inflation from the influences 
that real activity and inflation have on monetary policy. 
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, monetary policy authorities need to make 
an effort to estimate the transmission mechanism in order to have an idea of how 
long it takes for their policy actions to impact on key macroeconomic variables 
and by what magnitude. It is this understanding that will assist in explaining 
policy actions and their impact on the economy to the public and hence central 
bank credibility. We should however, acknowledge the fact that the public may 
have its own view of the transmission mechanism, which may not necessarily 
agree with that of the central bank or monetary authorities. 
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a long time lag between policy 
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action/change and its impact on inflation and other macroeconomic variables 
(see for example, Taylor (1995) and (1996), Mishkin (1996), De Fiore (1998), and 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). It is therefore important that the monetary 
authorities should have estimates of the length of the time lag as well as the 
extent to which the economy, or specifically, real GDP and inflation, react to 
policy actions/ changes. Put slightly differently, an examination/assessment of 
the transmission mechanism, i. e., the different ways in which output and prices 
are affected by monetary policy, is a pre-requisite to a more effective and efficient 
design and implementation/conduct of monetary policy. 
Although the focus of this thesis is on Botswana, it is nevertheless worthwhile to 
first look at monetary policy in general and its objectives, instruments, etc.; how 
it has evolved overtime, and the different monetary policy frameworks that have 
existed to date, especially in developing countries with particular reference to 
Africa. It is hoped that this will help bring the question of the transmission 
mechanism into proper perspective. 
1.2 The Conduct of Monetary Policy 
Monetary Policy focuses on attaining and maintaining price stability to support 
sustainable and balanced economic growth. The design and conduct of monetary 
policy has been delegated to central banks in many countries. Governments are 
not considered the most appropriate institutions to conduct monetary policy. 
David Ricardo is quoted as saying that "It is said that Government could not be 
safely entrusted with the power of issuing paper money; that it would most 
certainly abuse it ... There would, I confess, be great danger of this if Government 
- that is to say, the Ifflnisters - were themselves to be entrusted with the power of 
issuing paper money. But I propose to place this trust in the hands of 
Commissioners, not removable from their official situation but by a vote of one 
or both Houses of Parliament I propose also to prevent all intercourse between 
5 
these Commissioners and Ministers, by forbidding any species of money 
transactions between them", see Fraser (1994). 
There are some differences in the way central banks conduct their monetary 
policies, but one thing that is common across almost all central banks are the 
objectives of monetary policy. n-te objectives of monetary policy are usually 
stated as price stability or to keep inflation low and stable. Price stability Oow 
inflation) in turn supports the Government's economic objectives such as 
economic growth and employment. As such, most central banks put some 
weight on stabilising output/growth as well as inflation (see for example, Bank 
of England at h!! ]2: / /www. bankofengland. co. uk/`monetan7l2olicv. htm 
If high and sustainable economic growth is the main concern of national 
governments, why is the focus so much on inflation? This question might seem 
irrelevant, but it is important in that one needs to know the connections between 
inflation and output in order to appreciate the importance of keeping inflation 
low and stable. A high rate of inflation is considered harmful to the economy. 
For one, high and unpredictable inflation creates a very hostile environment for 
decision making. For example, during periods of high inflation, producers are 
not in a position to tell whether an increase in the price of a commodity reflects 
an increase in the general price level or just an increase in relative prices. In such 
a situation pricing decisions become difficult. Investment and consumption are 
also adversely affected during high inflation periods. Second, the economy is 
composed of net savers and net borrowers. Net savers, though they have the 
funds, they nevertheless do not have or are unwilling to invest in alternative 
projects other than financial assets, whereas net borrowers lack the funds to 
invest in projects that would yield higher returns in future. Net borrowers 
therefore borrow from net savers and have to repay the loans with some interest 
If the economy is characterised by high and unpredictable rates of inflation, the 
wealth is redistributed from lenders to borrowers in that the real rate of return is 
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reduced by inflation. "Jiat rates to charge to borrowers during periods of high 
inflation becomes a problem. All these constitute some of the undesirable effects 
of uncertainty about future inflation on business decisions and economic growth; 
that is why the objective of price stability is important. Mishkin (1996) observed 
that, ".... unanticipated movements in the price level can cause unanticipated 
fluctuations in output, an undesirable outcome. Particularly important is that 
price deflation can be an important factor leading to a prolonged financial crisis, 
as occurred during the great depression. An understanding of the transmission 
mechanism thus makes it clear that the goal of price stability is desirable because 
it lowers the uncertainty about the future price level. Thus the price stability 
goal implies that a negative inflation rate is at least as undesirable as too high an 
inflation rate". Meanwhile, Taylor (1996) noted that, "cross-country evidence 
shows that countries with lower inflation tend to have higher long-term 
economic growth rates", and that, "a low and steady inflation rate improves 
cyclical performance". 
The assumption is therefore, that attaining and maintaining the goal of low and 
stable inflation will create a friendly environment for both investment and 
consumption decisions, and hence leads to high economic growth and low levels 
of unemployment. It is recognised, though, that there are some short run trade- 
offs between inflation and unemployment, i. e., policy actions geared towards 
achieving low levels of inflation may result in high levels of unemployment in 
the short-run, but the long-run benefits outweigh the short-run costs. In that 
respect, Taylor pointed out. that "there is little disagreement that there is no long- 
run trade-off between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment", and 
that "there is a short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment". 
Taylor, however, acknowledges that there is more disagreement in the 
proposition that there exists a short-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. 
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The conduct of monetary policy has evolved over time with numerous strategies 
and innovations initiated. As stated above, there is a general consensus that 
monetary policy is most suitable for macroeconomic stability. However, 
Keynesian economists have traditionally believed that fiscal policy is more 
effective than monetary policy. The focal point for this controversy is what is 
thought to be the main determinant of economic activity or what determines the 
level of output, employment and prices. Whereas Keynesians assume that the 
Government and its expenditure activities are the main force behind economic 
growth, the Monetarists on the other hand firmly believe in the growth of money 
supply as the key determining factor. For example, periods of depressions are, in 
the monetarist view, a reflection of depressed monetary expansion whereas high 
inflation results from excessive monetary expansion. These fluctuations in 
money supply lead to equally undesirable fluctuations in economic activity, i. e., 
business fluctuations emanate from fluctuations in money supply growth. 
The monetarist position is countered by the Keynesians who, however, do not 
discount the effects of money growth completely, but argue that there are more 
important factors that explain business fluctuations and inflation other than 
money supply alone. Sims (1992) states that in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
difference between Keynesians and Monetarists seemed to man), to be the 
differences over the relative sizes of certain elasticities in a system whose formal 
structure was more or less agreed upon. 
NobA, ithstanding the arguments against the use of monetary policy for price 
stability, monetary policy has gained a lot of prominence over the years and most 
central banks' approach to the conduct of monetary policy, was influenced to a 
very large extent, by the quantity theory of money. The quantity theory of 
money is centred on the understanding that for inflation rate to maintain a rising 
and sustainable trend, money supply has to be expanding at excessive rates as 
well. It is in this regard that inflation is said to be a monetary phenomenon; an 
S 
argument that lends support from the neo-classical model that assumes perfect 
market information and flexible prices (see for example, Froyen (2005)). The 
findings of the neoclassical model are appropriately surnmarised by the equation 
of exchange, which forms the basis for a framework for the quantity theory of 
money. The equation of exchange states that the stock of money (M) multiplied 
by the speed at which money changes hands in the economy, i. e., velocity of 
money circulation (V) is equivalent to nominal output (PY) where (P) represents 
prices and (Y)is real output. 
. AIV =- 
PY 
In this equation, velocity is assumed to remain constant, so is real output, which 
is assumed to be always at full employment level. Identity (1.1) can be re- 
specified as: 
p (J'/fl*Af (1.2) 
Identity (1.2) indicates that, the price level (P)is proportional to the supply of 
money since 
V) is assumed to remain constant. This in a way is a re- 
(Y 
enforcement of the transaction motive for holding money. Whether the increase 
in money supply is inflationary or not depends on whether the economy is 
below, or above its potential level. According to Hoggarth (1996), the effects of 
money supply growth on the economy can be summarised as in table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1: Monetary Expansion and Inflation 
(1) (2) (3) 
Short Run Short/Medium Run Long Run 
(If actual output is (If actual output is above (If actual output is above 
below potential) potential) potential) 
Inflation Unchanged Inflation increases Inflation increases 
Actual output increases Actual output returns to Actual and potential 
initial level output growth are lower 
than would have occurred 
otherwise 
Source: Glenn Hoggarth (Bank of England) 0 
Table 1.1 above indicates that money supply increase is only inflationary when 
the economy is above potential (columns 2 and 3) otherwise below potential, the 
increase in money supply leads to economic growth with inflation remaining 
unchanged (column 1). In the long run, when the economv is above potential, an 
increase in money supply leads to high inflation and at the same time reduces 
output growth (column 3). However, opponents of the quantity theory of money 
argue that the economy is not always at full employment, i. e., it is unrealistic to 
assume that real output always remains constant. Furthermore, velocity does not 
also remain stable over time. For example, during depressions velocity tends to 
decline and increase during boom periods. But even when the assumption of 
constancy of the money supply and velociq, is relaxed, money supply still 
remains a very important determinant of the price level, more so in the long run, 
and the quantity theory of money still remains an important guide to the conduct 
of monetary policy in most central banks. As indicated above, the conduct of 
monetary policy is the responsibility of central banks whose operations differ 
from one central bank to the other depending on the degree of independence 
accorded to each central bank. Central bank independence can be defined in two 
ways; there is goal independence and instrument independence. Fraser (1994) 
argues that central banks "should not have goal independence but they should 
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have instrument independence". Accordingly, instrument independence means 
that the central bank makes its choice of what instrument to use to attain the goal 
set by the government. Meanwhile, goal independence means that a central 
bank is free to set the inflation objective. Some central banks, for example, the 
Bank of Botswana, have both goal and instrument independence so that they are 
free to set their inflation objectives and well as choose their instrument. 
Meanwhile, the conduct of monetary policy has evolved overtime, with different 
kinds of monetary and financial set-ups in different countries. There is no 
specific rule that governs the choice of a policy framework. Instead the choice is 
country specific and depends on a number of factors, amongst them are; financial 
development, history of inflation, institutional set-up, etc., an of which are 
country specific. Below we look at some of the financial and monetary 
arrangements that existed at one point or another in different countries, 
especially in Africa. 
1.3 Monetary Policy Frameworks 
Even though the objectives of monetary policy are similar across different 
countries, central banks do differ in the manner in which they conduct their 
monetary policies. Much of the difference emanates from the different 
frameworks and/or financial systems within which the), operate. These financial 
systems have taken different forms in different countries; probably because of 
different political ideologies and also their key national objectives at the time. 
For example, at the time of independence, African countries' financial systems, 
and hence their monetary policies, were modelled alongside those of their 
colonial powers, but thereafter evolved very differently (Honohan, and 
O'Connell (1997)). Accordingly, Honohan and O'Connell (1997) and Ncube 
(2004) identify five monetary regimes that were/are in operation in Africa (see 
table 1.2 below for a summary). First, there is the currency board arrangement 
which is mostly characterised by a fixed exchange rate system. A currency board 
is a country's monetary authority whose role is only limited to issuiu-Ig notes and 
coins. This is one of the rules based system in which there is no room for 
discretion on the side of the monetary authority. In that sense, the domestic 
country central bank cannot exercise independent monetary policy. The value 
and stabilitý, of the currency is directly linked to the foreign anchor currency. As 
a result, the exchange rate is strictly fixed. Low inflation is imported from 
abroad by pegging the exchange rate to a low inflation country. 
Table 1.2: Monetary Regimes. in Africa 
Monetary Regime Characteristics 
Currency Board A currency board is a country's monetary authority and issues notes 
and coins. The value and stability of the currency is directly linked to 
the foreig 
., 
n anchor currency. The exchange rate is, as a result, strictly 
fixed. 
Printing Press Common in poor countries. Large sums of money are printed to 
finance huge budget deficits. This huge budget financing often leads to 
hyper- or near hyper-inflation. 
Controlled Economy Very popular in socialist states. The state controls prices and/or the 
exchange rate. Prices do not adjust to market conditions which results 
in rationing of goods and foreign exchange. 
Discretionary Government does not have unlimited access to borrowing and 
Regime monetary policy could be active. Commercial banks face ceilings on 
credit expansion. Credit ceilings are sometimes associated with interest 
rate controls. Implemented at the insistence of the IMF in some 
countries. 
Pure Market-cIearing Discourages heavy government reliance on monetary expansion. 
Monetary authorities use a variety of instruments (e. g., interest rates, 
central bank lending, etc. ) to influence economic activity. Does not rely 
on administrative controls and market-determined prices play a central 
role. 
Source: Honohan, and O'Connell (1997) and Ncube (2004). 
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In this manner a country is said to be importing credibility from abroad, most 
commonly from a bigger trading partner country. Many countries went through 
this stage in their monetary and financial frameworks. This can be traced as far 
back as the Gold (Exchange) Standard under which all currencies were fixed, at 
some rate, to the United States Dollar (US$), and the dollar was the only currency 
that was directly convertible into gold. The rest of the currencies were, therefore, 
only convertible into gold indirectly through the US$ (Honohan and O'Connell). 
Some currency boards still exist today and one such currency board in Africa is 
the Common Currency Area (CCA) formally known as the Rand Monetary Area 
(RMA). Initially, the CCA consisted of South Africa as the dominant partner, 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. However, Botswana left the currency area to 
pursue her monetary policy independently in 1975 (see chapter 2 for more 
details). Currently, the national currencies of Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia 
are pegged on a one-to-one basis with the South African Rand and there is a 
tendency for the nationals of these countries to prefer the South African Rand to 
their own currencies. Currency boards are believed to have been able to reduce 
inflation from historically higher levels. Because of its lack of flexibility, among 
other problems, currency boards were completely abandoned in some 
regions/ countries in favour of the more flexible regimes, while in other areas 
some modifications were introduced. One of the modifications was to still 
maintain the fixed exchange rate, but manage it within some specified range. 
The authorities could only, intervene if the exchange rate over or under-shot the 
specified ranges. Meanwhile, Ncube, (2004) states that, "the Currency Board 
regime typically existed during colonial periods for most of the countries" and 
that "almost all English-speaking former colonies went through this phase in the 
1960s, with the exception of Botswana and Namibia". He further states that 
"Francophone countries are still under the currency board regime, with the 
French and Belgian countries playing the external debt agents". 
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The second monetary regime that could be identified in the literature is the so- 
called "'Printing Press", (Honohan and O'Connell). According to Honohan and 
O'Connell, the printing press economy is characterised by overly accommodative 
monetary policy. Large sums of money are printed in order to finance huge 
budget deficits, which results in high inflation. In fact these actions have the 
potential to destabilise the economy in that, deficits tend not to improve or 
reduce, but instead continue to grow. As the central bank prints more and more 
money, inflation will also rise higher and higher. Under the printing press, there 
are absolutely no attempts to restrain inflation. Countries that went through this 
phase include: Zaire (1970s through to the 1990s); the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (1980s and 1990s); Burkina Faso (1980s and 1990s); and Zambia (1980s and 
1990s), to name just a few. According to Ncube (2004), this regime is 
. 11 characterised by passive monetary accommodation to any domestic and 
external shocks". The results of such an overly accommodative policy are often 
not desirable as has been experienced in Zaire, for example. It has been observed 
that Zaire relied heavily on monetary financing of the government budget deficit, 
at least during the period up to the late 1990s, which sometimes was as much as 
three quarters of government spending at the expense of hyper- or near hyper- 
inflation (see for example, Honoharn and O'Connell). Honoham and O'Connell 
indicate that, 
"There have been months in each of the past six years in which prices rose 
by more than 30 percent in Zaire. The most severe hyperinflation was 
when monthly inflation averaged 227 percent during November 1993 to 
January 1994. This was in fact the highest monthly inflation ever recorded 
for any country in International Financial Statistics". 
The third monetary regime identified in the literature is the controlled or 
rationing economy týype. Countries such as Tanzania, Ghana and Mozambique 
to name just a just few, went through this regime from the 1970s (Tanzania and 
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Ghana) through to the 1980s (Mozambique). This regime was also very popular 
in the socialist states whose attempts were to control prices and/or exchange 
rates. This was often at the expense of disequilibria in the economy. In this 
monetary regime, prices and quantities are not allowed to adjust in response to 
market forces. It is a non-market-clearing regime in which goods and foreign 
exchange are rationed. This in turn creates an incentive for parallel markets 
whose prices are market clearing but often operating illegally since they are 
viewed as an attempt to frustrate aims and objectives of the authorities. 
The fourth regime is known as the "discretionary regime" which, according to 
Ncube (2004), falls between the printing press and rationing regimes. This 
regime is characterised by credit ceilings. The authorities set limits on credit 
extended by commercial banks and credit ceilings are sometimes associated with 
interest rate controls. Under this monetary regime, it is not uncommon to have 
credit directed towards certain sectors of the economy. Under this regime, 
monetary policy could be active and the Government does not have unlimited 
access to borrowing Eke under the printing press regime. In some countries, this 
monetary arrangement was at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) under their structural adjustment or stabilisation programs. Countries that 
have gone through this regime include Ethiopia (1970s and 1990s); the Gambia 
(1980s); Ghana (1980s) and Zambia (1970s). 
Finally, we have the "Pure Market Clearing" regime in which the central bank 
uses indirect or market based instruments of policy to influence economic 
conditions. This is the most favoured regime which has a long history in most 
developed countries, including Europe and the United States, but also recentlv 
favoured in the developing countries including those in Africa (e. g. South Africa 
(1980s); Ghana (1990s); Botswana (late 1980s) and Zimbabwe (1990s)). In this 
regime, market forces play a greater role. Monetary policy under this regime 
could either be accommodative or restrictive depending on the assessment of the 
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economy by the authorities. For example, information provided by a wide range 
of economic indicators such as, interest rates, credit growth, money supply 
growth, nominal exchange rates, etc., will determine the kind of policy stance 
that the authorities adopt. Under this regime, the control of inflation is the key 
objective of the monetary authorities, hence heavy monetary financing of the 
government budget, which is deemed highly inflationary, is not encouraged. 
This regime accords monetary policy authorities a lot of flexibility in dealing 
with various economic shocks and has landed credibility in most countries. 
Due to some inefficiencies experienced with the use of direct controls most, if not 
all, major central banks have moved away from direct controls or the use of 
direct instruments of monetary policy to indirect instruments. Since central 
banks do not have direct control over the objective variable (s), i. e., inflation, it is 
necessary that they resort to the use of indirect instruments. In this framework, 
we have an instrument of monetary policy, which operates through an 
intermediate target in order to achieve the objective or final target. This being 
the case, what then follows is the question of what constitutes the best 
instrument of monetary policy. I'Ve discuss fl-ds in the section below. 
1.4 Instruments of Monetary Policy 
The choice of what instrument to use is a difficult and controversial one. One 
thing commonly agreed though is that authorities should have some direct and 
identifiable control over whatever variable is chosen as an instrument This is 
very important in that if the variable is also subject to some influence outside 
those of the monetary authorities, their efforts to control such a variable will be 
frustrated. The other issue concerning the choice of an instrument is that, the 
variable should have the most influence over the target variable amongst other 
possible instruments. Here again, there is a lot of controversies notably between 
Monetarist and Keynesian economists on the basis of the assumptions they make 
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about the economy (see for example, Bain and Howells (2003)). The Keynesians' 
view is that a lot of instability emanates from the money market. Their 
assumption is that the demand for money is not stable hence the instability in the 
money market. With this assumption, Keynesians; suggest that interest rates 
should be used as an instrument of monetary policy. However, the Monetarists 
have a contrary view. According to the Monetarist, the demand for money, 
hence the money market is stable, but rather the instability in the economy is 
caused by the instability on the expenditure side, which, in IS-LM framework is 
represented by the IS curve. In that case the Monetarists favour the use of money 
supply as an instrument of monetary policy. 
These two propositions are demonstrated in a paper by Poole (1970) who showed 
that if we assume a stable money demand function, then money stock could be 
the proper instrument and, if a stable IS function is assumed, then the interest 
rate will be the proper instrument. Poole also notes that there is a third position 
taken by what he refers to as the "fence sitters" who argue that "the monetary 
authorities should use both the money stock and the interest rate as instruments" 
in which case, the idea is "to maintain some sort of relationship between the two 
instruments since it is recognised that the money stock and interest rate cannot 
be set independently". 
Despite the ongoing debate concerning the choice of monetary policy 
instruments, most major central banks use interest rates, notably the overnight 
inter-bank rate, as their policy instruments. It is through the inter-bank rates that 
central banks can influence other short-term money market interest rates. The 
overnight inter-bank rate is the interest rate commercial banks charge amongst 
themselves for lending funds to meet reserve requirements. So. by manipulating 
the supply of bank reserves, the quantity of high-powered money available for 
meeting bank reserve requirements, central banks are able to control the inter- 
bank rate. It is argued that with the interest rate as an instrument, the money 
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stock is allowed to freely adjust to demand for money shocks. Money demand 
shocks, in this framework, do not have an impact on output and inflation. On 
the contrary, a money supply instrument requires interest rates, and to some 
extent output, to adjust to clear the money market, and hence introduce 
undesirable interest rate and output volatility. 
In addition, there are many definitions of money supply and the choice of which 
one to use is not an easy one. Even though the authorities may have some 
reasonable degree of control over some of the monetary aggregates, it is 
nevertheless important that a stable relationship exists between the chosen 
monetary aggregate and the target variable; inflation, and also a stable demand 
for that aggregate. But empirical evidence indicates that the demand for money 
is less stable, and more so in developing countries which are subject to structural 
breaks. In fact, Clarida, et al (1999) noted that, "Large unobservable shocks to 
money demand produce high volatility of interest rates when a monetary 
aggregate is used as the policy instrument. It is largely for this reason that an 
interest rate instrument may be preferable". They further noted that, "Narrow 
monetary aggregates are not good policy instruments due to the implied interest 
volatility. Broad aggregates are not good intermediate targets because of their 
unstable relation with aggregate activity". It is as a result of these that tile use of 
short-term interest rates as an instrument of monetary policy is common in most 
central banks including the Bank of Botswana. 
Open Market Operations (OMO) are also used as an indirect instrument of 
monetary policy. OMO involve the purchase and sale of government securities 
by the central bank in order to influence the quantity of commercial banks' 
reserves, hence their ability to extend credit. A sale of securities should reduce 
the money supply whereas a purchase should increase the money supply. As an 
example, consider a P10 000 purchase of Bank- of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs)2 
2 BoBCs are a Bank of Botswana paper, hence a liabflity to the Bank of Botswana; they are not 
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on simplified balance sheet of the Bank of Botswana (top half of table 1.3) and a 
representative commercial bank (bottom half of table 1.3) and assume a reserve 
requirement ratio of 10 percent. Buying the certificates by the Bank of Botswana 
is an expansionary monetary policy action and increases its liabilities by the same 
amount (PlO 000). To buy the certificates, the Bank of Botswana has to draw 
down their reserves (assets). The commercial bank that sells the certificates to 
Bank of Botswana will then hold P1 000 in required reserves and have P9 000 
excess reserves that it can loan to investors or borrowers. The reverse action sees 
the commercial bank reducing its liquid assets by P10 000 and therefore denying 
it the opportunitý, to extend credit. 
Table 1.3: Balance Sheets (Bank of Botswana and a representative 
commercial bank. 
Bank of Botswana 
Assets Liabilities 
_P10 000 +P10 000 
Commercial Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves +P10 000 Checkable deposits _P10 000 
Required Reserves +P1 000 
Excess Reserves +P9 000 
Total Assets +P10 000 Total Liabilities _P10 000 
The Bank of Botswana Certificates are a liability to the central bank but an asset 
to commercial banks. Therefore, OMO operations alter the liabilities side of the 
central bank as well as the asset side of commercial banks. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 
below show Bank of Botswana's liabilities side of the balance sheet and the assets 
side of Commercial Banks' balance sheet, respectivelv. The sale of Bank of I 
Government Securities, in which case they would be an asset to the Bank of Botswana. 
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Botswana Certificates by the Bank of Botswana increases commercial banks' 
holdings of the certificates and therefore reduces their liquid assets (but increases 
Bank of Botswana's liabilities). This also increases their deposits with the Bank of 
Botswana. Collectively, these reduce commercial banks' ability to extend loans 
and therefore, lead to the reduction in the money supply. The purchase of Banl, 
of Botswana Certificates by the Bank of Botswana has an opposite effect. 
It is also recognised that instruments of monetary policy do not have a direct 
influence over the target variables. As such there has to be another variable 
(known as an intermediate variable) that has direct and measurable influence 
over the target variable and at the same time be directly imfluenced by the 
instrument. Some central banks use various monetary aggregates while others 
opt for an exchange rate target 
Table 1A: Liabilities of Bank of Botswana (P Million) 
As at end of Deposits' BoBCS2 
Currency in 
Circulation3 
Capital 
& 
Reserves 
Other 
Liabilities 
Total 
liabilities 
1995 6,595.0 1,963.8 318.5 3,319.7 1,172.3 13,369.3 
1996 7,347.9 2,815.7 355.8 6,839.3 1,833.0 19,191.7 
1997 15,581.7 3,308.2 417.1 1,866.0 557.5 21,730.5 
1998 19,190.1 3,246.2 497.7 3,201.6 476.2 26,611.8 
1999 20,272.3 4,230.2 606.8 3,387.3 494.1 28,990.7 
2000 24,652.7 3,712.4 606.5 4,353.7 708.6 34,033.9 
2001 28,332.8 5,147.7 701.1 6,629.7 529.6 41,340.9 
2002 17,120.9 7,663.5 759.1 4,074.8 490.3 30,108.6 
2003 11,280.7 8,739.3 818.0 2,730.0 441.3 24,009.3 
2004 10,6213 9,649.3 910.9 3,025.6 286.1 24,493.2 
2005 13,805.7 12,416.1 935.3 7,168.4 553.5 34,879.0 
(1) Includes deposits from Government and Commercial 13anks 
(2) Includes Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs) held by commercial banks on their behalf 
and on behalf of their customers 
(3) Consists of notes and coins. 
Source: Bank of Botswana 2005 Annual Report. 
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Table 1.5: Assets of Commercial Banks (P Million) 
As at 
end of 
Liquid 
Assets 
of which 
BoBCs 
Balance 
s from 
Foreign 
Banks 
Loans & 
Advances 
Fixed 
Assets 
Other 
Assets 
Total 
Assets 
1995 1,113A 831.9 188.8 1,650.6 93.1 104.8 3,150.7 
1996 1,503.9 2192.4 431.7 1,674.4 110.6 120.9 3,841.5 
1997 1,959.8 1571.9 789.5 1,794.8 113.2 120.5 4,777.8 
1998 1,917.1 1322.1 1,399.6 2,717.4 129.4 344.7 6,5082 
1999 2,241.6 1717.7 1,319.6 3,946.9 158.6 494.6 8,161.3 
2000 1,842.1 1241.1 1,392.7 4,749.0 166.6 403.4 8,553.8 
2001 2,612.8 1770.1 2,191.7 5,373.5 175.4 647.9 11,001.3 
2002 2,187.6 1622.4 1,514.7 6,523.2 194.9 762.7 11,183.1 
2003 2,547.4 2028.1 1,731.7 7,140.0 205.5 1,338.2 12,962.8 
2004 3,231.0 2543.2 1,430.7 8,329.8 205.3 1,645.5 14,8 
2005 4,768.4 4140.7 1 2,658.0 8,908.8 191.7 1,158.9 17,685.8 
Source: Bank of Botswana 2005 Annual Report. 
Long term interest rates and credit growth can also be used as intermediate 
targets. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) suggest that, "credit becomes a very 
important intermediate target if one considers the impact of monetary policy on 
the ability of the banking system to lend". 
As much as it is difficult to use monetary aggregates as an instrument of 0 
monetary policy for the reasons alluded to above, it is equally difficult, for 
similar reasons, to use a monetary aggregate as an intermediate variable. As for 
the exchange rate, not only is it vulnerable to speculative attacks, which could 
highly destabilise the economy, it also inhibits the central bank's ability to 
practice an independent monetary policy. Figure 1 below presents a graphical 
presentation of the above described monetary policy framework. Whereas the 
framework is popular among quite a number of central banks, recentlv there has I 
been a move, by several large central banks, away from this framework. Even 
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though it has served well in the past, the controversy around the choice of 
instrument and the intermediate target variables and the stability of their 
economic relationship has recently made it less attractive. 
Figure 1.1: A Typical Monetary Policy Framework 
Instrument (s) 
i. Short-term policy 
in te re st ra te 
iii. Open Market 
Operations (OMO) 
Intermediate Variable(s) 
e. g., L Monetary Aggregates; or 
ii. Long-term interest rates; or 
Objective 
pp Inflation 
I 
iii. nominal Excliange Rates; or 
iv. Credit Growth 
Instead, there is a tremendous support for targeting inflation directly, which 
tends to be more credible than the former. Ramaswamy (1997) states that, 
....... the historical experience in a number of countries has weakened the case for 
anchoring monetary policy to an intermediate target, and that targeting inflation 
directly may be a better option for monetary policy". Of the inflation targeters, 
he further notes that, "the success of this framework (at least for now) in these 
countries has led to a growing belief that low inflation is best achieved by 
targeting inflation directly, rather than relying on intermediate targets to do this 
indirectly". 
Ideas behind directly targeting inflation are not necessarily new. However, the 
framework was popularised in the 1990s when New Zealand (1990), Canada and 
Israel (1991), and the United Kingdom (UK) in 1992 adopted inflation targeting 
frameworks. it appears that many more central banks are/or will soon follow 
the trend. In this framework, inflation becomes the only objective and other 
variables (from both the supply side and the demand side) are used as indicators 
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and often summarised in the form of inflation forecasts. In essence, inflation 
forecasting assumes the role of an intermediate variable/target in which case, a 
higher inflation forecast than target results in tightening of policy while a lower 
inflation forecast than the target suggests loosening of policy. Inflation targeting 
is believed to offer more accountability in that it is easy to judge whether the 
objective has been met or not. Central banks on the other hand feel obliged or in 
many cases, they are required by law to account for a miss in the target in order 
to improve monetary policy credibility. That is one of the reasons why central 
banks that have adopted this framework issue regular inflation reports in order 
to inform the public of their inflation forecasts, explain factors expected to drive 
inflation in a particular direction, their policy responses, etc. 
just like other frameworks, inflation targeting has its problems. There is the 
question of which inflation measure to target. The operation of monetary policy 
focuses on regulating demand pressures. It is important that the chosen measure 
of inflation discounts the occasional large influences on prices that do not reflect 
demand pressures and the underlying inflation trend, but may be due to external 
influences such as supply shocks and changes in administered prices. 
Conventional measures of headline inflation, usually calculated using the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), do not satisfy these requirements. Major inflation 
targeters have, as a result, adopted different core or underlying inflation 
measures. Though these measures can be derived from a variety of methods, the 
most commonly used approaches are smoothing by excluding certain 
consistently volatile items in the CPI or statistical approaches, which include the 
trimmed mean, weighted median, etc (see for example, Cecchetti, S. G., (1997), 
Roger, S., (1997 & 1998)). Meanwhile, even though these measures are good for 
policy purposes, the general public nonetheless appreciates them less. It is 
therefore common practice to quote core inflation figures alongside the headline 
inflation figures. 
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One other issue that is worth highlighting is that of the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Though generally agreed that monetary policy is a very important 
stabilisation tool, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge the fact that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy depends on a number of factors, including the 
structure of the economy, the exchange rate regime in place, openness of the 
economv, which determines the degree of capital mobility, etc. For example, the 
Mundell-Fleming model, suggests that monetary policy under flexible exchange 
rate and capital mobility, is effective, i. e., monetary expansion results in higher 
output with interest rates at international levels. However, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, monetary policy is only effective in the short-run, i. e., 
output expansion following a monetary expansion is only temporary. The 
Dornbusch model that assumes fixed prices and incorporates expectations into 
the analysis also arrives at the same conclusions as those of the Mundell-Fleming 
model (Dornbusch (1976a)). Introducing flexible prices into the model, 
Dornbusch (1976b) suggests that monetary expansion affects domestic output 
through two channels, i. e., through exchange rate depreciation and a fall in 
domestic interest rates. Further, since the depreciation of the exchange rate 
reduces relative prices of domestic goods, aggregate demand for domestic goods 
increases over and above their supply, which in turn leads to inflationary 
pressures (inflation increases) but does not affect output. Under this framework, 
a monetary expansion leads to an increase in inflation. 
Other important factors that influence the effectiveness of monetary policy 
include the state of development of the financial system in an economy as well as 
the monetary regime in place. This is particularly important in most developing 
African states which are still at their earliest stages of financial sector 
development (see 1.2 for the monetary regimes in Africa). For example, Ndungu 
(2004), states that "... In the long run effective monetary instruments will benefit 
the economy by enhancing the efficiency of financial intermediation and 
ensuring a more effective monetary control. This is because effective monetary 
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policy (or indirect instruments of monetary policy) requires a developed 
financial market. On the other hand, financial sector development win also 
depend on the appropriate monetary policy. Thus, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy will be either facilitated or hampered by the developments in the financial 
system". Further, Ncube, (2004), states that, "The existence of monetary control 
is facilitated by the existence of well functioning capital markets, while indirect 
monetary instruments contribute to the further deepening of the financial 
markets". He further states that, "Financial markets are sources of economic 
signals that are fully capable of transmitting monetary actions through the use of 
indirect instruments to various market participants, with the result being an 
effective monetary control among market participants". Ayogu and Emenuga 
(2004), states that in Nigeria, "... monetary policy plays an accommodating role 
to government expenditure. The central bank first submissively finances the 
resulting deficit, and then seeks afterwards to mitigate the adverse 
macroeconomic effects of such unbridled debt financing. Unfortunately, some of 
the damage control measures generate more instability in the system". Other 
research work which indicate that monetary policy in developing countries of 
Africa may not be effective given the underdeveloped nature of their financial 
systems and monetary regimes include Kasekende and Michael (2004); and Sowa 
(2004) who state that, "since independence, Ghana has had the opportunity to 
control and manage its monetary and financial system through its central bank", 
and that "this opportunity has never been exercised to the fullest for a variety of 
reasons. These include undue interference by government in the operations of 
the Bank of Ghana (fiscal operation by government) and hence the lack of 
independence by the central bank compromise monetary policy". Other related 
studies include those by Asea, P., Ncube, M., and Leape, J., (2004), Harris, L., 
(2004); Kimei (2004) and Ndungu (2004). 
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1.5 Objectives of the study 
The main objective of this study is to estimate the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Botswana; to establish the various channels through which 
monetary policy impacts on the economy. It is widely agreed that monetary 
policy impact on the wider economy through various channels and the 
importance of each transmission channel depends on different factors, which are 
country specific (see for example a survey of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in "The journal of Economic Perspective, Fall 1995"). It is hoped that 
the estimation of the transmission mechanism for Botswana will help us identify 
the most active or strongest transmission channel of monetary policy. It is 
however, imperative that certain factors on the Botswana economy are clearly 
spelled out in order to make more realistic assumptions with regard to the 
transmission of monetary policy in Botswana, bearing in mind that the 
transmission mechanism is, to a large extent, driven by country specific factors. 
This is done in chapter 2 and from the monetary developments indicted therein; 
we have come to the following conclusions, which also form our testable 
hypotheses: 
a. there is a strong link between the short-term policy interest rate and 
short-term money market rates; 
b. the link between the short-term policy interest rate and the long-term 
money market rate is weak or, at best, uncertain and this also implies a 
weak link between the short-term policy interest rate and key 
components of aggregate demand (consumption and investment); 
C. the exchange rate channel is not active given the fixed exchange rate 
regime in Botswana (the Pula is pegged to a basket of currencies) and 
that there is a strong and direct link between foreign (especially, South 
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Africa) prices and those of Botswana; and 
d. Given the dominance of the banking sector in the financial system, 
both the bank lending and balance sheet transmission channels are 
(expected to be) strong. 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
Studies of the transmission mechanism in developing countries in Africa are 
lacking. This could be due to the fact that it was not long ago, i. e., around the 
1990s as indicated in 1.3 above, that countries in Africa started adopting the more 
modem central bank operations in a market-based economic and financial 
system characterised by indirect monetary policy. Such operations require an 
understanding of the transmission mechanism; that is probably why the 
developed countries that have long adopted this regime are way ahead in their 
knowledge of the transmission mechanism. Developed countries, including the 
United Kingdom, United States of America, New Zealand, Canada, etc., are far 
more advanced in this area and a lot of research papers on the subject of the 
transmission mechanism have been published in various economic journals. 
Unfortunately, for developing countries, especially in Africa, such research work 
is very limited or almost non-existent. For example, we know of no published 
research on the transmission mechanism in Botswana. Bank of Botswana records 
do not show if there has been any research work in this area despite the fact that 
the Bank of Botswana has been in existence since 1976, when Botswana 
terminated her membership of the then Rand Monetary Area and established an 
independent monetary regime. Without an empirical analysis of the 
transmission mechanism in Botswana, one is inclined to conclude that the Bank 
of Botswana's monetary policy framework and its conduct of monetary policy 
are guided more by economic theory than the monetary authorities' 
understanding of the country's transmission mechanism. It could also be that the 
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Bank of Botswana's monetary policy was modelled alongside that of her colonial 
master, England. As Honohan and O'Connel (1997) pointed out that, "African 
countries' financial systems, hence their monetary policies were modelled 
alongside those of their political powers". Without a thorough understanding of 
the transmission mechanism, the Bank of Botswana is likely to commit policy 
errors that could be disastrous to the economy. Similarly, there appear to be no 
studies on the subject of the transmission mechanism in African countries, except 
a few including South Africa. Lack of empirical analysis of the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Botswana and developing countries of Africa in 
general, is the main motivating factor behind this thesis. TIds thesis is therefore, 
a major contribution to knowledge on this subject in Botswana in particular and 
Africa, in general. Most importantly, the kind of quantitative analysis adopted in 
this thesis, that applies three different and tested techniques (the Narrative 
Approach, Vector Autoregression analysis and estimation of a structural model) 
is the first of its kind in Botswana. It is also hoped that this study shall inspire 
other researchers, especially from Africa to research extensively in this area. 
Africa and African countries do not exist in isolation; the winds of globalisation 
are sweeping across all continents and with them, the challenges of monetary 
policy are ever increasing and call for a better understanding of the transmission 
mechanism. Although this stud), may not answer all the questions one may 
want to ask, it nevertheless provides a basis for further research in this area. 
1.7 Data and Methodological Issues 
We acknowledge and also appreciate the importance of estimating the 
transmission mechanism from monetary policy point of view. However, we also 
have to accept the fact that estimating the transmission mechanism in any 
economy is not easy, let alone in a small economy with relatively less developed 
financial markets like Botswana. In the empirical analysis of the transmission 
mechanism, different approaches have been used. However, it is also important 
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to acknowledge the fact that no single method can fully overcome the difficulties 
in assessing the transmission mechanism. Each method has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. One of the complications results from data availability 
and/or quality. In most cases, especially in developing countries like Botswana, 
either we have very short series for some variables, or the quality/ accuracy of 
data is questionable. The data may also be unavailable at certain frequencies, 
which heavily inhibit the effective use of some methods. 
To help address some of the problems encountered in estimating the 
transmission mechanism, three key methods shall be adapted to help assess the 
transmission mechanism in Botswana. These are the vector autoregression 
analysis (the VAR approach); the narrative approach; and the structural 
approach (estimating a small structural model for the Botswana economy). Both 
statistical and graphical analyses are conducted in order to better understand the 
relationships between key transmission variables. Data are drawn mostly from 
the Bank of Botswana publications such as the Annual Report, Botswana 
Financial Statistics booklets, as well as data from Botswana's statistical agency, 
the Central Statistics Office. Data not available from these publications are 
drawn from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)s International Financial 
Statistics. We are interested in monthly, quarterly and annual data from 1984 to 
2004. Tlie starting date for the analysis changes depending on the availability of 
the relevant data. 
1.8 Conclusion and organisation of the thesis. 
In this chapter, we have briefly discussed the conduct of monetary policy. We 
have also looked at how monetary regimes have developed in Africa from one 
extreme case, the currency boards, to the most recently favoured framework 
(inflation targeting). The effectiveness of monetary policy under different 
conditions was also discussed, albeit briefly. The transmission mechanism was 
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also defined in this chapter, noting that the importance of different transmission 
channels depends, to a large extent, on country specific factors. Tlie remainder 
of this thesis is structured as follows; Chapter 2 looks at monetary develo ments Ip 
in Botswana since independence, with particular reference to interest rate and 
exchange rate policies, and their implications for the transmission mechanism. A 
literature review of the transmission mechanism is the subject of chapter 3, while 
chapter 4 deals with the structure of the Botswana economy and some data 
issues. Chapter 5 looks at the "narrative" approach to estimating the 
transmission mechanism with particular reference to Botswana. Another 
approach to estimating the transmission mechanism, the vector autoregression 
(VAR) approach is a subject of chapter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the structural 
approach to the transmission mechanism where a small structural 
macroeconomic model for Botswana is estimated. The performance of the model 
is a subject of chapter 8 where the model is solved under different assumptions 
or is subjected to various shocks in order to assess its predictions of the economy 
under different scenarios. Finally, chapter 9 provides overall concluding 
remarks, policy implications, as well as highlighting some issues for further 
investigation. 
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Chapter 2 
Monetary Developments in Botswana since Independence and their 
Implications for the Transmission Mechanism 
2.1 Introduction 
During the ten years following political independence, Botswana was part of 
what was known as the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) and did not have her own 
currency. Other RMA member countries were South Africa, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. Namibia joined the RMA at a later date following its political 
independence. All members of the RMA used the South African currency, the 
Rand. According to Harvey (1985) the RMA, later called the Common Currency 
Area (CCA), did not have any formal arrangements governing its operations. 
Negotiations to formalise the currency area were completed after Bot5wana had 
left the common currency area and established independent monetary 
arrangements. 
However, being part of the monetary area had its own advantages and Harvey 
(1985) cites the following as the main advantages: 
a) that "being part of the RMA made it impossible for the Government of 
Botswana and Swaziland to finance budget deficits by money creation 
(so-called "borrowing" from a central bank-), provided of course that 
the South African Reserve Bank did not finance Government deficits in 
Botswana and Swaziland; 
b) With hindsight, the decision of most other African countries to create 
their own monetary systems and national central banks was extremely 
costly,. There was enormous pressure on Governments to spend more 
31 
than the), could raise in taxation, by borrowing other than from their 
central banks, and from aid receipts. Resistance to this pressure was 
weak, and became one of the main causes of economic problems iri 
Africa; 
C) the absence of exchange controls on transactions with South Africa 
(and with each other, although the level of such transactions was 
negligible) reduced the costs and inconvenience of investment and 
trade, including tourism; 
all transactions within the monetary area were free of any exchange 
rate risk; 
e) there were no costs of exchanging one currency for another; and 
Residents could invest in the well developed financial markets in 
South Africa". 
Meanwhile, the associated costs were very substantial as well. Most importantly, 
Botswana did not have independent control over monetary and exchange rate 
policies and was simply part of the South African monetary system. TI-ie South 
African authorities set interest rates, exchange rates and the exchange controls 
with the rest of the world with little regard to their impact on other member 
countries. Furthermore, the two branches of commercial banks operating in 
Botswana were South African banks owned by the British so that all the rules on 
liquidity considerations and other related banking regulations were set by the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa. There was therefore no significant difference 
between Botswana's interest rates and those in South Africa, more so that there 
were no exchange controls between the member countries of the RMA. In short, 
all the major policy decisions were taken by the South African Reserve Bank with 
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no consideration of their impact on the other smaUer member countries. 
With a per capita income of US$69 at independence in 1966, Botswana was 
classified as one of the poorest countries in the world and relied heavily on the 
British government grants and other grants to finance her recurrent budget 
deficit British grants ceased in 1971/72 and this was considered much quicker 
than expected as it was envisaged that, given the poor state of the economy, 
Botswana would rely on grants for an extended period of time. At that time 
there was little physical and social infrastructure to form the basis for economic 
growth and development However, with the discovery and exploitation of 
diamonds in the early 1970s and earl), 1980s, the country's economy was rapidly 
transformed. jefferis and Harvey (1995), indicate that for much of the 25 years 
after independence, Botswana was "one of the world's fastest growing 
economies, with an average annual growth rate of 12.8% between 1965 and 
1990". The IMF Country Report of April 2005 indicates that, "Botswana's 
economic growth rate averaging slightly over 7 percent over the past two 
decades has been among the highest in the developing world". It further notes 
that, "with a per capita GNP of US$4,732 (2004 estimate), Botswana is one of only 
a few African states classified as a lower middle-income country". 
Following the discovery and mining of diamonds, foreign exchange reserves 
started to build up quickly. These developments meant that there was a need to 
have separate monetary and exchange rate policies from those of South Africa, 
which was operating under different economic and political environment. In 
fact, Harvey (1985), noted that, "TI-ie South African economy, in contrast, was 
suffering from a low gold price and low foreign exchange reserves, and so 
needed wholly different policies. In addition, South Africa had always held an 
exceptionally high proportion of its foreign exchange reserves in gold (as high as 
95 per cent at times) presumably for historical and tactical reasons. Botswana did 
not share those motives for holding gold, but was prevented from choosing its 
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own investment strategy while the RMA's foreign exchange reserves were 
(virtually) all held by the South African Reserve Bank" 
Given the aforementioned economic and monetary developments, the Botswana 
authorities considered it worthwhile to establish separate and independent 
monetary arrangements. The decision to withdraw from the RMA was heavily 
criticised in some quarters. For example, the monetary preparatory committee, 
which was appointed to consider the pros and cons of establishing an 
independent monetary system, concluded that monetary independence was 
beneficial. It however, raised concern about "the risks Botswana would run into 
if it managed its own currency. These were the same concerns also raised by the 
IMF. TI-ie IMF advised "strongly against a monetary independence on technical 
grounds, arguing that the extreme openness of Botswana's economy" and "the 
likely fluctuations in the balance of payments would require Botswana to hold 
exceptionally large reserves, at levels higher than the Botswana authorities could 
afford to maintain, given the country's poor long-term prospects" (Hermans; 
(1996)). There were also concerns about the value and stability of the newly 
issued national currency. However, the authorities went ahead with their 
decision, despite the strong opposition, and in 1976 Botswana established her 
own central bank, the Bank of Botswana, and introduced her own currency, the 
Pula, in August the same year. According to Hermans (1996), the objectives of 
the Bank of Botswana were stated as: 
a) To promote and maintain internal and external monetary stability, an 
efficient payments mechanism and the liquidity, solvency and proper 
functioning of a soundly based monetary, credit and financial system in 
Botswana; 
b) To foster monetary, credit and financial conditions conducive to orderly, 
balanced and sustained economic development of Botswana; and 
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C) To assist, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the objects as set out in (a) 
and (b), in the attainment of national economic goals. 
The objectives of monetary policy were then stated as: supporting the balance of 
payments; maintaining a liberal foreign exchange regime; and avoiding sharp 
shifts in aggregate demand (Hermans, 1996). According to Hermans, although 
the objective of price stability was not explicitly stated, it was hoped that the 
above objectives were the means to achieving price stability. 
2.2 The Exchange Rate Policy 
At the time of its introduction, the Pula was pegged to the United States Dollar 
(US$) at the rate of Pl=US$1.15. Since the South African Rand was also pegged 
to the US$ at the same rate, this meant that the Pula and the Rand were 
effectively traded on a one-to-one basis (i. e., Pl=Rl). However, in April 1977, 
there was a revaluation of the Pula to P1=R1.05 in order to help curb imported 
inflation from South Africa. Tlie South African authorities had reduced subsidies 
on maize meal production, which led to an increase in maize meal prices, one of 
Botswana's key imports. There was also an increase in railway tariffs, an 
increase in certain sales and exercise duties and others, which were bound to 
increase import prices and hence fuel inflationary pressures in Botswana. So, an 
exchange rate revaluation was considered the most suitable policy measure to 
mitigate against the envisaged rise in inflation (Harvey (1985); Gaolatlhe and 
Hudson (1989)). However, besides these economic reasons, the revaluation was 
also for "strategic and psychological reasons; to demonstrate that the Pula was a 
strong currency independent of the Rand and to effectively punish those who 
had continued to base most of their financial business in Rand", (Hermans 
(1987)). 
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Following an appreciation of the Rand against the US$, which by now had been 
taken off the US$ peg and allowed to float, the Pula depreciated against the Rand 
to P1=R1.01, raising fears of increased import prices. Consequently, there was 
another revaluation of the Pula to P1=R1.05 as a disinflation policy measure in 
September 1979. Having been allowed to float, the Rand began to fluctuate a lot 
against the US$ and equally so against the Pula. To reduce these undesirable 
fluctuations of the Pula against the Rand, the authorities decided to peg the Pula 
against a basket of currencies comprising the Rand and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)'s Special Drawing Rights (SDR)3. The Rand had a weight 
of 50 per cent and the other 50 per cent were shared proportionately between the 
SDR currencies. 
The allocation of the basket weights was based on trade patterns between 
Botswana and South Africa, on the one hand, and Botswana and the SDR 
countries on the other. TI-ie relatively larger weight assigned to the South African 
Rand was in recognition of the fact that Botswana imports were mostly from 
South Africa and also that South Africa was a very important market for 
Botswana's non-traditional exports. Even though Europe and the United States 
were considered important markets for Botswana's traditional exports; 4 , these 
were nevertheless not considered to be sensitive to exchange rate movements. 
Harvey states that "it was considered important to choose a basket that would 
give the Pula as much stability as possible against the country's main trading 
currencies, avoid as much imported inflation as was practicable, and maintain 
the competitiveness of producers who had to compete with imports or in exports 
markets". 
3 The SDR was then made up of the USA Dollar, British Pound, Japanese Yen, German Mark and 
the French Franc. 
4 Traditional Exports include Diamonds, Copper-Nickel and Beef. These are excluded in the 
definition of non-traditional Exports. 
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There was another revaluation (i. e., the authorities' decision to raise the value of 
the currency) in 1980, again, as an anti-inflation measure. Following a series of 
revaluations of the currency to fight inflation, in 1982, the exchange rate was 
used as a policy tool to stabilise what was considered to be the first major balance 
of payments (BoP) crisis since both political and monetary independence. 
Harvey noted that towards the end of 1980, the market for gem diamonds 
(Botswana's major foreign currency earner) began to perform very badly, but 
most severely during the period towards the end of 1981 and the begirming of 
1982. Diamond exports almost came to an end; foreign exchange reserves started 
to fall quickly. Given the experience from other African countries, the authorities 
did not adopt a "wait and see" attitude hoping that the market would soon 
recover. Policy interventions were initiated at the earliest opportunity possible. 
Since the aim was to avoid assigning too much burden on one policy instrument, 
the exchange rate was not the only policy option considered. Consequently, 
other policy measures adopted included the following: 
a) limits on the increase in commercial bank lending, backed by increased 
official liquidity requirements; 
b) increased interest rates; 
C) incomes policy; 
d) reduction in government spending; 
e) increases in taxation; 
0 devaluation; and 
g) Foreign borrowing. 
All these measures were intended to reduce overall expenditure in the economy. 
The credit ceiling, increase in liquidity requirements and increase in interest rates 
would reduce credit growth, which had been accelerating following the mining 
and construction booms. Increases in taxation would increase Government 
revenue while the reduction in spending would improve the Government budget 
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position. Meanwhile, devaluation was intended to increase competitiveness of 
the country's exports in international markets. On the income policy, the 
Government decided not to increase salaries of civil servants, which was done on 
an annual basis, circumstances permitting. This also reduced the Government's 
recurrent expenditure. On foreign borrowing, the Government had the option to 
draw the remaining amount from a Euro loan already negotiated, but never 
used. The Government had also access to IMF balance of payments finance, 
which would have been cheaper than commercial borrowing. These options 
were not used since the other policy measures which had already been 
implemented "had a rapid impact on the foreign exchange reserves", (Harvey, 
1985). Most importantly, the diamond market recovered very quickly. Since 
then there were a series of revaluations and devaluation aimed at fighting 
inflation and improving competitiveness as and when was considered necessary. 
However, since the 1991 devaluation of the Pula, the thrust of the exchange rate 
policy has been to maintain competitiveness relative to the Rand by modest 
adjustments5 of the nominal exchange rate, supported by slightly restrictive 
monetary, fiscal and wage policies", Leith (1996). The authorities had realised 
that domestic prices were not sensitive to changes in the exchange rate and that 
changes to the exchange rate for anti-inflation purposes invariably affects the 
competitiveness of the non-traditional export industries. As a result, the use of 
exchange rate to fight inflation was discontinued and the key exchange rate 
policy objective was to maintain a stable real exchange rate with the rand. It was 
hoped that this would promote investment in non-traditional export industries 
(Harvey (1996)). Consequently, from 1994 until the third quarter of 2000, the 
exchange rate of the Pula against the rand was maintained within a specified 
range through discrete changes to the basket weights whenever the exchange 
rate reached either end of the established exchange rate bands. From the fourth 
quarter of 2000 onwards, the basket mechanism was left to operate freelv. I 
5 This involves slightly altering the basket weights and/or the "adjustment factor" that forms part 0 
of the basket mechanism. 
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However, in February 2004, the Pula was devalued by 7.5 per cent against the 
basket to restore international competitiveness. This followed the continued 
appreciation of the South African Rand against the SDR currencies and since the 
Rand has a relatively larger weight in the basket, the Pula also appreciated 
against the SDR currencies. 
Meanwhile, due to the basket mechanism the Pula also appreciated against the 
Rand, a development that the authorities considered detrimental to the country's 
export performance. Currently, Botswana operates a crawling peg exchange 
rate system which was adopted in May '7005. The framework for the 
determination of the Pula exchange rate consists of the following elements: 
a) The Pula continues to be pegged to a basket of currencies consisting of 
major trading partners, namely, the South African Rand and Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund, comprised 
of the US Dollar, the Euro, the British Pound and the Japanese Yen; 
b) The exchange rate of the Pula to the basket will be adjusted 
continuously rather than in discrete steps; 
C) The margin between the buy and seH rates for currencies quoted by the 
Bank of Botswana was increased from +/-0.125 percent around the 
central rate to a margin of +/-0.5 percent. 
2.3 Exchange Controls 
In chapter 1, we observed that the existence or lack of capital mobility has a 
major impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy. As noted by Mabe (1996), 
"Exchange controls could stifle the development of the financial system in that 
they put some limitations on financial instruments in which residents are 
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permitted to deal". The financial system plays a key role in the transmission of 
monetary policy in the economy. In order for actions by the monetary 
authorities to be transmitted through the economy, the financial market has to 
have enough financial instruments and the necessary depth. Alternatively, 
residents ought to have access to foreign financial markets as well. Likewise, 
foreigners should also have access to the domestic financial mark-ets. These 
should increase competition, which should also lead to financial innovation and 
efficiency in the financial system. 
Abolishing capital controls allows for free capital mobility between the domestic 
and international economies so that iri the long run domestic interest rates, which 
measure the cost of capital, equal international rates. In the case of a floating 
exchange rate svstem, the difference between international and domestic rates 
should only reflect the expected exchange rate appreciation/ depreciation and a 
risk premium of financial assets denominated in the home currency. In the case 
of a fixed exchange rate regime, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) reduces 
to the risk premium only since the exchange rate is not expected to change. 
just like many other developing countries in Africa and elsewhere, Botswana 
introduced exchange controls immediately after obtaining monetary 
independence and the introduction of the national currency, having operated 
under South African exchange controls before independence. Botswana was 
allowed, under Article XIV of the IMF's articles of association, to impose 
restrictions on current and capital account transactions. Under the exchange 
control regulations and manual, "virtually every kind of transaction, involving 
either payments in foreign exchange, or obligations which could result in future 
claims against Botswana's foreign exchange reserves, covering capital as well as 
current transactions, was regulated", Hermans; (1996). According to Jefferies and 
Harvey (1995), the introduction of exchange controls in Botswana was based on 
the premise that 
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a. foreign currency should be available as freely as possible for current 
account transactions, so that most imports of goods and services were 
allowed, as were dividend payments to foreign shareholders of 
businesses in Botswana and interest payments on foreign loans; and 
b. Capital outflows were relatively tightly controlled, so that residents 
were not in general permitted to maintain foreign bank accounts and 
keep their savings oversees, or indeed to own any other kind of foreign 
financial asset. 
From the above guiding principles, it is evident that controls on current 
transactions were relatively more relaxed whereas capital controls were 
comparably very strict. Jefferis and Harvey argue that this strategy was adopted 
for the following reasons: First, since the country had just introduced its national 
currency, the authorities were not certain of the confidence that investors or the 
public in general had on the new currency. Adopting loose capital controls 
would allow the public to hold foreign currency accounts and, in the process, 
undermine the new currency. It was also felt that "being a capital importing 
country, the country could not afford the luxury of allowing residents to invest 
abroad. Therefore, the general principle was to contain unnecessary foreign 
capital outflows thereby trying to ensure that available resources would be used 
locally in the best national interest", Mabe (1996). The second consideration was 
with regard domestic assets. It was believed that since total domestic assets were 
largely in the hands of foreigners, adopting less strict capital controls would 
enable foreigners to withdraw their assets from Botswana within a short period 
of time. That would cause Botswana's foreign exchange reserves to fall sharply 
and lead to a shortage of local savings to finance local investment. Capital 
outflows would also reduce the tax base. FinalIV, under the exchange control 
regulations, foreign owned companies were required to bring a certain amount 
of capital from external sources, by not allowing their local borrowing to exceed 
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a specified proportion of the total required capital. However, unlike in other 
developing countries, exchange controls in Botswana were not used to maintain 
an overvalued exchange rate, or to determine which imports would be permitted 
(jefferis and Harvey (1995) and Mabe (1996)). 
Botswana has experienced rapid economic growth since 1967, one year after 
independence, owning mainly to the discovery and subsequent mining of 
minerals, especially diamonds. During this period, the importance of exchange 
controls diminished even though they still remained in place, since it was 
believed that they did not hinder economic development in any way. However, 
when the economy started to experience problems in the early 1990s, exchange 
controls were viewed very differently. Unemployment started to increase as 
economic growth slowed down and "exchange controls became more widely 
perceived as an obstacle to business efficiency and a disincentive to foreign 
investment", Hermans (1996). Administration of exchange controls was also a 
costly affair for both commercial banks and the central bank. Following 
intensive lobbying by the Bank of Botswana and the business community in 
Botswana, the Government began to appreciate the importance of abandoning 
exchange controls, even though they were perceived as more liberal compared to 
those prevailing in other African countries. However, instead of an outright 
abolition of the exchange controls, the government opted for a gradual approach 
to finally abolish the controls in a few years' time. Hermans noted that the 
exchange control manual was amended in 1995 to make it generally easier for 
residents to acquire foreign exchange, and introduced annual capital allowances 
for external investment for the first time, available to both individuals and firms. 
The progressive liberalisation of the exchange controls led to a complete abolition 
of current account controls by the end of 1995. Controls on the capital account 
were left in place, but gradually relaxed until they were finally abolished in 1999. 
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Meanwhile, it has been argued that even though Botswana had exchange 
controls in place, the), may not have been as effective as they were initially 
intended to be. Some of the reasons are that; the openness of the economy 
facilitated the exploitation of leads and lags in international payments and the 
ease of disguising capital account transactions as current transactions. Capital 
may also have been transferred throug. 1i some illegal means such as the over- 
invoicing of imports aefferis and Harvey (1995)). 
2.4 Interest Rate Policy 
Up to the late 1980s and early 1990, the Bank of Botswana used interest rates and 
the exchange rate for the conduct of monetary policy in preference to other 
instruments such as the control of money supply and the reserve requirement 
ratio. Meanwhile, money supply and credit controls were only used in 1982 as 
part of the package of measures introduced to address the Balance of Payments 
and budgetary problems occasioned by the downturn in the diamond market. 
As noted above, exchange rate policy was initially used as an anti-inflation tool 
and latter used to promote the non-traditional export sector, while at the same 
time having to also accomplish the task of curbing imported inflation. However, 
the authorities realised how difficult it was to achieve the two conflicting 
objectives, and therefore abandoned the anti-inflation objective and focused the 
exchange rate more on the competitiveness objective. Meanwhile, the interest 
rate policy has also evolved over time. Originally, the authorities decided to 
adopt a policy of low interest rates. Hermans argues that the belief was that, 
"keeping interest rates low would promote investment and economic growth 
and that exchange controls would be effective in preventing the oufflow of 
domestic savings to money and capital markets offering higher returns". 
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The Bank of Botswana used the powers conferred on it by both the Bank of 
Botswana Act and the Financial Institutions Act to impose ceilings on 
commercial banks lending rates and floors on their deposit rates. It was believed 
that this policy would not harm the profitability of commercial banks, which 
were thought to be already highly profitable. For example, a study by the Bank 
of Botswana in 1984 had revealed that interest rates paid by commercial banks on 
deposits averaged 4.65 percent while interest rates charged on loans averaged 
14.44 percent, thus implying a spread of 9.79 percent. As a result, it was 
concluded that commercial banks in Botswana were highly profitable by both 
international and regional standards, therefore providing an opportunity to 
reduce their lending rates without adversely eroding their profitability (Setlhare 
(2002)). 
The Bank of Botswana did not only set ceilings on lending rates and floors on 
deposit rates but also reduced interest rates on the call account deposits. 
Hermans argues that the call account was introduced at the Bank of Botswana in 
1976 to enable commercial banks to earn some interest on the excess liquidity in 
the system, previously easily absorbed by the money market in South Africa. 
Excess liquidity in the system was a direct result of the country's remarkable 
growth performance. This coupled with exchange controls on the capital account 
that limited the extent to which residents invested funds overseas meant that the 
accumulation of large deposits associated with the country's mineral wealth 
outstripped the opportunities for productive investment (Bank of Botswana 
Annual Report, 1993). Excess liquidity refers to that portion of commercial 
banks' funds that is not on-lent, or used to maintain the necessary reserves (Bank 
of Botswana (1993)). 
During the 1980s, the situation took a dramatic turn when commercial banks, 
which were all foreign owned, refused to accept large deposits from companies 
and the public in reaction to the control on interest rates. This forced the Bank of 
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Botswana to assume the role of "deposit taker of last resort". Treasury Bills, 
which were introduced in 1976 to promote the creation of a domestic money 
market, were discontinued in 1982. It was realised that they were not popular 
with the commercial banks which, instead, preferred to hold their excess funds in 
an easily accessible overnight call account facility at the Bank of Botswana 
(Hermans). Consequently, the Bank of Botswana opened the call account to 
members of the public as well as companies, subject to the maintenance of a 
minimum of P150 000. However, since nominal deposit rates were maintained at 
very low levels below the rate of inflation, real rates on deposits were negative. 
These discouraged savings while encouraging "liberal extension of credit to 
households and firms, often for unproductive purposes, at a rapidly expanding 
and ultimately unsustainable rate (Hermans). 
According to the Bank of Botswana Annual Report of 1993, "the low interest rate 
policy achieved different results than those intended by the policy makers. 
Household savings were discouraged since real interest rates became negative 
due to high inflation rates. Credit to households and firms exploded, mostly for 
unproductive ends such as purchases of consumer durables. As a corollary, the 
household sector was a net debtor up until 1993". The low interest rate strategy 
also induced firms to invest in capital intensive projects which were undesirable 
for a country with high rate of unemployment (Clarke (1992)). 
These events prompted the Bank of Botswana to take a move towards financial 
liberallsation. Financial sector liberalisation refers to the implementation of 
policies that reduce the restrictiveness of controls on the workings of financial 
markets (Moloi, 1996). This includes the development of money markets; 
adoption of indirect monetary control systems, and establishing a strong 
supervisory framework (Guitian, 1994). Accordingly, financial liberalisation 
more often involve deregulating the financial sector; improve the monetary 
policy framework; promote competition in the financial sector; improve 
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infrastructures and deepen financial markets; and strengthen prudential 
regulation and the supervisory framework (Moloi). 
From 1989, the authorities decided to adopt a more market oriented or indirect 
use of monetary policy instruments. 'n-ie low interest rate policy was abandoned 
and interest rate ceilings on lending rates and floors on deposit rates were 
removed so that commercial banks could determine their interest rates, bank 
charges and commissions. Interest on the call account facility was also increased 
gradually from 6.9 percent in 1989 to 11 percent in March 1991. According to 
Hermans, "the objective of the interest policy shifted to that of "maintaining 
moderately positive real interest rates to encourage saving and to ensure that 
loans were channelled primarily for productive purposes". Other than 
encouraging saving and channelling loans to productive investments, the 
objective of real positive rates was also intended to dampen consumption or 
demand in the economy and to also help fight inflation. This objective followed 
recommendations of a study by the World Bank and the IMF of Botswana's 
financial system. Besides maintaining positive rates, the report entitled, 
"Botswana: Financial Policies for Diversified Growth" also recommended the 
following: 
" Issuing of a short-term paper by the Bank of Botswana to help manage 
liquidity and develop the money market. By so doing, the Bank would be 
phasing out its role as a "deposit taker of last resort"; 
"a policy to generate more competition among commercial banks by 
encouraging new entrants, encouraging competition between non-bank 
financial institutions and commercial banks, and encouraging innovation in 
the range of financial services offered; 0 
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* to review the role and operations of Government's Public Debt Service Fund 
and Revenue Stabilisation Fund; and 
* The progressive curtailment of the role of the Government as the major 
source of funds for parastatals" investment. 
Following the broad recommendations of the report, the Bank of Botswana 
introduced its short-term paper, the Bank of Botswana Certificate (BoBC) in May 
1991 and discontinued the call facility in August the same year. BoBCs were 
intended to mop up excess liquidity ft-i the financial system, and hence help 
maintain positive real interest rates in the economy in line with those prevailing 
in the international capital markets. So, since 1991, the Bank of Botswana has 
indirectly influenced the level of market interest rates through adjustment of the 
Bank rate as well as engaging in open market operations (OMO). OMO involve 
the sale and purchase of BoBCs. Therefore, ONIO has become a key component 
of the conduct of monetary policy in Botswana and the Bank Rate, which is 
closely linked with interest rates on BoBCs, is the Bank's short-term policy rate. 
The Bank of Botswana uses, as an intermediate target, growth of credit to the 
private sector, with inflation being the objective variable. 
In addition to these initiatives, the Bank revised both the primary and liquid 
asset reserve requirement ratios in 1994 to help strengthen the effectiveness of 
monetairy policy. The ratios were revised from differentiated ratios for various 
classes of deposits to a uniform ratio for all kinds of bank deposits (Bank of 
Botswana Primer on Money and Banking, pg. 7 (1998)). In 1994 the reserve 
requirement ratio was set at 3.25 percent for all deposits categories (prior to this 
revision, the requirement ratios were as follows: 8 percent for demand deposits, 6 
percent for call deposits, and 3 percent for both savings and time deposits). The 
6 Parastatals are public or Government owned entities/ corporations such as the Water Utilities 
Corporation, Botswana Telecommunications Corporation, Botswana Power Corporation, 
Botswana Railways, etc. 
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liquid asset requirement ratio was revised to 10 percent for all liquid assets 
(before the revision, the asset requirement ratios were as follows: 35 percent for 
demand deposits, 25 percent for call deposits, and 10 percent for both time and 
savings deposits). It was believed that the old ratios reduced the profitability of 
commercial banks (the Bank of Botswana does not pay : interest on commercial 
banks' deposits); they also led to wider margins on commercial banks' loans. It 
was further noted that, different requirement ratios for different deposit facilities, 
as originally was the case, discouraged financial institutions from introducing 
deposit facilities more suitable for the needs of customers. Consequently, a 
system of uniform ratios on all deposit types was introduced. 
2.5 The current status of the Financial Sector in Botswana 
We have noted elsewhere in this chapter that, following monetary independence, 
the central bank exercised a considerable degree of direct controls over the 
operation of commercial banks. The central bank set maximum and minimum 
lending and deposit rates, respectively. Tl-ie bank also regulated the banking 
sector with regard to the number of commercial banks that could operate in the 
country at any particular point in time. 
Under the old Banking Act, the Bank of Botswana had to take into account 
whether the market could sustain an increased number of banks when 
considering banking applications. TIds gave protection to the already existing 
commercial banks and discouraged competition. Exchange controls on current 
and capital transactions were also imposed. However, following the financial 
sector reforms, which were started in 1986, the financial sector has undergone a 
considerable degree of transformation. With the Bank of Botswana not 
regulating the number of banks operating in the country, but only concerned 
with the competence of applicants, at the end of 2003, private sector banks 
serving the Botswana market comprised of five commercial banks and two 
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merchant banks. In addition, there are Government-owned financial institutions 
that carry out bank ing-rela ted functions in areas that are not adequately covered 
by the private sector. Other components of the Botswana financial sector are the 
stock exchange and stock broking firms, insurance companies and a growing 
number of pension funds and asset management companies, bureau de change 
and many micro lenders providing personal loans. 
For a long time before and after independence, Barclays Bank and Standard 
Chartered Bank were the only two commercial banks operating in the country. 
An increase from two to five commercial banks, by the end of 2003, was 
considered a positive development for a small economy like Botswana with a 
population of around 1.7 million (as at the end of 2005, the number of 
commercial banks had risen to six). It is therefore, generally agreed that the 
financial sector reforms have led to increased competition in the banking sector. 
In fact the Bank of Botswana Annual Report (2003), states that "the Botswana 
banking sector has experienced not only a significant increase in the number of 
participants but also a major technological transformation. n-ie expansion in the 
number of banks has been accompanied by an increase in the number of 
branches and agencies, business points, encashment points, ATNIs, and other 
facilities as a result of which access to banking services has been made easier 
than before". 
One other characteristic of the Botswana financial sector is that, commercial 
banks still dominate other financial intermediaries. At the end of 2004, 
commercial banks held 92.6 percent of total market deposits and accounted for 
88.8 percent of outstanding loans and advances. The banking industry in general 
is still highly profitable, financially sound, solvent and highly liquid. 
Furthermore, commercial banks maintain prudential ratios in excess of the 
statutory requirements. This could be a result of limited investment 
opportunities in the local capital markets. To this end, the IMF (2004) observed 
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that "with few opportunities for investment in the local capital markets, 
investinent abroad, as well as investment in the Bank of Botswana Certificates 
has increased significantly". One of the most worrying developments in the 
banking sector is that, as was the case in the 1980s, commercial banks are still 
reluctant to extend long-term loans. Commercial banking credit is still 
dominated by over drafts and loans of maturity not exceeding three years despite 
efforts from the Government to encourage long-term lending. 0 
The Government's role in the financial sector has also been reduced. Before the 
Government embarked on financial liberalisation, the Government operated 
three financing schemes. These were the Public Debt Service Fund (PDSF), 
established in 1973 originally meant to be an investment arm of the Government 
to help cover the costs of servicing government borrowing. It however, ended 
up as a vehicle for government lending, primarily to public enterprises or 
parastatals. Lending from PDSFvvas discontinued in 2002 when the Government 
decided that all public enterprises or parastatals should source their needed 
funds from the local and/or international financial markets. Consequently, the 
PDSF loan book was auctioned to the private sector in 2004. The othertiWo loan 
schemes were the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), which provided grants to 
new and expanding enterprises, and the Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises 
(SNINIE), which provided subsidised loans to citizen entrepreneurs. However, 
SMME was introduced well after financial liberalisation was initiated. It was 
considered ill conceived and therefore discontinued quickly. Outstanding 
operations of both FAP and SNINIE were transferred to the Citizen 
Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) which was established in 2001 to 
provide subsidised loans to commercially, viable commercial enterprises. 
The Government also replaced the defined-benefit pension scheme with the 
defined-contribution scheme in 2002 and also off loaded the running of the 
scheme to private pension fund managers. This further boosted the stock 
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market, which was established in 1989, as private pension fund managers 
transferred some of the funds to the stock markets and also resulted in a large 
capital outflow in the financial account of the balance of payment A further 
boost to the stock exchange was the listing of the Government bonds in January 
2005. TI-ie Government issued bonds for the first time in 2003 with maturities of 
2 years, 5 vears and 12 years prunarily intended to support capital market 
development given that the Government has no immediate need for the funds 
(Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 2003). The issuing of the Government bonds 
resulted in a representative sovereign yield curve to serve as a reference point for 
private and parastatal issuers. Other organisations that have issued and listed 
bonds on the stock exchange are the Botswana Development Corporation, the 
Botswana Building society, Barclays Bank, as well as Stanbic Bank. As noted in 
the 2005 Budget Speech, "the issuing of bonds by Government and local 
organisations, the securitisation of the PDSF loan book, and the listing of all these 
bonds on the Botswana Stock Exchange have helped to further develop the local 
capital market". 
2.6 Implication for the transmission mechanism 
From around 1989, the Bank of Botswana switched from direct to indirect 
instruments of monetary policy. With indirect monetary policy instruments (e. g., 
open market operations), the central bank influences money market interest rates 
as well as deposit and lending rates indirectly by changing items in its own 
balance sheet (e. g., stock of reserve money). By changing the stock of reserve 
money, the monetary authorities are able to alter the balance sheet of commercial 
banks. Consequently, the supply of reserves to the banking system is affected, so 
is the money supply in the economy through the money supply process. In this 
way financial asset pries are also affected. Under direct use of monetary 
instruments, the central bank directly alters items in the balance sheet of 
commercial banks. Under this regime, the role of financial system or the 
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financial market is non-existent. Put differently, under the direct controls, the 
financial system and financial market conditions play no role in the 
determination of financial prices and allocation of credit (Reinhart et al, 2003). 
The adoption of indirect instruments of monetary policy in Botswana was part of 
the broader financial sector reforms of 1986 necessitated by the need to 
encourage private-sector growth through a market based system. Being a 
mineral led economv, the authorities recognised the need for economic 
diversification and identified the private sector as an important partner in 
economic development Most Sub-Saharan countries undertook financial sector 
reforms within the framework of the INIF and World Bank supported structural 
adjustment programmes (SAP). Reinhart et al, state that "under these reforms, 
which constituted financial deregulation as one of the key components, countries 
were to grant their central banks more autonomy in conducting monetary policy, 
liberalise interest rates, avoid or abolish the direct control over allocation of 
credit, implement monetary policy through indirect instruments, restructure and 
privatise banks and, more generally 0ý, 
develop and foster the environment for 
proper functioning of financial markets in the hope of reversing decades of 
financial repression and enabling their economies to grow faster". 
Both financial repression and liberalisation/deregulation have implications for 
the transmission of monetary policy. Financial repression involves direct 
controls on key monetary variables (interest rates, credit, etc. ). When credit is 
directed to some specific sectors and interest rates on deposits and lending are 
set by the authorities, market prices are not a true reflection of the market 
conditions and distort the allocation of resources. In fact, controlled interest rates 
are an inaccurate reflection of capital scarcity, induce misallocation of resources 
and prohibit appropriate risk taking by financial institutions. In extreme cases, 
this promotes financial disin termed ia tion where investors develop a bias for non 
financial assets and/or foreign financial assets. Another characteristic of 
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excessively regulated financial markets is the co-existence of an informal 
financial sector that has serious implications for the ability of the mone", 
authorities to control the entire financial system. 
As noted above, 1986 marked the beginning of financial liberalisation in 
Botswana. Some of the consequences of financial liberalisation include increased 
competition between financial institutions, which requires these institutions to 
adopt and respond promptly to the ever changing market needs. Increased 
competition is a result of growth in the number of institutions in the economy 
and the opening up of the economy to foreign investors. TI-lese developments 
have implications for the conduct of monetary policy and the transmission 
channels of policy. On the positive side, financial deregulation assigns a greater 
role to markets in determining market prices and as such one would expect 
markets interest rates to fully reflect the true cost of capital. 
The resulting competition also ensures that financial institutions are efficient in 
allocating resources. This will also ensure that policy actions by the monetary 
authorities are transmitted through the economy quickly and also in the most 
efficient and effective manner, ie., financial deregulation is often associated with 
improved efficiency and a much greater range of financial services. 
Furthermore, removing controls on interest rates insures that they increase to 
levels that stimulate higher savings and reduce disintermediation. 
There is evidence to suggest that financial repression may lead to credit rationing 
that could starve some households and firms (especially small firms) of the 
needed credit. Liberalisation, which leads to abolition of credit controls and 
"reduction in reserve requirements may make more resources available for 
lending, especially to households. Also, a redirection of credit may favour 
consumers, loosening their liquidity constraints. At the microeconomic level, a 
privatised and more competitive banking sector may search the additional 
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business of consumer lending", (Reinhart et al). 
There are also indications that financial liberalisation. might also adversely affect 
some of the channels through which policy is transmitted. For example, the link 
between short-term policy interest rates and lono-term money market rates is 
weakened. By changing the short-term policy rate, monetary authorities seek to 
influence both short-term money market rates as well as long-term market rates. 
These should in turn impact on the income, wealth, consumption and/or saving 
decision of firms and households. Blundell-Wignall et al (1990) site two instances 
where financial liberalisation might undermine some of the transn-dssion 
channels. First, market interest rates are strongly influenced by expectations 
about future rates and hence anticipated economic policies, activity and inflation. 
This may reduce the linkages between official short-term interest rates and 
market determined rates. Second, the globalisation of financial markets too may 
cause domestic Ionger-term interest rates to be increasingly influenced by rates in 
other countries. This could also serve to weaken the links between domestic 
monetary policy and those interest rates most likely to induce changes in private 
spending behaviour. That, in a liberalised financial market, authorities may find 
their influence on long term interest rates reduced is also supported by the 
efficient markets hy othesis. With regard to interest rates on financial .p 
instruments of different maturities within the same market, the efficient market 
hypothesis states that the expected holding period returns on all maturities are 
identical, or differ only by a constant risk premium (see for example Copeland, 
2005). 
As pointed out in chapter 1, the use of indirect instruments of monetary policy 
involves setting money and/or credit as intermediate targets. In this monetary 
policy framework, the intermediate target should provide early warning of 
inflation problems to guide the directional changes of monetary policy 
instruments. It is also necessary that the instrument of monetary policy (the 
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short-term policy interest rate) should have a predictable and rapid influence on 
the intermediate target. However, there is a possibility that financial 
liberalisation may interfere with these requirements. In their stud), Blundell- 
Wignall et al, used country-specific empirical evidence from the United State of 
America, Germanv, Italv, the United Kingdom and Canada and concluded that 
a) the short-run role of money as a leading indicator has been affected by 
the process of financial liberalisation. and innovation in some countries, 
and the dynamic nature of this process is such that continuing effects 
of a similar nature cannot be ruled out in the future; 
b) "rate/ quantity, " deregulation has made deposit pricing more flexible 
in some countries, which reduces the reliabilit%, of control over I 
monetary aggregates through portfolio allocation channels; and 
C) It was difficult to identify any long-run equilibrium relationship 
between money and nominal income. Such relationships were not 
found for an), narrow aggregate, and for broad aggregates there were 
exceptions for only two countries. 
In line with the developments in developed countries, this evidence seem to 
support the view that monetary policy should instead focus directly at the key 
objective, ie., inflation and use money, credit and other variables only as 
indicators of future economic developments. Since financial deregulation opens 
up the economy as foreign exchange controls and constraints on holding of 
foreign assets are removed, domestic capital markets are increasingly subjected 
to the forces of globalisation. This reduces the importance of liquidity constraints 
in the transmission mechanism. Blundell-Wignall et al conclude that "financial 
liberalisation appears to reduce the extent to which credit availability is a 
constraint on spending decisions, and hence the authorities' ability to use this 
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hitherto powerful channel of influence. Wealth and intertemporal substitution 
effects are therefore likely to be relatively more important transmission channels 
for influencing consumption and housing demand in more Iiberalised financial 
environments". However, this conclusion may be more relevant for some 
developed countries. In developing countries such as Botswana, with shallow 
and relatively underdeveloped financial and capital markets, the situation mav 
be different. For example, in developing countries, household liabilities are 
likely to far exceed interest-ra te-bea ring assets so that an increase in interest rate 
erodes their net-worth and hence limit their access to credit. In developed 
countries, the reverse might be true, that households and firms' interest-rate- 
bearing assets exceed liabilities meaning that an increase in interest rate increases 
the cash flow and wealth, at the same time increasing their access to more credit 
Financial institutions may also not have the incentives to find alternative means 
(issuing other forms of credit instruments/ facilities, either at home or abroad, 
i. e., restructure their asset portfolios) of easing the liquidity constraints resulting 
from an increase in interest rates. 
There is no doubt that financial liberalisation in Botswana has led to increased 
competition and the development of the financial market. As a result of 
increased competition, financial institutions have become more innovative as 
evidenced by an introduction of a wide range of financial services offered. 
Despite these developments, the financial and capital markets still remain 
shallow and illiquid, which is mainly a result of lack of alternative investment 
opportunities, hence investors tend to adopt a "buy and hold" strategy. This has 
serious implications for liquidity pricing in the market and hence, on the 
transmission of monetary policy. In fact, the INIF (2004) noted that interest rates 
in Botswana do not reflect appropriately the market liquidity conditions. The 
INIF attributes this to the following. - 
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a) the inter-bank rate has been set at 1 percent below the Bank rate by an 
informal agreement; 
b) The inter-bank activities are low because banks prefer to transact in 
repos or reserve repos with the central bank to meet the daily liquidity 
requirements, which is offered at the same rate as the inter-bank rate. 
So, there is no price incentive for banks to look first to the inter-bank 
market to place or borrow funds overnight; 
C) the short-term interest rate - the BoBC rate - has followed closely the 
direction of the Bank Rate, as the central bank had been, de facto, 
targeting the price of BoBCs than quantity through uniform price 
auction method; and 
d) The prime lending rate has been consistently 1.5 percent above the 
Bank rate. 
The result of all these is that, "the interest rate in Botswana reflects closely the 
direction of monetary policy, as they are linked systematically to the Bank Rate, 
but do not mirror the liquidity condition in the market. Such arrangements have 
not been conducive to the most efficient channelling of liquidity, and may have 
disrupted the transmission of monetary policy adjustments". 
The IMF Report further states that, "due to the high economic growth 
experienced for most of the years since independence and the lack of absorptive 
capacity of the economy, the financial system is characterised by excess liquidity. 
This excessive liquidity, coupled with lack of alternative investment 
opportunities (e. g., limited financial assets), has put more pressure on the Bank 
of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs). BoBCs were introduced in 1991 to help absorb 
excess liquidity through open market operations. Since they are risk free and 
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offer higher returns even by international standards, commercial banks and other 
large investors have invested heavily on BoBCs, with secondary market activities 
mostly dominated by transactions with the Bank of Botswana. This is because 
the Bank of Botswana has committed itself to buying the BoBCs along a yield 
curve based on the auction cut-off rate, so that participants in the market have no 
incentive to seek out buyers in the private market. This has discouraged the 
discovery of the price of liquidity in the market". 
The systematic link between the policy rate and other money market interest 
rates referred to above is clearly evident from figure 2.1 below. In general, a 
change in the short-term policy rate is always followed by changes, in the same, 
direction in commercial banks' prime lending rates and deposit rates. 
Figure 2.1: Interest Rates 
18 
16 - ccccccccc9ztty 
7--ý 
tmmmx: 
$.: Scccccc! Mccc ........ 14 - cccccccný ................ 
12 
10 
8 
6B OBLR B0BCR 
PLR DEP 
4ý 
..... I. I 'T-1 IIIIIIII11 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Note: BOBLR is the Bank of Botswana policy rate also referred to as the Bank Rate; PLR is the 
commercial Banks' Prime Lending Rate, BOBCR is the interest rate on Bank of Botswana 
Certificates; and DEP is the interest rate on commercial banks' deposits. 
58 
Whereas lending rates are most often changed by the same magnitudes with the 
change in short-term policy rates, deposit rates are, in most cases, only adjusted 
by smaller magnitudes especially when the direction of change is upwards. This 
deposit pricing behaviour of banks mean that changes in market interest rates 
influence the net opportunity cost of holding money and in developing 
economies where there is less competition, the opportunity cost (interest rate 
spread) is often very high by international standards. In Botswana, the net 
spread has been increasing over the years despite increased competition brought 
about by financial liberalisation and the subsequent increase in the number of 
commercial banks. For example, the Bank of Botswana Annual Report of 2003, 
states that net spread rose from 1.8 percent in 1993 to 4 percent in 2002. 
Meanwhile, in the absence of a representative long-term market interest rate, it is 
difficult to assess whether there is a (strong) link between the short-term policy 
interest rate and long-term money market rate in Botswana. The only long-term 
bond market instrument available is the 12 year Government Bond, which was 
only introduced in 2003 and therefore, does not provide a long enough interest 
rate series to make an appropriate analysis. However, the extent to which the 
monetary authorities can influence long-term market interest rates will mainly 
depend on private sector expectations about whether a change in short-term 
policy rate is temporary or sustained, also depending on their expectations about 
future inflation. Monetary policy decisions and actions are therefore likely to 
play an increasing role in shaping or influencing private sector expectations. For 
example, the monetary authorities' consistent failure to achieve the announced 
inflation objective/ target could be interpreted as a weak commitment to low 
inflation. This, combined with globalisation of capital markets, which tends to 
align domestic and international rates, will weaken the influence of short-term 
policy rates on long-term money market rates. 
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We have also noted that Botswana is a small open economy with a fixed 
exchange rate system (the Pula is fixed/pegged to a basket of currencies). This 
means that the monetary authorities cannot use the short-term policy rate to 
influence the nominal exchange rate (there is no link between short-term policy 
rate and nominal exchange rate). Instead, domestic short-term policy rate is kept 
in line with that of the anchor country. In the case of Botswana, the anchor 
country rate would be the basket weighted average of the basket currency rates. 
Indeed, for some time, the objective of monetary policy is Botswana was stated 
as, "to achieve price stability as reflected in a low and stable rate of inflation, and 
to maintain positive real interest rates (after allowing for inflation) that are 
comparable to those prevailing in major international financial markets" (Bank of 
Botswana Moneiary Policy Statements, various issues). That being the case, one 
would expect the role of the exchange rate in the transmission of monetary policy 
to be very little and at most, non-existent. 
Because of this exchange rate system and the fact that the Bank of Botswana had 
long abandoned the use of exchange rates to fight imported inflation, one would 
expect foreign prices to have a direct impact on domestic inflation. Given the 
strong trade links between Botswana and South Africa, especially the heavy 
reliance on imports from South Africa, Botswana inflation should closely mirror 
that of South Africa. In other words, Botswana inflation need to be more 
responsive to foreign price shocks especially shocks to South African prices 
because domestic interest rates cannot be used as an independent policy tool to 
guide the exchange rate. This is in contrast with a flexible exchange rate system 
where the monetary authorities can influence the nominal exchange rate through 
the short-term policy interest rate in order to counter the impact of foreign price 
shocks on domestic inflation. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have looked at monetary developments in Botswana since 
independence and noted that, until 1986, the financial sector in Botswana was 
regulated. The Bank of Botswana directly set a floor for deposit rates and a 
ceiling for lending rates as well as inhibiting capital mobility through the use of 
capital controls on current and capital accounts transactions. There was also lack 
of competition and therefore little efficiency in the financial system. Financial 
institutions had no incentives to be innovative and operate efficiently. 
We also noted that from 1986, Botswana undertook a financial liberalisation 
programme, which saw increased competition and improved efficiency in the 
financial system. This was also accompanied by the adoption of indirect 
instruments of monetary policy in 1989. These developments have implications 
for the transn-dssion mechanism. For example, they determine the importance of 
various channels of the transmission mechanism. After careful consideration of 
all the developments alluded to in this chapter, one is inclined to conclude that: 
a) the link between the short-term policy rate and the short-term money 
market rate is expected to be strong (see figure 2.1 above), while the link 
to the long-run money market rates is uncertain (no long-term interest rate 
series is available to conduct the necessary analysis); 
b) Since Botswana operates a fixed exchange rate system, we expect little or 
no role for the exchange rate in the transmission mechanism. Instead, 
foreign prices, especially South African prices, are expected to have a 
strong and direct influence on Botswana inflation; 
C) Given that the financial system is heavily dominated by commercial 
banks, the bank lending channel is expected to be strong, especially with 
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respect to credit to households and small firms. Large firms like 
Debswana (the diamond mining company in Botswana), who are more 
likely to have recourse to commercial paper markets and other sources of 
short-term credit, typically respond to an unanticipated decline in cash 
flows - arising from monetary tightening - by increasing their short-term 
borrowing. However, the importance of the bank-lending channel is 
expected to diminish overtime because of financial deregulation and 
innovation; 
d) Similarly, the balance sheet channel is also expected to be operational in 
Botswana. 
In this chapter, we have also noted that interest rates in Botswana are unlikely to 
be a true reflection of liquidity conditions in Botswana. The IMF (2004) raises a 
number of factors that seem to support this view. Whether this is true or not is a 
matter for empirical investigation. The estimation of the transmission 
mechanism should therefore, help answer some of these questions. 
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Chapter 3 
The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy -A Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy depends on a number of 
country specific factors. Besides, "different economic structures may lead to 
differences in the importance of the various channels (HM Treasury, 2003). For 
example, "in a small open economy where the exchange rate is fixed, capital 
movements are unrestricted and domestic and foreign assets are perfect 
substitutes, the money supply is outside the control of the monetary authorities. 
Hence monetary policy cannot affect real activity", (De Fiore, 1998). 
Furthermore, Cermely, A., and Vonnak, B., (2002), argue that "in a small open 
economy (with flexible exchange rates) the exchange rate is supposed to play a 
crucial role in the transmission of shocks to the economy". 
According to the standard IS-LM model, the transn-dssion of monetary policy 
occurs through changes in the interest rate (the traditional interest rate channel). 
Monetary contraction, for example, leads to an increase in the interest rate, which 
reflects an increase in the cost of borrowing. Consequently, expenditure on 
investment and consumption (capital goods and consumer durables) is reduced, 
leading to an overall reduction in aggregate spending/ demand. This model is 
nevertheless criticised on the basis that, it does not differentiate between real and 
nominal values. Put differently, it is not clear "whether it is a model of real 
output with fixed prices or a model of nominal output that does not distinguish 
between real and nominal values", (Meltzer, 1995). 
Meanwhile, this minor setback is eliminated once we introduce the Phillips curve 
into the model. The Phillips cun, -e does recognise that following a monetary 
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shock, prices also move, therefore providing a distinction between real and 
nominal values. For example, following a monetary expansion, interest rates will 
fall, leading to increases in consumption and investment, therefore overall 
demand and spending. As aggregate spending rises, prices move upwards but 
not as much as the increase in money supply since the monetary shock was not 
anticipated. Therefore, real money balances and output increase by some 
magnitude dependent upon the increase in the price levels. This is a short-run 
reaction and once the monetary, shock is fully understood and correctly factored 
into the decision making process, money wages and commodity prices increase 
accordingly so that the short term effects of the monetary expansion on real 
money balances and output are eroded. In the long run, real output and real 
money balances are back to equilibrium (the long-run Phillips curve), hence the 
notion of the long run neutrality of money. 
As noted in chapter 1, a number of policy instruments have been in use for some 
time, ranging from direct instruments (e. g., credit ceilings, interest rate ceilings, 
direction of credit to particular sectors, etc. ) to indirect instruments (e. g., 
monetary aggregates, credit growth, etc. ). Currently, it appears that the 
commonly used instrument of monetary policy is the short-term interest rate. In 
some countries this is the interest rate that central banks charge on loans to the 
commercial banks under their supervision (e. g., the Bank Rate in Botswana). 
Other central banks use inter-bank rates, i. e., interest rates on overnight loans 
between commercial banks. Uiese are interests rates that are directly controlled 
by the central banks and their changes are expected to have some impact on the 
general level of market interest rates in the economy. 
A change in the level of interest rates in the economy is also, in turn, expected to 
impact on the key components of demand such as investment and consumption 
and consequently on inflation. This is the traditional interest rate channel of the 
transmission mechanism under the basic IS-LM framework. It is however, worth 
64 
noting that, having introduced the Phillips curve analysis into the picture, 
emphasis is now on real interest rates as opposed to nominal interest rates. Of 
particular importance is the fact that, what matters most are real long-term 
interest rates as opposed to short-term interest rates, which are believed to 
impact more on investment and consumption spending. Monetary authorities, 
however, have influence over short-term nominal interest rates via their 
influence on their short-term policy rate. But because of sticky prices, a change 
in short-term nominal rates leads to a change real long-term rates since the latter 
are an average of the former under the expectations hypothesis of the term 
structure of interest rates. 
Below we present a theoretical view of the interest rate channel and how it 
affects real output and inflation. We also look at other charmels of the 
transmission mechanism that are believed to be also important, e. g., the exchange 
rate and credit channels of monetary policy transmission. This is a theoretical 
picture because it is generally what is expected in economic theory; whether it 
happens in practice or not or if it does, whether it is true for an countries or not, 
is an empirical matter. That is why an estimate of the transmission mechanism in 
one country can not be generalised to all economies. Likewise, the importance of 
any one channel of the transmission mechanism differs from one economy to the 
other. Factors such as the level of economic and/financial development, and 
hence the availability of a variety of financial assets will, amongst others, 
determine the importance or otherAise of the various transmission channels. 
Exchange rate arrangements/ policies as well as institutional set-up are also 
important. Also important are the political and institutional arrangements, 
which differ between countries. 
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3.2 The Interest Rate Channel: 
3.2.1. The Policy Interest Rate and other Money Market Interest Rates 
A change in the policy rate is expected to have an immediate change in other 
short-term rates, normally by the same magnitude (see figure 2.1 in chapter 2). 
Since the central bank's policy interest rate or commercial banks' inter-bank rate 
represents the cost of borrowing by commercial banks from the central bank, for 
the commercial banks to maintain their profit margins, they are also likely to 
increase their lending rates. Commercial banks normally have a benchmark- 
lending rate (the Prime Lending Rate), i. e., the minimum rate they would charge 
to their most trusted and credit worthy customers. Any margin over and above 
this benchmark will be determined by their assessment of the risk profile of the 
borrower. So, commercial banks usually adjust their lending rates withh-1 a short 
period of the announcement of a change in the policy rate. Deposit rates (interest 
rates paid by commercial banks to the deposit they hold) also react to changes in 
the policy rate without much delay. The spread between the commercial banks' 
lending rates and their deposit rates accounts for part of their profit. Therefore, 
depending on the level of competition in the banking system the spread may 
increase with lending rates increasing more than the increase in deposit rates. It 
may also decrease if lending rates increase by less than the increase in deposit 
rates or remain unchanged when lending and deposit rates increase by the same 
magnitude as a result of an increase in the policy rate. 
Whereas the impact of an increase or a decrease in the official rate on other short- 
term market rates appears obvious, with long term rates the impact is not as 
clear. If we assume that long-term interest rates are a weighted average of 
current and future short-term rates, then an increase in short-term rates can lead 
to either an increase or a decrease in the long-term rates depending on inflation 
expectations. If the markets expect inflation to fall following an increase in short 
term rates and therefore a reduction in future short-term rates, long term rates 
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will fall. Conversely, if agents expect inflation to rise despite the increase in 
current short term rates and therefore envisage an increase iri future short term 
rates, long term rates will also increase, i. e., move in the same direction as current 
short-term rates. All these considered it may turn out that an increase in the 
official rate may lead to small increase or decrease or no change at all in long 
term interest rates. Tl-iis is further reinforced by the fact that adjustment of 
interest rate adds to administrative costs of commercial banks. As such 
expectations are very crucial; if the banks consider the increase in the official 
interest rate to be temporary, they may not respond. Likewise, if the change is 
considered small, commercial banks may not change their long-term rates either, 
even though this might be the case even with short-term market rates. 
3.2.2 The Policy Interest Rate, Investment and Consumption 
An increase in the policy short-term rate also has an impact on both investment 
and consumption. However, both consumption and investment decisions are 
based on real long-term interest rates as opposed to short-term nominal interest 
rates. Inflation expectations play a crucial role here. Since prices are stick), in the 
short-run, an increase in the policy interest rate will trigger an increase in the real 
interest rate, more so if economic agents strongly believe that future inflation win 
decline. With consumption, an increase in the real interest rate will make savings 
for future consumption more attractive, lower credit demand as credit becomes 
more expensive and also makes repayment of existing loans more expensive, 
thus reducing the disposable income of agents. 
Further, asset prices are negatively related to real interest rates; therefore, an 
increase in the real interest rate resulting from the increase in the policy rate will 
reduce asset prices, thus lowering the value of agents' wealth. All these factors 
contribute towards lowering consumption since consumption is not only a 
function of current income but also depends on; wealth, expected future income 
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and the ability to borrow to finance current consumption. Investment is also 
affected in a similar manner. For example, the decision to invest is partly 
determined by the ability to borrow. Once credit becomes expensive due to the 
increase in interest rates, investment is negatively affected. The increase in 
interest rate also increases the opportunity cost of financing irivestment projects 
from internal funds. The decrease iri asset prices also reduces the net-worth of 
firms making access to loans difficult. With the increase in real interest rates, 
some investment projects become less attractive (the discounting factor becomes 
high). 
In summary, an increase in the nominal policy rate resulting in a rise in real 
interest rates reduces investment and household consumption and hence reduces 
domestic demand since investment and consumption are the two most important 
components of domestic demand. 
3.3 Other Asset Price Channels 
The standard IS-LM analysis of the transmission mechanism treats interest rates 
as the only asset price available, but the monetarist view is that there are also 
asset prices that are worth considering. This gives rise to other channels of the 
transmission mechanism such as the exchange rate channel and the equity price 
channel. 
3.3.1 Equity Price Channels 
Economic literature here identifies two ways through which monetary policy 
affects real activity through equity prices. Tobin's q theory is one route, with 
wealth effects being the other route. 
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a. Tobin's q Theory 
Tobin's q theory defines q as a ratio of market value of firms to the replacement 
value of capital. A high q means that the market value of a firm is higher than its 
replacement cost of capital so that with little equity a firm can buy a lot of new 
investment goods. In that sense, q is a relative price and when the value of 
installed capital is greater than its replacement cost, there is an incentive to 
invest. That is, the higher the firms' q, the more is investment demand and 
spending, which leads to higher income. On the contrary, a lower q requires a 
firm to issue more equity in order to buy just a little investment goods, so that 
with a lower q, investment is expensive. This leads to reduced investment 
spending and hence income. If monetary authorities engage in expansionary 
monetary policy that leaves more money in private hands, there will be more 
demand for equities as agents try to reduce their undesirable money holdings. 
Consequently, equit37 prices go up, so is firms' q. As explained above, a higher q 
leads to more investment and hence an increase in income. A contractionary 
monetary policy has a negative effect on firm's Tobin's q and thus on investment 
demand and income as well. 
Blanchard (1981) also considered the interaction between output and the stock 
market and showed that monetary policy does not only affect the economy 
through its impact on equity prices and the firm's q. Blanchard's model assumes 
three main determinants of spending, with one of them being the value of shares 
in the stock market. Under this model, a monetary expansion "lowers the real 
interest rate and thus the cost of capital. This lower cost leads to a higher stock 
market value, higher spending and higher output and profit". An interesting 
case is when prices are assumed neither fixed nor strictly flexible, that is prices 
adjust slowly so that money is neutral in the long run as prices adjust to their 
equilibrium value over time. Blanchard notes that during the adjustment 
process, "the sequences of initially increased profits and interest rates followed 
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by decreasing profits and interest rates have a complex effect on the stock market 
which may keep increasing after its initial jump and which may also decrease 
below its steady-state value during the adjustment process". 
b. Wealth Effects 
According to Froyen (2005), this channel of the transmission mechanism 
originates from the life cycle hypothesis by Brumberg, R., and Modighani, F., 
(1962) and Ando, A., and Modighani, F., (1963)). According to the life cycle 
hvpothesis, consumption is a function of consumers' lifetime resources, which 
include wealth, and common stocks constitute a sizeable proportion of 
consumers' wealth. As noted above, monetary expansion leads to higher stock 
prices, which means an increase in consumers' wealth. An increase in the 
consumers' wealth leads to an increase in consumption, which, being an 
important component of income, leads to an increase in income. Housing and 
land prices have been also regarded as important transmission channels, in that 
an increase in their relative prices leads to an increase in Tobin's q for houses and 
land. Also important is the fact that land and houses constitute wealth so that an 
increase in their respective prices leads to an increase iri wealth, and hence 
aggregate demand. 
3.3.2 The Exchange Rate Channel 
Several empirical studies, e. g., Broda (2006), Atta, J. K., jefferis, K. R., and 
Mannathoko, 1., (1999) and Ndung'u, N. S., (1999), suggest that there is a strong 
relationship between the national price level and the exchange rate regime. For 
example, Broda, states that "specifically, developing countries with fixed 
exchange rates have higher national price levels than those with flexible rates". 
He furd-ier states that, "... the tendency to run expansionary policies may lead to 
a real appreciation in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes but not in those 
with flexible regimes. This tendency may be especially pronounced in 
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developing countries and that countries that anchor their exchange rates to 
stabilise inflation typically suffer from inflation inertia. Ndung'u suggests that, 
"Exchange rate and monetary polices are key tools in economic management and 
in the stabilisation process in developing countries, where low inflation and 
international competitiveness have become major policy targets. He further 
notes that, at least for the case of Kenya, "monetary shocks drive exchange rate 
movements, and real exchange rate movements have an impact on monetary 
shocks, i. e., they drive each other". These findings suggest that that there is a 
strong link between the transmission mechanism of policy and the exchange rate 
regimes and hence the effectiveness of monetary policy. In other words, the type 
of exchange rate regime in a country will determine which monetary policy 
transmission channels are operational and more effective. This, of course, also 
depends on other factors in the economy. For example, in an open economy, 
with no capital controls or with free capital mobility, an increase in the short- 
term nominal interest rate will feed through to other market interest rates, as 
noted above. This increase in domestic interest rates (monetary contraction) 
attract foreign capital as domestic financial assets become more attractive 
compared to their foreign counterparts, thereby putting upward pressure on the 
exchange rate. Consequently, the exchange rate will appreciate. This continues 
until domestic short-term rates equal foreign rates through the uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) condition. The resultant appreciation of the domestic 
currency leads to a decrease in net exports (imports increase relative to exports), 
hence a reduction in output. An appreciation of the exchange rate also reduces 
imported inflation. 
On the other hand, a monetary expansion makes domestic currency deposits less 
attractive as domestic interest rates fall following a monetary expansion. This 
leads to a depreciation of the exchange rate, making domestic goods cheaper and 
more competitive in the international markets. Improved export performance 
increases net exports and hence income. 
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The combined effects of a change in the short-term policy interest rates on other 
short-term market interest rates, asset prices and exchange rates, and taking into 
account market agents' expectations about future inflation, are expected to have 
an impact on total demand via domestic demand and net external demand. TIle 
resultant decrease in total demand will reduce net exports and domestic 
inflationary pressures. From the exchange rate channel, the appreciation in the 
exchange rate will reduce imported inflation. The two combined (reduced 
domestic and imported inflationary pressures) will lead to downward pressures 
on domestic inflation. TI-ie impact of a change in the short-term policy interest 
rate on domestic inflation, through its effect on assets prices, other short-term 
domestic interest rates, inflationary expectations and exchange rates for an open 
economy with floating exchange rates is appropriately summarised in figure 3.1 
below. 
Figure 3.1: A Typical Transmission Mechanism under a floating exchange rates 
regime 
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Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the transmission mechanism reduces to 
figure 3.2, with no role for the exchange rate charmel. Instead, foreign prices 
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have a direct impact on domestic prices since domestic interest rates cannot be 
used as an independent tool to guide the exchange rate. Domestic interest rates 
are, instead, kept in line with those in the country to which the currency is fixed 
(see for example, Ha, J. L., and Shu, C., (2002)). 
Figure 3.2: A Typical Transmission Mechanism under a fixed exchange rate 
regime 
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3.4 The Credit Channel of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
In addition to the transmission channels described above, research has revealed 
that there is also the credit channel, which is often overlooked, but also 
constitutes an important component of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. This channel of the transmission mechanism is a result of asymmetric 
information that makes it difficult to enforce financial contracts and/or verify 
certain information (see for example, Bernank-e and Gertler (1995)). Proponents 
of the credit channel argue that, central banks do carry out open market 
operations (OMO) in their conduct of monetary policy. OMO, it is argued, has 
an impact on the external financing premium, i. e., the difference in the cost of 
raising funds from external sources and the cost of internal financing. For 
I., 
example, a change iri monetary policy that raises or lowers market interest rates 
tends to change the external financing premium in the same direction (Bernanke 
and Gertler). According to the credit view, there are two channels through 
which monetary policy action impact on the external-financing premium. These 
are the balance sheet channel and the bank-lending channel. 
3.4.1 The Balance Sheet ChanneJ7 
In the credit market, some borrowers are considered more riskv, while others are 
considered less risky. How risky a borrower is, depends amongst others, on 
his/her financial position, which could be judged on the basis of his/her balance 
sheet (the same applies to firms). This therefore, means that, as the quality of the 
balance sheet changes, so does the borrowers net worth. The borrower's net 
worth is negatively related to the external finance premium. The lower the 
borrowers' net worth the greater is the external finance premium and vice versa. 
So changes in monetary policy also affects the borrowers' balance sheet, hence 
the net worth. 
An increase in interest rates following a monetary tightening increases interest 
expenses on already existing short-term loans that firms acquire for inventory 
and working capital and therefore, reduces the net cash flow of firms. 
Furthermore, as interest rates increase, asset prices fall, given the inverse 
relationship between interest rates and asset prices. These collectively erodes the 
firms' financial positions, and hence their net worth. This is the direct impact of 
monetary policy on the extemal-financing premium. There is also an indirect 
link that operates through a reduction in consumers' spending. If monetary 
tightening reduces the spending capabilities of consumers and firms' customers; 
then firms will experience declining revenues while their costs, some of which 
are fixed in the short term (e. g., wages, interest expenses, etc. ) are not reduced as 0 
' The balance sheet channel is also known as the financial accelerator, the broad lending channel 
or borrower net worth channel (see Coricelli, F., et al (2006)). 
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well. The firms' net worth and creditworthiness are therefore eroded, hence an 
increase in their external financing premiums. Overall, the decline in the firms' 
or households' net worth increases the problem of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, and hence reduces lending. Both the direct and indirect impact of 
monetary tightening reduces investment and consumption expenditures, and 
hence overall demand. There are two scenarios here: 
a. Monetary expansion (tightening) leads to an increase (decrease) in equity 
prices, which then reduces (increases) the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Consequently, lending increases (declines) leading to 
an increase (decrease) in investment and therefore an increase (decrease) 
in income. 
b. Monetary expansion (contraction) reduces (increases) interest rates, which 
increases (reduces) cash flow. An increase (decrease) in firms' cash flow 
reduces (increases) the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. As 
a result lending rises (falls) and ffivestment and income also rise (fall). 
Unlike in the case of the interest rate channel, under these channels of the 
transmission mechanism, it is the short-term nominal interest rates that 
matter in as far as firms' cash flows are concerned. Uds is because short- 
term interest payments affect firms' cash flow more than long term rates 
(Bernanke and Gertler, Coricelli et al). 
Meanwhile, measuring a firm's net worth is not a straightforward matter. 
However, in empirical research, coverage ratiO8 iScommonly used as a measure 
of a firm's financial condition. For example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have 
revealed that there is a positive relationship between the coverage ratio and the 
short-term policy interest rate. An increase in the policy interest rate, which 
indicates monetary tightening, leads to an increase in the coverage ratio. This 
8 The Coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of interest payments by non-financial corporations to 
the sum of interest payments and profits (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). 
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results from both the direct and indirect impact of monetary policy on the firm's 
financial position. In short, monetary tightening (increase in the short-term 
interest rate) leads to an increase in other short-term market interest rates, and 
hence an increase in interest payments and at the same time reduces the firms' 
net cash flows. So, in the case of the balance sheet channel, what is at work is 
what Corecelli et al refer to as "imperfect substitutability between external and 
internal financing". 
3.4.2 The Bank Lending Channel 
According to Coricelli et al., the bank lending channel is a result of the imperfect 
substitutability between credit and other financial assets in the banks' balance 
sheet on the one hand, and that between bank credits and other forms of 
financing on firms' balance sheet on the other hand". This is because monetary 
policy actions are also believed to have an impact on the balance sheets of 
commercial banks as well. In most countries, especially developing countries, 
commercial banks are the main source of investment finance. This means that 
actions by the monetary authorities that impact on the commercial banks' ability 
to extend credit will also affect the external financing premium. 
Open market sales for example, absorb funds from the financial system. 
Deposits at the commercial banks are reduced, thus reducing commercial banks' 
loanable funds. In this case, firms and households have to seek credit from 
elsewhere, which they may not get or if they do, they have to build some 
working relation with their new clients. These activities are all costly, which 
means that the external financing premium rises. So, monetary policy affects the 
external finance premium by shifting the supply of intermediated credit, 
particularly loans by commercial banks (Bernanke and Gertler). TI-le credit view 
implies that monetary policy will have a greater effect on expenditure by smaller 
firms that are more dependent on bank loans than it will on large firms that can 
76 
directly access the credit markets through stock and bonds markets without 
going through banks (Mishkin, 1996). Coricelli, et al., also noted that "for 
monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy, it is necessary for some 
firms not to be capable of substituting bank credit for other forms of external 
funding on the capital markets (imperfect substitutability on the liability side of 
the firm). 
3.5 Other Transmission Channels 
In addition to the above channels, literature also identifies two other channels of 
the transmission mechanism. We have the Trade Credit channel which may 
become the only source of external financing for firms which have no credit 
rating and thus no access to capital markets during credit rationing. It provides 
an escape route for firms facing external financing constraints in the wake of 
monetary tightening, and it occurs if a firm delays payment to its suppliers or 
accepting supply of goods with an agreement to pay later. There is also the Bank 
Capital Channel, and according to Corecelli et al., this channel is operational if 
the following assumptions hold: 
i) it is costly for banks to raise equity 
banks assume an interest rate with the maturity of their credit being 
higher than that of their deposits; and 
Capital regulations influence banks' credit supply. 
Accordingly, "a rise in interest rates triggered by monetary policy action 
increases the cost of financing while leaving the remuneration of bank assets 
unchanged due to maturity mismatch. This induces a fall in bank capital. In the 
event that the bank is close to the minimum capital requirement prescribed by 
law, it is obliged to decrease the supply of loans, as raising equity is costly". 
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3.6 Empirical Modelling 
The difficulties of modelling and estimating the transmission mechanism were 
discussed in chapter 1 and literature review iri this chapter has indicated the 
existence of various channels of the transmission mechanism. To assess the 
importance of these channels in Botswana, three analytical methods are adopted. 
The adoption of three different approaches is meant to help us deal with the 
difficulties inherent in estimating the transmission mechanism. The three 
methods are the "narrative approach" in chapter 6, vector autoregression (VAR) 
in chapter 7 and the structural approach, which involves estimating a small 
structural model in chapter 8. Simulation results of the structural model are 
conducted in chapter 9 and should help us assess the relative importance of each 
transmission channel. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we looked at the available literature on the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and noted that there are different channels 
through which monetary policy actions are transmitted through the economy. 
We have the traditional interest rate channel which is a basic component of the 
IS/LM analysis. A change in the policy rate has an impact on other short-term 
money market interest rates as well as long-term real interest rates, which in turn 
influences consumption and investment decisions. Changes in consumption and 
investment will in turn impact on domestic demand, which in relation to the 
productive capacity of the economy will determine the level of inflationary 
pressures. The other important channel of the transmission mechanism is the 
exchange rate channel, which is particularly important in small open economies 
operating a flexible exchange rate system. For example, an increase in the policy 
rate leads to an increase in other money market rates; and in an open economy 
with free capital mobility, this leads to capital inflows, which lead to an 
appreciation of the domestic currency. An appreciation of the domestic currency 
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has a negative effect on net exports (exports become expensive while imports 
become cheap), hence income; and also has a dampening effect on imported 
inflation. The literature also identifies other channels such as the equity price 
channels, wealth effects, trade credit channel and the bank capital channel. It is 
also worth emphasising that the importance of all these channels differs from one 
country to the other. 
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Chapter 4 
Structure of the Botswana Economy and Data Related Issues 
4.1 Introduction 
The economy of Botswana is peculiar in many respects. Not only is the economy 
driven by a single commodity export, but it is heavily dependent on imports 
with very little by way of domestic production or manufacturing taking place. It 
is on this basis that this chapter seeks to highlights some of the important issues 
for consideration when interpreting the results of the analysis presented in the 
next three chapters. 141ereas the focus of chapter 2 was more on monetary 
developments in the economy and their implication for the transmission 
mechanism, this chapter focuses more on the real side of the economy. The 
structural approach in chapter 7 identifies the different links between the real 
sector and other sectors of the economy. 
The chapter is structured as follows: first, section 4.2 looks at the structure of the 
economy, before conducting a number of statistical tests on our data in order to 
establish some basic interrelationships that may exist between the variables. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, the transmission mechanism is determined by country 
specific factors and an understanding of such factors should help us get a better 
understanding of the transmission mechanism within the Botswana context. 
Data properties, including the order of integration, definitions and 
transformations are covered in section 4.3, while section 4.4 conducts Granger- 
causality tests to establish the existence or otherwise, of any correlations between 
variables of interest. It is hoped that these simple exercises will also help us 
better understand the nature/ structure of the economy of Botswana. This is an 
important component of this study in that it provides a framework within which 
the transmission mechanism of policy in Botswana should be understood. 
Concluding remarks follow in section 4.5. 
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4.2 Structure of the Botswana Economy 
4.2.1 Composition of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
The economy of Botswana is heavily reliant on one major commodity export 
(diamonds) so that the mining sector is the mainstay of the economy. It is due to 
the high economic growths recorded for many years as a result of diamond and 
diamond exports that the INIF and the World Bank classify Botswana as a middle 
high income country. However, there are major problems that require due 
attention in this kind of economy; first as a mineral led economy, it is susceptible 
to external shocks that might severely disrupt the economy. Second, the 
Government also plays a very important role in what could amount to crowding 
out the private sector. This is so because of the fact that the economy has a very 
narrow industrial base and there is therefore a need to diversify the economy. To 
'Mg that extent, the Government finds itself, not only as a facilitator, but also pla) i 
a direct role in the diversification exercise in a great number of ways (more of 
this is discussed in chapter 2 and briefly below). 
Table 4.1 below indicates that between 1976/77 and 2004/05, on average, Mining 
accounted for 36.5 percent of total GDP followed by General Government with 
14.8 percent. The dominance of the mining sector became more pronounced 
from the early 1980s onwards taking over from agriculture. In well diversified 
economies, one would find GDP well spread, almost equally, amongst the 
various sectors and the private sector assuming a relatively greater role in 
economic activity compared to government. The role of the mining sector is so 
huge that the other sectors are also dependent on it. For example, the second 
largest sector in terms of its contribution to GDP is General Government. Tlie 
Government is able to undertake its activities because of revenue from mineral 
exports. Table 4.2 below shows a breakdown of sources of Government revenue. 
The second column of table 4.2 shows the proportion of tax revenue to total 
revenue; the third and fourth columns show percentage shares of non-tax 
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revenue and grants to total Government revenue. The fifth colunui shows the 
percentage share of mineral revenue in tax revenue, while the final column 
shows the share of mineral revenue to total Government revenue. 
Typical of a mineral led economy, tax revenues from mining account for the 
largest proportion of government revenue and averaged around 50 percent of 
total revenue, and around 80 of total tax revenue during the period between 
1989/90 and 2005/06 (the 2005/06 figures are preliminary estimates). 
The influence of the mining and government sectors cuts across the rest of the 
economic sectors. Man), activities by the other sectors are driven by activities in 
the mining and government sectors. In fact, Magang, D9., (1997) noted that, 
"Diamonds now account directly for approximately 30% of our GDP, about 50% 
of all government revenues and about 70% of national merchandise exports. But 
even these figures understate the importance of diamonds in our economy. For 
example, much of the GDP arising in other sectors such as construction, trade, 
banking and services results from spending incomes and revenues arising from 
diamonds. And our second largest source of government revenues is the profit 
of the central bank, which consists almost entirely of earnings from the 
investment of government budgetary surpluses, resulting from diamond 
revenues". 
9 Mr. David Magang was the minister of mineral resources and water affairs. 
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The Government has long recognised the need to minimise its role or influence in 
the economy and let the private sector take a leading role. However, this 
initiative is hampered by the need for diversification. To that extent there have 
been a number of financing schemes in order to encourage investment in other 
sectors, especially the manufacturing sector. Below, we briefly look at the role of 
government in the economy, confining ourselves to activities that have either a 
direct or indirect impact on the transmission mechanism. These activities are h-L 
addition to the policy initiatives, such as the interest rate and exchange rate 
policies, discussed in chapter 2. 
4.2.2 The Role of Government in Economic Activity 
The role of Government in economic activity is broad and takes different forms 
so much that its in-depth analysis can not be justifiably covered in this exercise. 
That being the case, we therefore only confine ourselves to those activities that 
have either a direct or indirect impact on the transmission of monetary policy. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, in 1973, the Government established what was 
known as the Public Debt Service Fund (PDSF) which was originally meant to be 
an investment arm of the Government to help cover the costs of servicing 
government borrowing. It, unfortunately, ended up as a lending scheme to the 
public enterprises which could otherwise utilise financial intermediaries for their 
financial needs. This scheme was left running until 2002 when the Government 
took a stance that it was high time public enterprises sourced funding from local 
and/or international financial markets. However, there were other government 
financing schemes in operation. There was the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) 
as well as the Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMME). FAP provided 
grants to new and expanding enterprises with more emphasis on manufacturing, 
which was believed to be more labour intensive and could provide the much 
needed jobs in the country. SMME provided subsidised loans to citizen 
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entrepreneurs. Operations under these two schemes were discontinued and the 
outstanding loans transferred to yet another government loans scheme, the 
Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA) in 2001. CEDA is still 
operating and provides subsidised loans to "commercially viable" enterprises, 
either wholly citizen owned or joint ventures between citizens and foreign 
investors. 
The running of these schemes means that, even though the Government has 
taken some steps to liberalise the financial sector by way of removing interest 
rates ceilings on lending rates or floors on deposit rates, etc., the role of financial 
intermediaries is undermined. Without such schemes, all operations funded 
under these schemes would have to access loans at markets rates from the 
financial intermediaries, hence improving their role in financial intermediation. 
It is also clear that not all the operations funded by the Goverriment schemes 
would have been able to get funding from commercial banks given their 
stringent screening process, hence avoiding the dangers of financing 
uneconomically viable projects at below "market determined" interest rate. It is 
in this respect that the operations of such schemes by the Government 
undermine the role of financial intermediaries in the economy and in the process, 
undermining the financial system as well. However, from the political and social 
point of view, the Government feels obliged to assist or spearhead economic 
diversification. 
4.2.3 GDP Growth 
Figure 4.1 below shows three GDP growth rates between 1974/75 and 2003/04. 
There is the adjusted growth rate and the unadjusted growth rate as weH as 
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growth rate of GDP excluding mining. The adjusted'O growth rate indicates that 
nominal GDP grew by more than 50 percent in 1988/89, which is a tremendous 
growth rate by any standard. However, according to Wright (1998), in 1996, 
Botswana statistical agency, the central statistics office (CSO) rebased their GDP 
estimates using the new 1992/93 social accounting matrix (SAM) from 1988/89 
to 1992/93. TTie SAM had indicated that the "true" level of GDP was 
significantly higher than implied by previous estimates of growth rates. 
Accordingly, Wright observes that, "Since the adjustment was principally to 
levels of GDP rather than growth rates, this led to a break in the GDP series with 
a large and basically meaningless jump appearing in 1988/89". A SAM tracks 
the monetary flows between industries and institutions and thus provides a 
comprehensive and consistent description of the transactions taking place in an 
economy between different sectors, factors of production, government and 
government institutions, households, etc., and therefore gives a good estimate of 
total output and expenditure in an economy. SAMs follow the principles of 
double-entry accounting according to which any expenditure or purchase by one 
entity is an income or sale or financial inflow for one or more others. Finally, for 
each account, total expenditure must equal total income. So, when the economy 
grows and new economic entities emerge, the SAM has to be revised to include 
the new economic participants; that is why the revised SAM will produce 
different figures from those of the old SAM. 
Meanwhile, the problem of the big jump appearing in 1988/89 has been dealt 
with in at least two ways. First, some studies have omitted the 1988/89 growth 
rate from the analysis and second; other studies have used the previous rates, i. e., 
the rates before the adjustment. This latter approach was used, for example, in 
the 1996 Bank of Botswana Annual Report, as well as by Leith (1997) in his study 
10 Adjustment here refers to the revision of the GDP estimates by the CSO using the 1992/93 
SAM. The previous GDP estimates were conducted under the 1985/86 SAM. 
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on "Grovvdi cllld Stl'UCtUral Tran, 4ornmtion in Botsivana". The latter option is 
adopted in this thesis. The groNvdi rate before adjustmenL, shown 1.,, Lll(, 
Unadjusted growth rate, is more representative than Lhe adjwtod ý,, rowth r, itc 
and indicates that nominal GDP areiv I-)v 44 percent. 
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quota. In addition, some subsequent discontinuities in diamond sales resulted in 
unusually large sales iri 1988/89". Gaolatlhe (1997) also noted that the period 
from 1987 to 1991 represents "the period of unusually rapid economic growth in 
Botswana" and that "there were signs that actual output exceeded potential 
output and that literally, ever), sector was buoyant". Construction, for example, 
is estimated to have grown by 40% in 1988/89, following the same rate of growth 
the year before. Gaolatlhe also attributes such growth to what he calls "the 
fortunes of the mineral sector". Consequently, GDP excluding mining is 
estimated to have grown by only 22% in the same year, which represents a fall 
compared to the rate of growth recorded the previous year. 
Due to strong growth in the mining sector, Botswana has been able to record 
high economic growth for over three decades up to the present date. On average 
GDP at constant 1993/94 prices grew by 8.7% between 1975/76 and 2004/05. 
Figure 4.1 above indicates that GDP growth in Botswana is highly volatile mainly 
reflecting the volatile nature of the mining industry which drives the majority of 
economic activities in the country. For example, GDP, at constant 1993/94 prices 
could grow by more than 10% or even close to 20% in some years and then 
record negative growth rates in others: in 1975/76 and 1977/78, GDP grew by 
18.4 and 19.6%, respectively, and recorded a negative growth rate of -0.2% in 
1992/93. 
4.2.4 Quarterly GDP data 
Estimating the transmission mechanism requires high frequency data. Ideally, 
one should use monthly data. However, in the absence of monthly data, 
quarterly data are the next best option. Miereas relatively long monthly and 
quarterly data series are available for some variables of interest, quarterly GDP 
published by the CSO only starts in the third quarter of 1993 (this also relates to 
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GDP components such as private investment, private consumption, government 
consumption spending, imports and exports). The CSO started estimating the 
quarterly GDP series about four years ago and started the estimates from the 
third quarter of 1993. For the purpose of estimating the transmission 
mechanism, one would need a longer series. 
In order to deal with this problem (short quarterly GDP series), we generate 
quarterly GDP figures from the first quarter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 2004. 
We use the Chov%, -Lin (1971) procedure, which was also used by Hayes and 
Turner (2005) in estimating the quarterly GDP for the UK economy during the 
interwar period, i. e., over the period 19220 to 1938. To use this procedure, we first 
have to identify a variable that is correlated to GDP but is available both on 
annual and quarterly basis. In the case of the UK, Hayes and Turner use 
industrial production. Industrial production has been used, in a number of 
studies, as a proxy for total GDP in cases where GDP is not available. For the 
case of Botswana, the industrial production series is not available, but we have 
realised that exports are highly correlated to GDP. As indicated above, the high 
correlation between GDP and exports in Botswana is symptomatic of the high 
dependence of the economy on mineral exports, especially diamond exports, 
which also tends to drive other sectors of the economy. Consequently, growth 
in exports and GDP growth are highly correlated (see figure 4.2 below). The 
export variable is therefore used in this exercise instead of industrial production. 
To generate quarterly GDP figures, an Eviews program by Hayes and Turner 
which implements the Chow-Lin method was used (for details of the model, 
refer to Chow-Lin (1971)). Figure 4.3 below shows the annual GDP series along 
side the interpolated quarterly GDP, all at current market prices. The log of the 
interpolated quarterly GDP is plotted in figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.2: Nominal GDP and Lxports Growths 
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4.2.5 Foreign Exchange Reserves 
a) Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Economic Growth 
Faced with a heavy inflow of revenue from mineral exports and with the 
economy's lack of absorptive capacity, as well as narrow economic base the 
Government's policy was that of accumulating as much foreign exchange 
reserves as possible in good times for use in bad times. Botswana never wanted 
to repeat the mistakes committed by other African or single commodity 
economies who failed to save for the future. In his analysis of the economic 
history of Africa in the 20th century, Wolgin, J. M., (1997) noted that, "When 
commodity prices were buoyant, governments received sufficient revenues to 
continue expanding their activities, but when commodity prices crashed and 
petrodollars dried up, governments began to resort to deficit financing, which 
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Figure 4.4: Log of interpolated quarterly nominal GDP. 
led to monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, and in an era of controlled 
prices, to increasing distortions, particularly in the foreign-exchange markets" . 
An example of an economy which has suffered in this way is Zambia. In the 
1960s Zambia was considered a well-off economy due to its copper and nick-el 
exports. However, the Zambian authorities did not keep their consumption 
under control and even when world copper-nickel prices started to fall in the 
early 1970s; it was thought that it was just a temporary development. In a way, 
Zambia was "riding with the tide". By the time the Zambian authorities realized 
that the world copper-nickel market was in trouble, it was already too late to do 
anything to save the economy. TTie world Copper-Nickel market never 
recovered and the economic success of the Zambian economy is now consigned 
to the economic history text books. This is the mistake that the Government of 
Botswana wanted to avoid and to that extent, Botswana has been able to 
accumulate foreign exchange reserves worth P18.7 billion at the end of 2005, 
which was an equivalent of around 22 months of import cover. In the process, 
Botswana has graduated from being one of the least developed countries in the 
world to a high middle income country. 
Botswana has also been able to run surpluses on its overall balance of the Balance 
of Payments for most of the years following the discovery of diamonds and 
subsequent mining and exporting (see table 4.3 below). In 2004, the World Bank 
noted that, "with a GNI per capita of $4,340 (2004 estimate) using the "atlas 
method", Botswana is classified as an upper middle-income country. The 
government has managed the country's resources prudently and has kept its 
recurrent expenditure within its revenue, allowing for investment in human and 
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physical capital. The government's revenue from diamonds, as well as profits 
from large foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Botswana, has largely 
cushioned Botswana from the recessions that have buffeted most countries in the 
region". 
Despite the accolades that the Government and people of Botswana receive from 
international observers, there are always fears that these economic achievements 
can be reversed. All depends on the stability of the diamond market and 
whether indeed "diamonds are forever" or will remain "a girl's best friend". A 
closer look at the contribution of other sectors to the economy suggests that these 
fears are not exaggerated. The domination of the mining and government sectors 
are a cause for concern (see table 4.1 above). Even though the Trade, Hotels & 
Restaurants and Banks, Insurance & Business have shown growth in the recent 
past few years, the economy is still far from the desired level of diversification. 
Of particular concern is the almost stagnant manufacturing sector, which has 
instead tended to decline despite the Government efforts to promote/boost the 
sector through financial and legislative interventions discussed above. These 
have serious implications for the economy in that the economy has a very narrow 
industrial/ manufacturing base, and therefore heavily dependent on other 
countries, especially South Africa, for imports. Botswana imports about 80% of 
goods from South Africa for her daily consumption needs, raising issues of how 
best the central bank can mitigate against the impact of imported inflation on 
domestic prices given the objective of export competitiveness. 
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4.2.6 Direction of Trade 
a) Imports 
About 80 percent of the country's imports are from the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), more than 90 percent of which are from South Africa. 
The remaining 20 percent is shared between the remaining regions (see table 4.4 
below). It is, therefore, not surprising that there is a very close relationship 
between Botswana and South African inflation rates (see figure 4.6 below). This 
is an indication of the dominance of the large economy (South Africa) on a small 
neighbour/ economy (Botswana). 
b) Exports 
Whereas more than 80 percent of Botswana's imports originate from the customs 
area, and most specificaRN,,, from South Africa, very little exports find their way I 
into the customs area or South Africa. As indicated in table 4.5 below, a larger 
proportion of Botswana exports go to the UK and Europe and these are mainly 
minerals (e. g., diamonds, and copper & Nickel) and beef. A very small 
proportion goes to the customs area. 
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Figure 4.5: Annual Inflation (Bots", ana and South Africa). 
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GDP for other Europe was estimated as the sum of GDP for Germany, France 
and Italy (these being the three largest economies in other Europe). World 
GDP/demand was estimated as follows: 
Yll- :- "'I YuA + '"'2 Yoc + "'3 Yrw (4.5) 
Where y,,, is world GDP, )', k / Yoe and ...... are GDP 
for the UK, Other Europe and 
South Africa, respectively, while ",, ii,,. and ii,., are their respective weights. 
Granger-causality tests between Botswana and a proxy for world GDP were 
conducted and the results are discussed in section 4.3 below. 
4.2.7 Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Credit Creation 0 
The continuously high mineral export earnings, and hence the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves means that the economy could afford to extend credit 
to finance growth in other sectors of the economy. But due to concerns of what 
uncontrolled credit expansion could do to the domestic economy (internal 
stabiliq, and inflationary pressures); it has always been the monetary authorities' 
desire to prevent undesirably high credit growth. This has, in some cases, 
proved to be very difficult since commercial banks often find themselves sitting 
on a lot of deposits that they could not invest anywhere. These are deposits far 
in excess of the statutory minimum reserve requirements. It was initially thought 
that exchange controls on the capital account prohibited banks and other private 
sector investors to invest some of their excess cash abroad. During the 1980s, 
commercial banks even refused to accept large deposits from companies and the 
public in reaction to the low interest rate policy in place at the time. 
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The low interest rate policy was adopted with the understanding that it would 
promote investment and economic growth. However, low interest rates 
maintained below inflation rate meant necrative real interest rates, which led to 
"liberal extension of credit to households and firms, often for unproductive 
purposes at a rapidly expanding and ultimately unsustainable rate", (Hermans, 
1996). In addition, there was the introduction of the government's motor vehicle 
and home loan schemes which offered the commercial banks risk free lending 
opportunities to central government emplovees, who accounted for close to 30 
percent of those in formal sector employment by the end of 1993 (Bank of 
Botswana Annual Report, 1993). These developments explain the high rate of 
credit growth between the late 1980s to the earl), 1990s (see figure 4.6 below). 
Due to these undesirable outcomes of the low interest rate policy, the financial 
sector was liberalised with all forms of controls on interest rates removed so that 
commercial banks were able to determine their lending rates. In addition, the 
Bank of Botswana also introduced its paper, the Bank of Botswana Certificates, 
which is an instrument for liquidity management. The Bank of Botswana 
Certificates were introduced in May 1991. Commercial banks reduced credit 
expansion as some of their funds were absorbed by the Certificates. 
As a result of these, commercial bank credit declined until mid-1996 and then 
started to rise again. Commercial banks indicated that by early 1997, there was 
significant competition for lending to "good borrowers", with some loans being 
made at interest rates below their prime lending rates, hence the increase in 
credit from 1996 (Bank of Botswana Annual Report, 1998). 
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By extending credit at rates below their own prime lending rates, it is obvious 
that the efforts of the monetary authorities to curtail credit growth for fear of 
inflationary pressures were being undermined. Since commercial banks were 
prepared to lend at below market rates (or below their own prime lending rates), 
it did not really matter by how much the monetary authorities adjusted the 
policy rate and whether commercial banks also adjusted their lending rates 
accordingly. Changes in the policy rate and the lending rates did not mean 
anything to borrowers since the situation was such that commercial banks were 
lending at below these rates. In such situations, monetary policy would not have 
the desired impact on credit growth hence domestic demand and domestic 
inflationary pressures. Consequently, the prevailing rates were not a true 
reflection of the cost of capital. Furthermore, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy was thus undermined by the actions of commercial banks. 
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Figure 4.6: AnnuaI Credit Growth 
4.2.8 Financial Sector Development and Interest Rates 
just like in most other developing countries, the financial system in Botswana is 
less developed, which means that the choice is between money and real assets 
(land, buildings, etc. ). Other financial instruments that provide the transmission 
channel between these two extremes are very few. For example, Government 
bonds were only issued in 2003 with maturities of 2,5 and 12 years. These bonds 
were issued primarily to support capital market development. Other than that, 
the only available financial instrument has been the Bank of Botswana 
Certificates, which, even though were meant to be a liquidity management 
instrument, ended up being used as an investment instrument by commercial 
banks and other entities. There are a few public enterprises or parastatal bonds 
which have been issued, but with the investors adopting to buy and hold, there is 
little secondary market activity for such instruments. The absence of financial 
instruments therefore hampers the responsiveness of money holdings to interest 
rate changes. 
As the demand for the Bank of Botswana Certificates increased and the Bank of 
Botswana having to issue more and more certificates, interest rate expenses 
became very high and were considered unsustainable in the long run. The Bank 
of Botswana therefore, decided to review the Bank of Botswana Certificates 
auction system/ procedure in order to encourage investors to seek alternative 
investment avenues outside the country. Towards the end of 2005, The Bank of 
Botswana decided to reduce the number of primary participants to allow only 
commercial banks to participate. A press release issued in November 2005 stated 
that; 
"Since 1991, the Bank used Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs) for the 
conduct of open market operations. BoBCs are monetary policy instruments: 
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they were not meant to be a traditional investment instrument. However, 
over the years, especially following the fundia-ig of the Botswana Public 
Officers Pension Fund, investors have found BoBCs to be an attractive short- 
term investment instrument Tl-iis is reflected in non-bank participation in the 
BoBC market, which has increased substantially in recent years to the current 
level, where approximately 70 percent of the total outstanding amount of 
BoBCs of P13 billion are held by non-bank institutions and retail investors". 
The press release further stated that, "the BoBC system has worked well as a 
monetary policy instrument but, looking forward, the situation was seen to be 
unsustainable for the following reasons: 
a) For the conduct of monetary policy operations, international best practice 
is to limit the trading in monetary policy instruments betWeen a central 
bank and its monetary policy counterparties (the banks). In Botswana, 
non-bank institutions which invest funds in BoBCs either on their own 
accounts or on behalf of clients have enjoyed an advantage as such funds 
have not been liable to reserve requirements which commercial banks are 
required to hold; 
b) the availability of BoBCs as investment instruments for the general public 
has served to inhibit the development and introduction of other Pula- 
denominated financial instruments, e. g., corporate bonds, negotiable 
certificates and other money and capital market instruments; and, 
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c) As the outstanding amount of BoBCs has increased, the cost to the Bank of 
Botswana has also increased. This is especially the case for the holdings by 
non-bank investors". 
Interest rates in Botswana are high compared to trading partner countries, 
especially South Africa and therefore providing good investment returns. The 
Bank of Botswana Certificates, being a central bank paper was considered a good 
investment opportunity. However, given the lack of other financial instruments 
in the economy, be it long or short term, one would have thought that investors 
would invest their excess funds abroad, more so that exchange controls have 
been abolished. However, investors seem to be reluctant to do so and therefore 
changes in the operations of the Bank of Botswana certificates were seen as a way 
of contributing to the longer-term development of Botswana's financial markets. 
The need for investment instruments for the general public (institutional and 
private) will challenge the banking sector and other financial institutions to be 
innovative and provide alternative instruments. Meanwhile, investors have the 
opportunity to take advantage of investment opportunities available in the 
international market. 
4.2.9 Income and Inflation 
We have so far discovered that the Botswana economy is driven more by the 
diamond sector, as well as general government, which is also heavily dependent 
on the mining sector. This means that, in any analysis, including the 
transmission mechanism, it will not be unrealistic to treat income as an 
exogenous variable, determined mostly by factors outside the influence of 
Botswana's monetary authorities. With short term interest rates used as a polic) 
instrument by the monetary authorities, it is doubtful whether income responds 
to any significant extent to changes in interest rates. If at all, the response should 
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be very small. However, the statistical tests conducted below and the analysis in 
the next three chapters should shed light on the extent to which income responds 
to interest rate changes. 
In other countries, especially in the developed world, where other sectors other 
than mining and government (e. g., manufacturing and services sectors) and 
where the financial system is an important source of investrnent funding, one 
would expect the influence of interest rate changes to be very high. Domestic 
credit expansion discussed in the previous section may have contributed very 
little to income in Botswana. This is in view of the fact that in an open economy 
like Botswana with a very large import component in its consumption and 
investment goods, some of the income is lost in the form of payment for imports. 
On the other hand, Botswana inflation seems to contain relatively large import 
content from abroad, especially South Africa as evidenced by the relatively high 
correlation between the two countries' inflation rates depicted in figure 4.7 
above. Domestic inflationary pressures seem to account for a small proportion of 
the variation in domestic inflation. In fact, imported tradables account for 
46.97%, by weight, of the total consumer price index (CPI). Domestic tradables 
account for 23.79 %. 
Meanwhile, even though domestic tradables are defined as goods produced in 
Botswana, we also have to take note of the high import content of such goods 
given that Botswana is not well endowed in raw materials and therefore has to 
import most of the raw materials from other countries. For example, textile 
exports have very high import content. Textile factories in Botswana have to 
import cotton and cloth from outside in order to manufacture finished goods 
such as jeans and t-shirts. Furthermore, non-tradeables, which include mainIv, 
services such as rent and utility costs (e. g., power and water) account for the 
remaining 29.24% of the CPL The cost of services in Botswana also includes a 
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considerable amount of import prices. For example, the cost of building a house 
is an important factor in d etermining the level of rent of the house and/or its sale 
price. In Botswana, most of the raw materials used in the construction industry, 
including housing, are imported. Around 80% of the electricity consumed in 
Botswana is imported from South Africa, so is some of the water. So the cost of 
these services, even though they are classified under non-tradables, have an 
imported inflation component since for the purpose of computing inflation, 
prices are obtained at the retail level. h-i addition to imported inflation, there is 
also the impact of administered prices on inflation. Taking all these factors 
together, one would not be too far off in concluding that monetary policy in 
Botswana is bound to be ineffective or have a very limited influence on domestic 
price developments. The same goes for its influence on domestic demand for the 
reasons given above. 
4.3 Data Definitions, Transformations and properties 
Table 4.6 below shows a list of some of the key variables used in this study and 
their definitions and transformations, where necessary. However, before 
conducting any empirical analysis, it is important to have a better understanding 
of our data and data generating processes to avoid problems that may negatively 
impact on the results. For example, in regression analysis, we are interested in 
assessing the existence or otherwise of any economic relationships between any 
two or more variables. However, if the variables in the regression equation share 
a common trend, one may conclude that a relationship exists, while in fact what 
have been captured are the correlated time trends. This is the problem referred 
to as spurious regression in the econometrics literature. This problem arises 
when the variables are non-stationary. A stationary series tends to return to its 
mean value and fluctuate around it within a more-or-less constant range (i. e., it 
has a finite variance); while a non-stationary series has a different mean at 
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different points in time and its variance increases with the sample size (Harris, 
1995). In order to test for the order of integration of our data series, we conduct 
unit root tests using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, the Philhps-Perron 
(PP) test and the jNlulti test for unit root that allows for structural breaks. As 
indicated by Harris (1995), a unit root test which does not take account of the 
break in the series will have (very) low power. The JMulti test therefore also test 
for the existence of structural breaks in the series and incorporates them in the 
test for the presence of unit root. The results in tables 4.7 and 4.7b below indicate 
that all the series are 1 (1), i. e., stationarity is achieved by differencing once. 
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4.4 Statistical Tests 
Having looked at the main features of the Botswana economN 7, this section carries 
out simple statistical tests that could further assist us in understanding the 
interrelationships between the various economic variables of interest. As noted 
in chapter 3, there are various channels through which monetary policy actions 
are transmitted through the economy and the transmission mechanism assumes 
that certain variables are interrelated. For example, the Botswana Monetary 
Policy Framework, which has short term interest rate as the policy variable, and 
credit growth as the intermediate variable, with inflation as the objective 
assumes a strong negative relationship between interest rates and credit growth 
on the one hand; and a positive correlation between credit growth and inflation 
on the other. In this framework, credit growth is an indicator for growth in 
domestic demand. This also assumes a strong positive relationship between 
credit growth and domestic demand or income. Briefly, this is to say that there 
exists a systematic relationship between current rates of credit growth and future 
values of the price level and/or income. 
As another step towards understanding the transmission of monetary policy in 
Botswana, we estimate a series of Granger-causality tests in order to gain some 
additional insights into the interrelationships between our variables. This 
exercise is further complemented by the narrative approach and innovation 
accounting exercise to be carried out in the next three chapters, respectively. For 
example, impulse response functions from a VAR system are used to quantify 
and graphically depict the time paths of the effects of shocks on economic 
variables. 
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4.4.1 Granger-Causality Tests 
The Granger-causality tests in this section are meant to help us gain more insight 
into the interrelationships between our variables of interest. Granger causality 
tests are about finding out whether past values of a variable, sayX,, are 
important in explaining the behaviour of another variable, say ),. In other 
words, it is about finding out the effects of past values of X, on the current value 
of)'. By definition, F, is said to Granger causeX, if past values of Y help to 
forecast the future values of X, Given or having chosen a lag length, 1) the test 
involves running a bivariate regression of the form: 
X, = alo + al Ix'-1 . ........ + apx, -p +'81 
Jf-, . ...... +, Blpj I-r + 
J, 
(4.1) 
Y, = a2o + a2 1) 1-1 . .......... +a 
Y 
p 1-p 
+)62]Xi-l ++ )62pXl-p + V, 
We then test the null hypothesis that. 
Al ""= A12 = ..... =, 6,,, =0 in the X, equation; and 
A, = 1822 162r = 
O'n th e 
equation. 
It is possible to have a two-way causation, unidirectional causation or no 
feedback between the variables. A two-way causation means that X, Granger- 
causes ), and 1, also Granger-causesX, while a unidirectional causation means 
that either ), Granger-causes X, or X, Granger-causes I,, and not both. Iri this 
section, we look at Granger causality between a pair of the variables important in 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These include; income, 
exchange rates (bilateral and effective exchange rates- both real and nominal), 
money supply (all measures of money supply), private sector credit (total and a 
breakdown between businesses and house hold credit), the price level, and the 
policy interest rate. Since we are dealing with non-stationary variables, the I 
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procedure is that, where any two variables in the Granger-causality test exercise 
are cointegrated, the test will be conducted with the concerned variables in log 
levels. In the absence of any cointegrating relationship, the test will be 
conducted with variables in log first difference in order to avoid the problem of 
spurious regression that is often encountered in variable with unit roots. 
Selection of the lag length in each VAR used to test for G rang er-Causali ty is 
based on several selection criteria. Evie', A, s provides five lag length selection 
criteria" and it is possible for different criteria to suggest different leg lengths for 
a single VAR. For all the VARs estimated in this exercise, the lag length selected 
by the majority of the criteria and also produces plausible regression results will 
be selected. The selected lag length for each VAR, selected as per this procedure, 
is shown in parenthesis next to the degrees of freedom (df) in the table of results. 
The selected lag length is always one less the degrees of freedom. 
a) Monetary Policy Framework 
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, Botswana's monetary policy framework is 
based on the "assumption" and/or economic theory or understanding that there 
exists a strong link between interest rates, the policy rate in this case, and growth 
in private sector credit on the one hand, and growth in private sector credit and 
the price level or inflation on the other. ConsequentIv, we have the Bank Rate 
as the poliq tool, credit growth as the intermediate variable and inflation, as the 
final objective. Evidence from the Granger-causality tests suggests that there is 
indeed a causal relationship between the policy rate and private sector credit. 
The null hypothesis that changes in the policy rate (b7-)do not Granger-cause 
private sector credit (psc) was rejected at the 5% significance level (see results in 
table 4.7 below). This suggests that movements in the policy rate carry 
11 The lag length selection criteria are as follows: LIZ (Log likelihood Ratio test); FPE (Final 
Prediction Error); AIC (Akaike Information Criterion); SC (Schwartz Information Criterion); and 
HQ (Hannan-Quin Information Criterion). 
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information about the future evolution of private sector credit, which suggests 
that monetary authorities can use the policy, rate to influence the future direction 
of private sector credit. However, for policy to be successful, the relationship 
between the policy rate and credit growth should not only be strong, but should 
be negative as well. Unfortunately, the bivariate VAR from the Granger- 
causality tests indicate a positive relationship. Further analysis in the coming 
chapters should help us ascertain this relationship and hopefully help us explain 
why, there appears to be a positive relationship between credit growth and 
interest rates. We further divided private sector credit into two components, i. e., 
credit to the household sector (Ihhc) and that to businesses (Ibc). The null 
hypothesis that the policy rate does not Granger cause household credit was 
rejected at the 5% level and household credit was found to Granger cause 
inflation, i. e., the null hypothesis that household credit does not Granger cause 
inflation (dcpi) was rejected at the 5% level. 
Meanwhile, the null that the policy rate does not Granger-cause bush-less credit 
was rejected only atlO% and the null thatbusiness credit does not Granger-cause 
inflation was rejected at the 5% level. Two way causal relationships were 
confirmed between inflation and the three definitions of credit as well as between 
the policy rate and household credit. The results are also shown in table 4.8 
below. However, there seems to be a problem with these results as well. First, 
the bivariate VARs estimated from the Granger-causality tests indicate a positive 
relationship between the policy rate and all the three categories of credit (total 
credit, business and household credit). This implies that as interest rates rise, 
credit also increases. 
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ab le 4.8: Nio tie tan, PolicN Framework based VA R Granger Causa I itN, /Block Exogencit\ IN aId 
J c,; ts (Quarterk data from 1984Q1 to 2004Q4). 
Dependentvariable: Chamýe in the log of Pri% ate Sector Credit - D(I. PSC) 
FACIU(R'd h i-,, q Pi-oh. 
D(51") -. 4mi 1 (). 0230 
Dependent variable: Change in the Bank of Botsivana Lending Rate - D(BOl"I 1. ") 
Chi-sLj Ll 
0 
Dependent variable: Change in the Bank of Botswana Lending Rate - 
f \JLlJ('d dt 
(I -1"C) 2.004o48 I 
1()l 0.1478 
Dependent variabie: Change in the log of Business Credit - 1)(1.11, C) 
I \Judcd 011-SLI dt Pl-ob. 
0 
Dependent variable: Change in the Batik of Botswana Lending Rate - D(BOBLR) 
E\C IU de dC Ili LI t P ro 1). 
1-)(1-111 Ic) 4 -5 
841 
Dependent variable: Change in the log of Household Credit - D(l. I-lHC) 
l. \CIU ed dt Prob. 
7.41,1 1 1()l 0.00o-I 
Dependent variable: log of Private Sector Credit - LPSC 
i'wiLl'it'd clli-sq I)f Prob. 
c). -, L)-, l 70 4 
Dependent variable: log of the Consumet Price Index - CPI 
\CILldcd 
L PCIC 10.2 2204 0.0108 
Dependent variabie: Log of Business Credit - LBC 
Prob. 
p -5 (-)4 01 4 17,1 0.04(io 
De pendent variable: log of the Consumer Price Index - LCPI 
f, \CIU ded dt Prob. 
I fic 
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cv-, (' Is ills ) stiltistic, 111v Second, the relationship betiveen credit and the polic. 1 it 
ins igil If ic a nt. These tx, \-o observations mlght be an Indh"ItIon that crcdlt 
developments are, to a large extent, independent of chano, es in interest rmes, 
HoNvever, before reaching, s-LIC11 a bOld C011CILIS1011,11101V WStS 1100d tO hC 
conducted and this is clone hi the coming chapters. 
b) Interest Rates and Income 
Molletary policy is not Only Concerned with the price lovel or fill-LiLion. ()Lltl)Llt 
fluctuations are also a matLer of policv concern. Thdt is vdiv, lor e\ample, moý, t 
centi-al banks' reaction ftlIlCtiolls ill the developed Coullti-io" Call be described t'v 
Taylor type rules that Indicate IIONN 111011LýL: 11'\- tldJLISL 111t(TOSt FMOI, Ill 
response to deviations of current inflation and current output from Some Lic"ired 
levels. To that extent, monetary Policy Ou'ght to be able to influence re'll output, 
at lecist in die short to medium term, gIvell price and wazo)c I lowever, 
the 111111 hypothesis that the Policy rate does not Granger CLILISC ]VLAI 111CM11C \N 11, 
gnificance 
level (see table 4. () below). not rejected at Lhe 5"o sig 
Ta I-) Ie4.9: Policy rate and real income VAR Granger-Causality/Block Fxogencitv 
Wald Tests (Quarteriv data from IL), 1,4Q] to 2004Q4). 
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Prob. 
0- D(BOBLR) 0.808"N' 1 loso 
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line with Lhe observations made above about how income is t,, eiierated iii 
Botswana. Since, die economy is driven 1-)ý mineral evorts; it i" Ilot sm-prisilic", 
Lhat changes iii the dornesfic interest rates may have no or little iiii'lLienkc on 
income. This leads us to die qLWSHon of whedler foreipi danand LOW c\phill 
movements in domestic GDP as dAcussed in section 4. o. 2 above. 1-1()\\ (, \ ei-, test.,, 
indicate that world GDP or demand (1r), ) dws not Gran; Wr-caum, donwstic Ulf' 
(the IILIII hypodlesi" that ý\ orld GDP does not Granger-cause domestic GDP was 
not rejecody This could be parHy due to tile fact that the proportioll (d 
exports to the UK and Europe, are mineral and beef (, \I')oi, t,,. 
The diamond market A highly regulated with most dianuinds chamidivd 
thrOU, (Ill a SingIC sLIppliCr, the Dianmid Tradino) Compariv lorirwrlý 
knovvii as dic Central Sellinco, org"Illisation (CSO). Botswana 1" a Illembel, ot till" 
cartel and as reported by Magall'g, th'it, "to 111,1xilill"c the Iýolgrezoclt(, Villuc ()\ cr 
I Is 
the long-term, it is necessary to even out peaks and troughs of the free market 
spot price in order to bring stability and predictability to the downstream 
segments of the diamond jewellery industry". He further noted that, "History 
has shown that at particular times and for particular reasons, it is necessary to 
withhold certain quantities or types of diamonds from the market. There are 
times when it is desirable, in the long-term interest of the strength of the 
industry, for producers to agree not to flood the market with diamonds, which 
cannot be smoothly absorbed into the manufacturing pipeline to feed the 
jewellery market". The DTC, which is the sales and marketing arm of the 
diamond mining company, De Beers, receives rough diamonds, mainly from 
Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania and Namibia. Diamonds are then sorted and 
valued before being sold. Member countries are each allocated quotas. 
DTC restricts supply during times of low demand and then increases supply 
when conditions improve. For example, it was reported on 
http: //www. mbendi. com/orgs/cbfp. htm, that during the first quarter of 1998, 
"Rough diamonds worth only US$800 million were released to traders by the 
Central Selling Organisation compared to $1.8 billion in the same months of 
1997". The report further states that, "this was due to the drop in demand from 
Asian markets, particularly Japan". This indicates that the demand and supply 
conditions, hence diamond prices are in a way manipulated so that the), do not 
fully reflect the market conditions. For example, if supply is controlled, this 
means that prices remain stable unlike in a situation where prices are let to 
fluctuate with market conditions. Since GDP captures the value of diamonds 
produced and sold to the DTC in any given period and not necessarily the value 
of diamonds sold to the world markets, this provide one possible reason why 
there seems to be no relation between world demand and domestic GDP even 
though it is driven by mineral exports, which should be highly correlated to 
world demand. 
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C) Output and Credit 
Meanwhile, there seems to be a Stl'011") CcILI-Scll IVlcItI()1`IshIl) hChV0011 F('cll OLIIJ)Lit Z 
and priva te sec to r credit with ýI II the th I, ee 11N, IN) tilt's IS tj Idt F('d I OL It I) Lit d( R", I I( )t 
Grang, er cause Hit, three categories of credit (i. e., totcll CIVdit, IIOLIýWhkdd dild 
hLIsMeSs CI-edit) all I-ej(, 'CtOLI dt the -1 % level with 110 R'V01's(' CdLIScIlitV IOLIIIJ 
table 4.10 below). 
I-able 4.10: The policy rate, credit and real income VAR Gran,! ler-Ca if ý,, a 
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Exogeneih- VVald Tests (QuarterIv data from -I-)84Q I to 2004Q4). 
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d) Interest Rates and Money Supply 
Of all measures of money supply (M1, M2, M3 and the monetary base), the 
policy rate was found to significantly Granger cause M1 and the Monetary Base 
at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. There was also some marginal evidence of 
M3 Granger causing the policy rate at the 10% level, which could be an 
indication that monetary authorities also consider the growth in money supply 
when adjusting the policy rate (refer to table 4.11 below). The narrow money 
supply variable (Ml) consists of notes outside the banking system plus demand 
deposits. Since money held in this form does not earn interest, a rise in interest 
rates increases the opportunity cost of holding monev, hence a negative 
relationship between the two. However, even though the bivariate VAR from 
the Granger-causality tests indicate a statistically significant negative 
relationship (with a t-value of -2.25), the interest rate elasticity/coefficient is very 
small (0.002). This means that the interest rate will have to rise by a very big 
margin in order to induce a significant switch from money to other assets. To a 
certain extent, the results are reflection of the lack of financial instruments in the 
economy. 
e) Inflation and the Exchange Rates 
In an open economy with well developed financial markets and a floating 
exchange rate regime, the exchange rate channel is very important in the 
transmission of monetary policy. For example, an increase in the policy rate that 
leads to increases in money market interest rates will attract foreign capital, 
which, in turn, will lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. An appreciation 
of the exchange rate helps to reduce the impact of imported inflation on domestic 
prices. Therefore, monetary authorities can use monetary policy to influence 
movements in the exchange rates in the desired direction. In the case of 
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Botswana NvIth a fixed exchange rate svstem (the Pula 1" fiwd to a bcl'ýket (d 
currencies Including flie SDR and South African Rand), we do not expect intcreýt 
rates to hifluence exchange rates movements. MOVUl"I'l(Albl III the I"ItOS 
reflect, more Lhan am-thing, movements in the bilateral rat(-, III dw currelICY 
ba, ýk(, L, e-specially the movement of the South Afric, in Rand aýgamst other 
ctl 11'ellcies. 
Tab] e 4.11: The policy rate and nioney supply VAR Graiigei--(. 'atz,,, ilitN, /rloci< 
eneity I'Vald Tests (QuartcrIv data from Ic)84QI to 2004Q4). Exog , 
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The South African Rand is said to carry more weight12 in the basket than the 
other currencies in the basket. The domestic currency is not allowed to 
appreciate against major trading partner countries, especially against the South 
African Rand. For example, Atta, et al., (2000) noted that, "when the Rand 
depreciates against the US dollar, Botswana becomes more competitive against 
the rest of the world; there is a windfall gain on exports and foreign exchange 
reserves, and Botswana does not have to initiate a policy response. If the Rand 
appreciates against the dollar, the opposite occurs". This is meant to encourage 
export competitiveness in the international market in order to help diversify the 
economy away from mineral exports and encourage manufacturing. It is against 
this background that nominal devaluations are carried out from time to time 
whenever the exchange rate is considered to have appreciated to levels outside 
the desired range. 
However, nominal devaluations also create a lot of problems for price stability 
since they are always accompanied by increases in inflation. For example, in 
February 2004, the Pula was devalued by 7.5% and following the devaluation, 0 
inflation rose from around 6% before the devaluation to more than 7% towards 
the end of the year. A further devaluation by 12% percent towards the end of 
June 2005 saw inflation rising again from around 6% before the devaluation to 
more than 10% by the end of the year. This phenomenon was also observed by 
Atta, et al., who noted that "In practice there may be a conflict between the two 
key policy objectives since the objective of maintaining stable prices, requires 
exchange rate stability, and maintaining export price competitiveness, requires 
devaluation. Typically, efforts to stimulate the competitiveness of non- 
traditional exports involve devaluation of the nominal exchange rate in order to 
alter the real exchange rate and improve the incentive structure facing producers. 0 
12 Weights in the currency basket are a heavily guarded secret, only known to members of the 
exchange rate committee comprising of some staff from the Bank of Botswana and the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning. 
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On the other hand, devaluation will clkoo increase Lhc price of importc, and I)Ll.,, Il 
Lip domestic inflation". 
Results of the Granger-caus'llit-Y tests In table 4.12 below indicate Umt, t1w null 
hypotheses alat the Policy rate d(-)('S ]lot the 110111illdl 
exchan, ge rate (Inrp) was not rejected. HoNvever, the null 1wpoffiesis th, it the 
nominal rand-pula ewhaiwe rate does not Granoer-cause inflation was not 11 C-) 
relected at flie -5 percent 
luvel Of significance. 11 
Table 4.12: Policy rate and the Exchange Rate VAR C. i-aii,, ei--CatisalitN, /I-', Iock 
I-xogeneity lVald Tests (QuarterIN, clata from 1L)S4Q 1 to 2004Q 
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These results llic-licate how efforts of the moncLarv authoritw,, to I'wht infl, iti 1 1011 
cll'(' Undermined I-, \- die owlidnge rcIte policy. However, the policy i,, con"Idered 
appropriate given the structure of thc Botswana economy. lo till-, end, Atta, ('t Z-) - 
al, noted diat "In the conte\t of proillo till ý0,11011-traditional - heyond 
diamonds and beef - policy mea,, UIVS to pl'()tC'Ct P)0t', VVcllld'S 
C0111petitivelless become critical. To this end P)()Ls\v, m, i li, i,, lonzo) relied on a 
1-14 
nominal exchange rate. " These results therefore rule out the exchange rate as a 
channel for the transmission mechanism (there is no link between the policy rate 
and chanues in the exchange rate). 0 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen how the Botswana economy is structured, with the 
country overly dependent on traditional exports, i. e., especially diamonds. I've 
have also pointed out to the weakness of the published quarterly GDP data and 
therefore constructed another quarterly GDP series using the Chow-Lin 
approach. The newly constructed quarterly GDP series is used in this study. 
A number of statistical tests were also conducted and the results provide useful 
insights to the transmission of policy in Botswana and therefore provide a basis 
for understanding and interpreting results of the analysis in the next three 01 
chapters. At this stage, it suffices to say that even though there appears to be 
interrelationships between some variables, it is still too early to reach firm 
conclusions regarding the transmission of monetary policy in Botswana. 
However, we could reasonably rule out the exchange rate channel. 
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Chapter 5 
The Narrative Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
The Narrative Approach provides an important first stage in the investigation of 
the transmission mechanism in that it allows us to establish the economic history 
of the periods in question. It is also useful, for example, in cases where the data 
series are short and therefore when VAR analysis becomes difficult. A brief 
overview of the narrative approach and the main concepts behind the approach 
and its underlying assumptions are discussed in section 5.2. 
As we shall see below, the narrative approach requires that we identify major 
monetary shocks in the economy; this is the subject of discussion in section 5.3 
with particular reference to the case of Botswana. The methodology and 
empirical results follow in sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Concluding remarks 
are covered under section 5.6. 
5.2 The Narrative Approach Defined 
The narrative approach was first used by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and 
later adopted by Romer and Romer (1989). More recently, De Fiore (1998) 
adapted it when analysing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in 
Israel. In this paper, we follow the same procedures as applied by Romer and 
Romer (1989) and De Fiore (1998). Even though the narrative approach has its 
own theoretical and practical appeal, it is nevertheless not as popular as other 
analytical methods such as vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. Romer and 
Romer noted that, "despite its significance, however, the narrative approach has 
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been largely neglected in formal research in the 25 years since Friedman and 
Schwartz's work". 
According to Romer and Romer, the central element of the narrative approach is 
that it identifies monetary shocks through non-statistical procedures, hence its 
name. Some approaches to estimating the transmission mechanism, such as 
vector autoregressions, have been criticised as being atheoretical and unable to 
identify the direction of causation. The problem of reverse causation, that is 
difficult to deal with using statistical approaches, is here dealt with through 
identifying large shifts in monetary policy not prompted by developments on the 
real side of the economy. To do this we rely on the historical records of the 
monetary authorities. 
Friedman and Schwartz define a monetary shock as "a monetary movement 
entirely unrelated to underlying economic developments". However, Romer and 
Romer are of the view that such a definition is likely to create some "judgement 
and unconscious bias". The bias arises due to the fact that, "Friedman and 
Schwartz's judgement is central to their identification of a shock; they must 
weigh a broad range of factors and decide whether the evidence as a whole 
indicates that a shock occurred". As a way of eliminating this bias, Romer and 
Romer adopt a narrow definition of a monetary shock by restricting their focus to 
what they consider "an era where a more precise definition of a shock can be 
specified". Accordingly, they define a shock to mean "only episodes in which 
monetary authorities attempted to exert a contractionary influence on the 
economy in order to reduce inflation". Defining a shock in this manner has 
several advantages. First, "it defines a shock in narrow and concrete terms". 
Second, Romer and Romer believe that "policy decisions to attempt to cure 
inflation come as close as practically possible to being independent of factors that 
affect real output". Central banks do provide and keep records explaining their 
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actions and it is from such records that such episodes as defined by Romer and 
Romer can be identified. 
5.3 The Case of Botswana 
The Bank of Botswana uses the Bank Rate as its policy instrument in order to 
achieve its objective of attaining and maintaii-iing low inflation. As such, the 
Bank increases its policy rate when inflation is considered high and lowers it 
when inflation is considered lower than the objective range. n-le narrative 
approach requires that we select episodes of monetary policy shocks aimed at 
reducing inflation. We, as a result, rely on the available data on the policy rate 
and the Bank's press releases issued at the time the policy rate was adjusted. For 
the purpose of transparency, the Bank of Botswana issues press releases ever), 
time there is a policy rate adjustment in order to explain to the businesses and 
the public at large why it was considered necessary to adjust the policy rate. 
Figure 5.1 below plots the policy rate (the Bank Rate) and annual inflation 
between 1985 and 2004. Even though there has been a series of policy rate 
adjustments, we can identify two episodes as the key reference points for our 
investigation. 
5.3.1 Episode 1: August 1990 
Before August 1990 the Bank of Botswana lending rate or Bank Rate, in short, 
remained unchanged at 6.5% for more than two years. Meanwhile, inflation was 
above the nominal interest rate and averaged 10.3 % for the 31 months period that 
the policy rate was kept at 6.5%. This meant that the real rate was negative and 
as a result credit growth accelerated to more than 40% for most of the time. The 
high rate of credit growth meant that inflationary pressures were building up. In 
addition to the rise in inflationary pressures emanating from the domestic front, 
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there were also fears of imported inflationary pressures resulting from the rise in 
South African inflation. South African inflation was above 10% and also rising to 
reach a maximum of 16.6% in October 1991. It remained at double digits until 
December 1992 when it fell to 9.3%. In order to deal with the problem of high 
inflation, the Bank of Botswana started a series of upward policy rate 
adjustments and saw the Bank Rate rising from 6.5% in July 1990 to 8.5% in 
August 1990 and up to 14.5'//0 in January 1993. The upwards adjustments in the 
policy rate from August 1990 onwards was considered necessary given the rise in 
inflation during the period. As mentioned above, inflation had been rising, from 
6.6% in May 1988 to as high as 17.6% in June 1992 and remained at double digits 
until October 1994 when it feel to 9.7%. 
All the press releases issued after every policy rate adjustment stated high 
inflation as the reason behind the adjustments. For example, in August 1990, the 
Bank of Botswana Press Release stated that, "In making the adjustment, the Bank 
noted that there are inflationary pressures building up in Botswana, due to both 
external and domestic factors, and this has made it imperative for the Bank to 
take appropriate measures to pre-empt the resurgence of these pressures. The 
annual inflation rate had dropped to 5.9 percent in July 1998 but increased to 6.4 
percent in August". The Bank further noted that "the year-on-year inflation in 
South Africa is beginning to rise and there are strong expectations of further 
increases in that country's inflation rate. This surge in the inflation rate is 
expected eventually to be transmitted to Botswana given our trading relations". 
5.3.2 Episode 2: June 1998 
Before June 1998, the policy rate followed a downward trend, falling from 14.5 % 
in October 1993 to 11.75 percent in May 1998. The June 1998 adjustment was the 
first, in a series of several other upward policy rate adjustments. Even though 
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inflation in Botswana was rulativeiv low compared to historicid levok, Lhere wcre 
fears of increasing, inflationary pressures frorn tile increase ill Credit Ul. 
Figure 5.1: Annual Inflation and the Policy Rate (Bank Rate) 
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In April 1998, the Government incredsod public Sector Salari(-, by 25",, across Lllc 
board and this partly contributed to all increase III O'edit Cgrowdl &ý PubliC 
sen-aiiLs qL1,11ified for and borrowed more monev from commercial hank,,. 
NioneLiry audiorities feared that the increase ill Public e\penditure, trom 
Increase U1 salarles as Nvell as credit grovvtll, would lead to donlestic Ill 11) tiolmrv 
pressures. At the end of 1009, the Bank of Botsvvana noted that, "At the 
of the vear, it became evident diat the upward Lrend in inflition, 
which beg'all in tile latter part of JQQ8, would continue. The rvýe in infl, ition vvaý, 
larg, ely clue to the rapid expansion in botli priv, ite and public c\penditure. 
Private sector expenditure oroxvth was Supported by suhýtalltl, ll Inciv0s(", Ill 
domestic credit", Bank of Botswana Annual Report (100P). The Bank of 
Botsw ana further noted that, "I nan effort to curb grmvt Ii of credit cind, tI it, re I orc, 0 
I 
ý, () 
contain the rise in inflation, the Bank raised the Bank Rate twice during the year. 
The adjustments were a continuation of a restrictive policy stance which was 
started in 1998". 
5.4 Methodology 
Having identified the two important monetary episodes as focal points for our 
analysis and satisfied ourselves beyond any reasonable doubt that the policy 
shocks were meant for nothing else other than to fight inflation, we use 
univariate dynamic analySiS13 to explore how the selected episodes of monetary 
tightening impacted on some of the key macroeconomic variables in the 
economy. In other words, we seek to determine how some key macroeconomic 
variables deviate from their "normal behaviour" as suggested by the cumulative 
forecast errors estimated by the univariate equations, following monetary policy 
tightening. As noted by De Fiore (1989), the idea is that the estimated equation 
approximates the normal behaviour of the variable in question. We consider the 
following variables: total credit, credit to the household sector, credit to 
businesses, real money balances (M1, M2, M3 and the monetary base) as well as 
exchange rates. Inflation or the consumer price index is not considered in this 
analysis because the choice of variables to be investigated is determined by the 
transmission channels we want to investigate. For example, the response of 
exchange rate to policy changes provides an irisight into the operation of the 
exchange rate channel. Real income and money supply responses point towards 
the interest rate channel. Likewise, credit variables should help us understand 
the credit channel. 
13 Univariate analysis involves, first, modelling the "normal" path of the variable of interest as an 
autoregressive process over the entire sample. Then, following each monetary shock, forecasts 
are obtained on the basis of the estimated relation. The forecasts approximate the path that 
would have prevailed in the absence of a monetary shock and cumulative forecast errors provide 
a measure of the effect of monetary policy on the variable considered, a given period after the 
shock (see, for example, De Fiore, Romer and Romer; and Friedman and Schivartz). 
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Given data limitations, we are unable to assess the balance sheet and bank 
lending channels separately; we as a result, focus on the broad credit channel of 
the transmission mechanism. Meanwhile, since policy shocks affect prices or 
inflation through these channels, the narrative approach focuses on the 
transmission variables stated above only and not the final outcome, which is 
inflation (refer to figure 3.1 or 3.2 in chapter 3). The procedure is as follows: 
5.4.1 Real Activity 
We noted in chapter 4 that economic activity in Botswana is driven mainly by 
mining. Mining is the largest sector fi-i the economy, followed by general 
government. We also noted that other sectors of the economy, including 
government, relv to a very large extent on the operations of the mining sector. 
Form these; one is inclined to conclude that monetary policy has no or little 
impact on economic activity. To investigate this hypothesis through the 
narrative approach, we first estimate the normal path of real activity as follows: 
'60 + flit + 
(5.1) 
Wliere fl, is a constant; i is a time trend; 17 is the number of lagS14 in the 
regression equation; and AY is quarterly percentage change in output. Since we 
are dealing with quarterly data, n is set equal to four or more quarters. To 
determine the impact of monetary policy tightening on real activitý,, we compute 
the cumulative forecasting errors from the date of the monetary shock up to eight 
quarters after the shock. Cumulative forecast errors are computed from the 
14 Own lags are included to capture the normal dynamics of the series (Romer and Romer, 1989). 
In addition, they control for the possibility that monetary authorities' policies tend to turn 
11 
contractionary after periods of strong growth that might naturally be followed by downturns 
even in the absence of a shift in monetary policy. 
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foHowing equation; 
CFE, G,, - yj (5.2) 
5.4.2 Exchange Rates 
For the exchange rate, the "normal" behaviour is given by; 
Ae, =a+ YAe, (5.3) 
Where Ae is the monthly percentage change in the nominal exchange rate. The 
same equation is estimated for the change in nominal effective exchange rate. 
From equation 5.3, we calculate the in-sample dynamic forecasts, which will 
enable us to compute forecast errors as the difference between actual and 
forecasted values of the percentage changes. Cumulative forecast errors are 
computed from equation (5.4) below: 
CFEI' (e, - e, f 
5.4.3 Other Variables 
(5.4) 
To take into account the fact that other variables whilst likely to be affected by 
monetary policy, they are also subject to cyclical changes; two regressions are 
estimated for each variable. The first regression is a simple univariate regression 
equation similar to (5.1) above. Denoting each variable, in turn, byZ,, the 
"normal" path for each variable is given by: 
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1 
A In Z, =c+st+zr, A In Z, -, +C, 
(5.5) 
l=I 
The regression equation includes a constant, c time trend, i and an the variables 
are in log first differences. The difference between the actual and forecasted 
difference of the log variable gives the forecast errors, which are then cumulated 
to determine the overall effect of monetary policy tightening on the respective 
variables from the date of the shock up to time i. Cumulative forecast errors up 
to time t are given by: 
CI'EIZ =ý(A]nZ, -Af InZ, 
) 
,. i 
(5.6) 
In the second rearession, we take into account cyclical movements in die 01 
variables that could be due to other shocks, such as shocks to output or changes 
in output. To try and capture this, the log of the first difference in Z, is regressed 
on a constant, a trend, ii own lags and p leads and lags of the log changes in 
output. Inclusion of leads and lags of the change in output is meant to capture 
the fact that Z, may be affected by both the expected and past changes in 
output, respectively. The regression equation is given by (5.7) below. 
n 
A In Z, =b+ bli + 2: o, A In Z, +±A In j-, + ý, (5.7) 
l=I j=-p 
Likewise, in order to determine the impact of monetary polic), tightening, we 
compute forecast errors being the difference between the "normal path" as 
predicted by equation (5.7) and the actual values of Z, and cumulate them up 
to period t as per (5.8) below. 
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CFE, z = 2: (A In Z, - A' In Z, ) 
, =i 
5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Interest Rates and Real Activity 
(5.8) 
Table 5.1 below presents the response of real activitý, or real output (y) to 
interest rate changes. 
Table 5.1: Cumulative Forecast Errors for Real Outvut* 
Quarters after shock 1990Q3 199SQ2 
1 -0.013 -0.053 
2 1 -0.043 -0.023 
3 -0.068 -0.050 
4 -0.093 0.070 
5 -0.110 0.058 
6 -0.123 0.039 
7 -0.159 0.017 
8 -0.181 -0.021 
*Cumulative deviation of quarterly percentage growth in real output from its forecasted level. 
Following the two monetary episodes, real output declined, i. e., real output 
appears lower than what it would have been had there been no policy shock; the 
policy shock of the first episode has a maximum negative impact on real output 
of -18.1%15 after 8 quarters and minimum negative impact of 1.3% after the first 
quarter. These results point towards a negative impact that policy shocks have 
on economic activity. However, following the second episode, real output falls 
Is Figures reported in the tables are multiplied by 100 in order to convert forecast errors to 
percentages. 
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for only three quarters after the shock and then rises thereafter. TI-Iis could be a 
reflection of the fact that the first episode was more severe than the second. The 
first episode saw interest rates rising from 6.5% in July 1990 to 14.5% in January 
1993 (an increase of 800 basis points), while in the second episode, interest rates 
rose from 11.75% in March 1998 to 14.25 in August 2000 (an increase of 250 basis 
points). For the United States of America, Romer and Romer conclude that 
monetary shocks have long-lived effects on real activity. Meanwhile, De Fiore 
concludes that "overall the quantitative impact of monetary shock on aggregate 
production is relatively small, particularly when compared with the results 
obtained in the literature for the United States. 
5.5.2 Interest Rates and Exchange Rates 
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis that 
Botswana operated a pegged exchange rate system until May 200516. From June 
2005, Botswana switched to a crawling peg exchange rate system. That being the 
case, the exchange rate movements are not purely determined by forces of 
demand and supply as is the case of a freely floating exchange rate system, but 
rather, by the basket mechanism (driven more by the respective currency 
weights) and the occasional adjustments by the authorities in order to align the 
exchange rate with economic fundamentals. Consequently, we expect monetary 
policy changes or monetary shocks to have little influence, if any, on the 
exchange rate. 
The dynamic forecasting exercise results, presented in table 5.2 below indicate 
that following the two episodes, the nominal exchange rate (the nominal 
exchange rate between the South African Rand and the Botswana Pula and the 
nominal effective exchange rate) depreciated relative to its trend forecast. After 
16 Our analysis covers the period up to December 2004. 
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the first episode, the exchange rate depreciated by up to 2.5% after seven months 
and started to appreciate thereafter17. The appreciation that started after the 
seventh month was halted by a 5'/0 devaluation of the nominal exchange rate in 
September 1991. The second episode was followed by an exchange rate 
depreciation of up to 4.9% after five months. Including dummy variables in the 
regression equations to account for devaluations that were undertaken during 
the period did not improve the results in any meaningful way. 
The depreciation of the exchange rate following a policy shock runs against 
economic expectations, at least in an open economy with free floating exchange 
rates. Ideally, in an open economy with free capital mobility and floating 
exchange rate, one would expect the exchange rate to appreciate following a 
monetary tightening. For example, following the three episodes identified by De 
Fiore for Israel, "the nominal exchange rate appreciates compared with the 
forecast, supporting the first step described by the exchange rate channel" and 
the peak effect of -6.3% occurs three months after the first shock. n-ie peak effect 
of the second shock is estimated at -8% after ten months, while the effect of the 
third shock is estimated at -3.9%. The difference in these results comes from the 
different exchange rate mechanisms and state of financial sector developments in 
the two countries. For instance, in the case of Botswana, a pegged exchange rate 
system means that exchange rate changes are independent of monetary policy 
actions, and therefore, follow the dictates of the basket mechanism. 
17 The pegged exchange rate systems allows for the exchange rate to fluctuate within a given range. It is 
not a strictly fixed exchange rate as in a currency board. Sometimes the authorities engage in a series of 
actions to ensure that the exchange rate depreciates for export coin petit iveness by either altering the basket 
weig , 
hts or the adjustment factor (however, such actions are strictly confidential and not known to anyone 
outside the exchange rate committee). Cý 
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Table 5.2: Cumulative Forecast Errors for Exchanze Rates* 
Months 
after the 
shock 
Nominal rand/pula Exchange Rate* 
1990MO8 1998MO6 
Nominal effective exchange rate 
1990M08 1998MO6 
1 -0.024 -0.01"? -0.04-7 -0.032 
2 -0.022 -0.005 -0.048 -0.034 
3 -0.025 -0.041 -0.044 -0,043 
4 -0.022 -0.042 -0.048 -0.041 
5 -0.020 -0.049 -0.045 -0.040 
6 -0.023 -0.029 -0.041 -0.036 
7 -0.0215 -0.028 -0.042 -0.034 
8 -0.023 -0.024 -0.042 -0.033 
9 -0.014 -0.029 -0.038 -0.031 
10 -0.013 -0.039 -0.036 -0,030 
11 -0.011 -0.031 -0.035 -0.028 
12 -0.008 -0.046 -0.033 -0.028 
13 -0.057 -0.029 -0,052 -0.024 
14 -0.060 -0.035 -0.087 -0.023 
15 -0.062 -0.037 -0.085 -0.021 
16 -0.059 -0.025 -0.087 -0.017 
17 -0.058 -0.027 -0.085 -0.016 
18 -0.056 -0.028 -0.082 -0.015 
19 -0.056 -0.022 -0.080 -0.012 
20 -0.056 -0.027 -0.078 -0.010 
21 -0.054 -0.012 -0.078 -0.006 
22 -0.055 -0.014 -0.076 -0.015 
23 -0.053 -0.021 -0.076 -0.028 
24 -0.045 -0.030 -0.076 -0.028 
*Cumulative deviation of monthly percentage change in the Exchange Rates from their 0 forecasted levels. A negative sign indicates an appreciation of the domestic currency. For 
example a forecast of 1.2 (normal path) relative to the actual exchange rate of 1.1 give a forecast 
error of -0.1. 
There is also the tinkeririg of the exchange rate by the authorities, that we 
referred to earlier, that is meant to promote export competitiveness for the 
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purpose of diversifying the economy. 
Further, Botswana may have abolished all forms of exchange controls, and thus 
allowing free capital mobility and may also have allowed the exchange rate to 
move within a given range, which should provide room for the exchange rate 
channel to be active, unfortunately, the less developed financial market in 
Botswana with very few financial instruments makes it difficult for foreign 
investors to take advantage of relatively high real interest rates in Botswana. The 
very limited financial instruments are mostly in the hands of locals who are 
happy to hold on to thern until maturity. Actually, when the Goverriment of 
Botswana first launched its bond issue in 2003, all the three bonds issued were 
over subscribed, mainly reflecting the existence of huge sums of money waiting 
to be invested in attractive financial instruments. In fact, the main objective of 
the bond issue was to help develop local capital markets by adding to the choice 
of available financial instruments and establishing a relatively risk-free yield 
curve to serve as a benchmark for other bond issues. 
There has also been a high demand for the Bank of Botswana Certificates, which 
resulted in the Bank of Botswana reviewing its operations in order to reduce 
interest expenses. The over-subscription of the Government bonds and the 
increasing demand for the Bank of Botswana Certificates was an indication of the 
excess demand for financial instruments in the economy. Furthermore, there is 
virtually no secondary market activity for these instruments (refer to chapter 4). 
That being the case one can reasonably conclude that, even though officially 
there are no capital controls, the free flow of capital is hampered by 
unavailability of financial instruments in the economy, in which case there are 
. 11 artificial" exchange controls that inhibit the free flow of capital. Moreover, 
given the exchange rate regime in Botswana, changes in the exchange rate are not 
driven by capital flows or market forces, but rather bv the exchange rate I 
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mechanism (e. g., movement of the South African rand exchange rate against 
major currencies and the relative weights in the currency basket). This is 
different from a case where the exchange rate band is maintained through 
sterilisation, i. e., buying and selling foreign currency in order to influence the 
exchange rate in a developed financial market. De Fiore noted that, "if a 
monetary tightening induces an inflow of foreign capital through higher interest 
rates, the central bank must sterilise the excess liquidity in order to attain the 
announced inflation target To the extent that sterilisation feeds back into higher 
domestic interest rates and in higher capital inflows, the effects described by die 
exchange rate channel are amplified". 
5.5.3 Interest Rates and Credit Growth 
This section seeks to investigate the importance of the credit channel in the 
transmission mechanism of policy in Botswana. From chapter 3, we have learnt 
that the credit view, as is normally referred to, is in two parts. There is the 
balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. The balance sheet channel 
focuses on the impact of monetary policy on the balance sheet of the borrower. 
For example, to the extent that monetary tightening leads to a deterioration of the 
borrower's financial position (due to increases in short-term interest payments, 
amongst others), and therefore his/her creditworthiness, this reduces the 
potential borrower's ability to borrow. Credit growth should, as a result, decline. 
On the other hand, the bank lending channel focuses on the banks ability to lend 
or extend credit as policy changes. A policy tightening reduces the banks' 
loanable funds, i. e., it reduces the availability of credit. 
Separating the two channels is empirically difficult in the sense that they operate 
simultaneously. However, to have an idea of the existence or otherwise of the 
balance sheet channel requires information on the balance sheet position of firms, 
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i. e., their short-term debt positions, interest rate expenses, etc. Such information 
is not readily available in Botswana. Therefore, our focus in this section is on 
credit extended by commercial banks to the private sector, which should help 
shed light on the operation of the bank lending channel. First, we estimate 
regression equation 5.5, which does not take into account cyclical movements in 
credit. The regression is estimated for total credit and its key components, i. e., 
business credit and credit to the households. Next, we estimate regression 
equation 5.7 for these credit components. Regression equation 5.7 includes four 
leads and lags of output to account for the cyclical movements in credit. 
Regression equation 5.5 is estimated on both monthly and quarterly basis 
whereas equation 5.7 is only on quarterly basis since we do not have monthly 
output series. Results are presented in tables 5.3 and 5.4 below. 
The results in table 5.3, indicate that credit fell during the first t-wo months 
following the first episode and increased thereafter. The second monetary 
episode did not induce any credit decrease. Takffig account of the cyclical 
movements in credit does not improve the results in an), meaningful way except 
that the rate of growth in credit is reduced when leads and lags of output are 
included in the regression (the first four columns of table 5.4). The same applies 
for household credit (last column in table 5.3 and the last two columns of table 
5.4). Generally, the picture is not any different for business credit, except that 
after the 1998 episode, business credit tended to fluctuate around zero. 
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From these results, one may reasonably conclude that interest rates have a 
limited impact on credit growth. The fact that credit growth fell for only two 
months following the first episode but did not respond or continued to grow 
after the second episode may be due to the magnitude of the two shocks. The 
first episode saw interest rates increasing sharply, by a larger amount (800 basis 
points) over two and a half years compared to an increase of only 350 basis 
points over a period spanning a little over four years. The second episode was 
therefore, relatively mild compared to the first one. One would therefore expect 
the impact of the first shock to be more severe and sustained. However, the 
decline was for only two months. The same goes for the impact on real economic 
activity in table 5.1 where the negative impact of the interest rate shock was felt, 
though small, after the first episode than the second. However, despite the large 
interest rate shock of the first episode, its impact on credit growth is only 
minimal with credit growth declining for only two months. Given the size of the 
shock, one would expect a more sustained decline in credit growth than just two 
months. 
The one conclusion that comes out of this analysis is that credit growth is less 
sensitive to interest rate changes, i. e., in order to have a tangible impact on credit 
growth, interest rates may have to be raised by a larger amount and sustained at 
higher levels for a longer period. This, therefore, has serious implications for the 
conduct of monetary policy in Botswana. If monetary policy actions have a very 
limited influence on the intermediate target, then it could mean that monetary 
policy is less effective, or that the Bank of Botswana might be using an ineffective 
monetary policy tool. We have seen from the Granger-causality exercise in 
chapter 4 that interest rates Granger-cause credit growth, but the bivariate VAR 
estimated from the Granger causality tests indicate a positive relationship 
between interest rates and credit. Addressing the question of why credit does 
not seem to respond to interest rate changes, as per the results of the narrative 
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approach, the following are possible explanations: 
a. The Government's financial assistance schemes may be 
undermining the role of commercial banks in credit allocation. 
That is, even if interest rates are increased, some borrowers who 
may have been rejected by commercial banks get the funds at 
subsidised rates from the Government financial schemes like 
CEDA. Currently, interest rates on CEDA loans range from 5% per 
annurn to 7.5% per annum depending on the size of the loan's. 
These compare to the commercial banks prime lending rate of 
16.5% per annum. With the high risk borrowers getting loans from 
Government schemes, firms that borrow from commercial banks 
are mainly the large and well established ones that are able to 
negotiate better loan terms. Since banks have excess liquidity, theý 
may be willing to lend at preferential rates to their "good 
customers" as has happened before (refer to section 4.2.7 in chapter 
4). The bank lending channel is strongest where commercial banks 
are the main source of credit. In the case of Botswana where there 
is access to cheap credit through Government, the role of 
commercial banks is undermined and the role of the bank lending 
channel may become insignificant. 
b. The past and current interest rates may not be high enough to 
dampen credit demand, especially for households. There is a 
general belief in Botswana that people are not sensitive to interest 
rate changes to the extend that some are willing to borrow at rates 
as high as 30 percent, which is almost double the commercial banks 
18 Interest rates on CEDA loans are fixed by Government and bear no relationship with the Bank 
of Botswana's monetary policy rate. 
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prime lending rate. Tl-iis "perception" was also echoed by the Bank 
of Botswana Governor in 2006. The Governor reportedly said that, 
"For years that I have been in the banking profession, I have been 
disheartened by observations and perceptions, which in some cases 
have been supported by facts, that Botswana citizens are consumer 
driven with an obsession for expensive vehicles and clothes. Such 
perceptions have led to the conclusion that the demand for luxury 
goods was high in Botswana. Botswana citizens are insensitive to 
the high cost of borrowing and would go to the extent of accessing 
credit on any terms in order to obtain and possess luxury items. 
As a result, man), of us tend to live beyond our means and 
generally end up with a debt trap and little or no accumulated 
wealth. High level of indebtedness is worsened by the rapid 
increase in instant cash moneylenders", Miiiegi, April 14,2006. 
C. It has been found elsewhere that the demand for credit contains a 
countercyclical component. For example, Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) argue that the countercyclical component of credit demand 
arises from the desire by households and firms to smooth the 
impact of cyclical variations in income on spending and 
production. As a result, firms and households may actually want 
to borrow after monetary tightening in order to make up for 
shortfalls in income and production. So, the observed increase in 
credit following the two monetary episodes may, in part, be a 
reflection of the cyclical behavior in credit demand and may not 
necessarily mean that the bank landing channel is inactive. 
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5.5.4 The Interest Rate Channel 
Results of the dynamic forecasting exercise presented in table 5.1 indicate that 
monetary shocks have a negative influence on real output, following both the 
1990 and 1998 monetary episodes, real output appears to fall. To further 
investiuate the existence or otherwise of the interest rate channel, we look at 0 
univariate regressions of real money supply(iiillcpi). Results are shown in 
tables 5.5 and 5.6 below. 
We estimate both regressions 5.5 and 5.7 and compute cumulative forecast errors 
as per equations 5.6 and 5.8. The narrow money supply (iiil) consists of currency 
outside banks plus demand or current account deposits, which do not earn 
interest. One would therefore expect the iii] money supply to decline with the 
increase in interest rate since the opportunity cost of holding money increases. 
Households and firms would therefore want to switch to interest earning assets 
as interest rates increase. 
Results from table 5.6 indicate that the impact of the 1990 episode on real money 
was negative, three months following the shock with a peak effect of -26.7 
percent occurring after 18 months. The effects of the second effects are mainly 
positive during the first 18 months and turn negative after 19 months. This 
could be due to the fact that the first episode was more severe compared to the 
second. The Granger-causality tests have also confirmed the negative 
relationship between interest rates and the iii] money supply. This could be an 
indication of the existence of the interest rate channel. just how strong it is, is 
difficult to tell from this exercise. 
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From table 5.6, results from regression 5.5, which accounts for output 
movements, also indicate that monetary policy shocks have a negative impact on 
money supply. Growth in money supply was less than what it would have been 
without a policy shock following both the first and second episodes. However, 
from regression 5.7, the initial response is positive, but then turns negative after 
six quarters, maybe indicating the lagged response of money supply to policy 
shocks. The comparative peak effects for Israel are estimated at -5.7% after 15 
months following the first shock. The results that account for output changes 
estimate a peak effect of -7.4% and -7.3% after 15 months for both the first and 
second shocks; and -1.6% after 4 months following the third shock19. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Assessing the monetary transmission mechanism is not an easy task. Adding to 
the difficulties, especially in developing countries like Botswana, is the lack of 
quality high frequency data. What we have in this chapter is our first attempt at 
estimating the transmission of monetary policy in Botswana. First, we have 
realised that monetary policy or interest rate changes have some influence 
(though limited) over the evolution of real output. The response of credit to 
monetary policy shocks is not as strong as one would expect. Following the first 
episode, credit growth responded accordingly, albeit briefly. Taking into 
account the countercyclical movement by including leads and lags of real output 
in the regression equation did not improve the results. 
Overall, these results indicate that the credit channel, in Botswana, is weak or 
less effective. We provided several possible explanations for this outcome. First, 
the role of Government, in her efforts to diversify the economy, is a major 
19 Since the analysis does not compare the severity of the shocks between the countries, we 
therefore can not reach any conclusion regarding the comparative strengths of the interest rate 
channel between these countries. 
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hindrance to the operation of the transmission mechanism. T'he Government 
runs grant/loan schemes that undermine the role of financial intermediaries. In 
that sense, financial intermediaries cede to be the only or the major sources of 
investment finance, which means that, the credit view or narrowly defined, the 
bank lending channel is no longer an important channel of the transmission 
mechanism as it would otherwise be the case if financial intermediaries were the 
only or the most important sources of investment finance. This partly explains 
why credit growth tends to increase following the two monetary episodes under 
investigation, although with only a decline for only two months after the first 
episode. 
Botswana's monetary policy framework was adopted on the understanding that 
there is a strong and negative relationship between interest rates and credit 
growth. However, if such a relationship or its strength is suspect, then one is 
likely to cast doubts over the effectiveness of monetary policy in Botswana. The 
underdeveloped financial system is also not helping the situation. The system is 
characterised by mainly two assets; there is money on the one hand and physical 
assets such as land on the other. Other short to medium and long-term financial 
assets that could fill in the gap between these two assets are almost non-existent. 
In developed financial markets, these assets facilitate the transition between 
money and physical assets in that interest rates changes prompt a switch 
between money and short-term financial assets with ease. It was also on the 
basis of these observations and many others that the IMF noted in 2004 that, 
"interest rates in Botswana do not reflect appropriately the market liquidity 
conditions". More of that is discussed in chapter 2. 
just like the Granger-causality tests in chapter 4, the dynamic forecasting exercise 
also indicate that we can reasonably rule out the role of the exchange rate 
channel. This is not surprising given Botswana's exchange rate policy, which is 
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driven more by the desire to diversify the economy through export 
competitiveness, than anything else. Iri a way, there are two conflicting 
objectives; one of export competitiveness, which requires nominal exchange rate 
devaluations and price stability which requires nominal appreciation or, at best, 
nominal stability. Nominal devaluations necessary for export competitiveness 
always lead to high inflation and thus defeat monetary policy objectives. 
Meanwhile, the fact that Botswana has a very narrow industrial base and import 
most of her consumption goods from South Africa and the fixed exchange rate 
regime where the South African Rand carries a higher weight in the currency 
basket means that imported inflation (from South Africa) is an important 
component of inflation in Botswana. Besides the imported inflation component, 
there is also the administered price component, hence leaving a very small 
proportion of inflation that is within the control of Botswana monetary policy 
authorities. One would, however, expect the imported component to dominate 
as evidenced by the close relationship between Botswana and South African 
inflation. Finallv, the response of real output and real money supply, to policy 
shocks indicate that the interest rate channel is also operational (the next two 
chapters should shed more light on this). 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analysis of transmission mechanism of monetary policy -a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapters 4 and 5 we concluded that there is a limited connection between the 
real economy and the monetary sector. The real economy is driven mainly by 
traditional and non-manufactured goods, mainly diamonds and beef exports and 
monetary policy has a very limited influence over the evolution of output. We 
also could not establish a strong negative relationship between credit growth and 
interest rate changes. Unless interest rates are adjusted by a relatively big 
amount, credit tends not to respond to interest rates changes. Furthermore, it 
was established, in chapter 4, that inflation in Botswana is highly correlated to 
that of South Africa, which provides more than 80 percent of Botswana's 
imports. 
Meanwhile, the analytical approach in chapter 5 above, termed the narrative 
approach is a very important analytical tool in as far as estimating the 
transmission mechanism is concerned and has important qualities that purely 
statistical methods such as vector autoregression, do not provide. For example, 
Romer and Romer (1989) state that, "statistical tests like regression of output on 
money, studies of the effects of anticipated and unanticipated money, and vector 
autoregressions cannot persuasively identifý, the direction of causation". 
Nonetheless, as stated in chapter 1, the various methods employed in assessing 
the transmission mechanism should not be seen as competing methods, but 
rather, should be regarded as complementary methods meant to unravel the 
complexities of the transmission mechanism. It is on this basis that, in order to 
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further provide an insight into Botswana's transmission mechanism, we in this 
chapter, adopt a vector autoregression (VAR) approach that allows for the 
interaction between two or more variables. We should therefore, be able to look 
at the interaction between monetarý 7 aggregates and prices as wen as the 
interaction between interest rates, domestic credit and prices. 
The VAR approach is very popular and has been used in a number of studies of 
the transmission mechanism. These include, Bernanke and Blinder (1992); 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Citu (2003), Arnoýtovd and Hurnik (2005); Bayoumi 
and Morsink (2001); Pattanaik and Kakes (2000); Smal and S. de Jager (2002) and 
others. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) also state that, "vector autoregressions 
have been used in an increasingly wide variety of econometric applications". 
The extensive use of the VAR in the analysis of the transmission mechanism 
stems from its flexibility and ease with which it allows for the time series 
analysis. It is argued that the use of VARs in empirical economics was 
introduced by Sims in 1980 who "demonstrated that VARs provide a flexible and 
tractable framework for analysing economic time series", Watson (1994). In 
analysing time series, one major problem often encountered is that of 
endogeneity or simultaneity. Tlie simultaneity problem arises from the fact that 
there is a reverse causality between economic time series. For example, 
"typically central banks raise interest rates when the economy strengthens and 
lowers them when the economy weakens", Citu (2003). A VAR analysis goes 
around this problem by treating all the variables in the system as potentially 
endogenous. To that extent, Bernanke and GertIer (1995) define a VAR as "a 
system of ordinary least squares regressions in which each of a set of variables is 
regressed on lagged values of both itself and the other variables in the set". For 
example a two variable or bivariate VAR is given by: 
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), = r,,, -r, 2x, + 0,, Y, + 0,2 X, -, + e, 
+02, ), Xf Y20 -y2l'i -I + 
022 XI-I + e2 
(6.1) 
With a VAR system such as in (6.1) above, we cannot use ordinary least squares 
for estimation. For estimation purposes, we need to transform the system into a 
reduced form equation system. The system we have in (6.1) is not reduced form 
since there is a contemporaneous effect of I, on X, and likewise, X, has a 
contemporaneous impact on),, which means that the error terms are correlated 
with the regressors. Using matrix algebra, we can present (6.1) as follows: 
1 Y12 j-" 710)+(011012)rli-l 
J" 
(r2l' )(X (r20 
02102ý, )ýX, 
-, 
We can also write (6.2) in a short form as: 
17o + 171,7, -1 + e, 
ev, Where B 
Y12 
z, r7o = 
(7, 
o 
); 
171 = 
011 012 
e, =. 
Y- I X, r2O 
(021022) (e. ) 
(6.2) 
We can then pre-multiply by the inverse of B, i. e., B-1 to obtain the VAR system in 
a standard form given by (6.3) below. 
Ao + A, --I-, + c, (6.3) 
Ao = B-' 
Where A, = B-', 70 
c, = B-'e, 
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Finally, defining element i of the vector A, as a, element in row i and column 
of matrix A, as a, and defining e,, to represent element i of the vector e, we can 
rewrite (6.3) as: 
Y, = alo + a,, )', -, + a,, 
X, 
-, +c, 
a,, +a,, Y, -, + a, -, 
X, 
-, + 6, 
(6.4) 
In (6.4), the assumption is that 7,2 = 721 == 0 in (6.1). This assumption eliminates 
the contemporaneous impact of 1, on X, and that of X, on ),, and ensures that 
the shocks c,, and -,, in the VAR system in (6.4) are not correlated with the 
regressors. An alternative assumption could be, either yl, =0 or Y2, = 0. Both 
assumptions ensure that the system is identified and therefore, can be reasonably 
estimated by the standard estimation techniques such as OLS. 
I 
6.2 Estimation Procedure 
In this chapter, we estimate two VAR models in order to investigate key 
macroeconomic responses to unanticipated policy shocks. We start with a basic 
monetary model (VAR1) that includes real output (1)), as a measure of economic 
activity, consumer price index (lepi), a money supply (e. g., 1n12) variable and the 
policy rate (boblr), arranged in that order. 
The second VAR model (VAR2) is an attempt to investigate the impact monetary 
policy has on bank lending activities. The Bank of Botswana has assigned 
private sector credit a prominent role in its monetary policy framework. Growth 
of credit to the private sector is the Bank of Botswana's intermediate target and 0 
as such it is considered to be an important channel for transmitting changes in 
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interest rates. Its responsiveness or otherwise to the change in monetary policy 
stance is therefore, very crucial. As an intermediate target, private sector credit 
has to respond to changes in the policy rate and in-turn, changes in the private 
sector credit emanating from a change in the policy stance should act as an 
indicator of inflationary developments via domestic demand. To that extent, we 
extend the basic model to include (in order) real output, the price index, private 
sector credit Qpsc) and the policy rate. 
Each of the VAR models described above has a maximum of four potentially 
endogenous variables. We also include some exogenous variables in order to 
take into account the fact that Botswana is a small open economy likely to be 
sensitive to a variety of foreign variables. Exogenous variables are therefore 
meant to control for changes in foreign demand and inflation. Given the strong 
economic links between Botswana and South Africa and the fact that South 
Africa is a big economy, relative to Botswana, which is also a major source of 
Botswana's imports, South African economic activities are bound to have 
considerable impact on Botswana. Our exogenous variables, therefore, include 
foreign consumer price index, measured by South Africa headline Consumer 
Price Index (sap)and real foreign demand, measured by world GDP(J'). By 
treating these variables as exogenous, the assumption is that there is no feedback 
from domestic variables to foreign variables, i. e., domestic variables have no 
influence over foreign variables. The potentially endogenous variables are real 
output, private sector credit, household credit, business credit, money supplý , 
the price index and the policy rate. 
Each VAR model is estimated in log levels, except the policy rate, in order to 
allow for implicit cointegrating relationships bet-, Aeen variables. To that extent, 0 
cointegration tests are conducted to establish the existence of cointegrating 
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relationships in our VAR models. Whereas some researchers would transform 
the non-stationary variables to make them stationary by differencing, there are 
strong arguments against this approach (see for example, Sims (1990), Sims, 
Stock and Watson (1990)). For example, Sims, Stock and Watson argue that, "the 
common practice of attempting to transform models to stationary form by 
differencing or cointegration operators whenever it appears likely that the data 
are integrated is in many ways unnecessary". Their argument is based on the 
following observations; first, the purpose of a VAR analysis is to 
capture/ determine the interrelationships that may exist between the variables 
and not to estimate model parameters. To that extent, estimating a VAR model 
with non-stationary variables should not pose any problems. Second and 
equally important is the fact that differencing discards information concerning 
the cointegrating relationships in the data, and those cointegrating relationships 
are what a VAR seeks to capture (see also Enders, 2004). This then means that 
for the purpose of estimating our VARs, we need to establish that a cointegrating 
vector exists first of all. 
6.3 Impulse Responses and Variance Decompositions 
One of the main advantages of the VAR is that, we are able to keep track of or 
trace how variables in the system respond or evolve overtime due to various 
shocks to the system. That is achieved by expressing our variables in the model 
in terms of the shocks and this gives rise to what is known as impulse response 
functions. In other words, an impulse response function indicates how the Y, 
and X, series in (6.4) above respond to the various shocks. We therefore 
estimate impulse response functions for all our VAR models described above. 
However, in order to do that, it is necessary to impose some identifying 
restrictions to the system. One such identification procedure is the well-known 
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Choleski decomposition. For example, the Choleski decomposition may restrict 
the system such that Y, has no contemporaneous impact onX, i. e., Y, only 
responds to a change in X, with a time lag or vice versa. Given the focus of this 
paper, we follow closely the identification procedure followed by Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) and latter adopted by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evan (1996), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Citu (2003) and others, which assumes that policy 
shocks do not have a contemporaneous impact on non-policy variables in the 
system. In other words, policy shocks affect the non-policy variables with a time 
lag (see also section 6.4 below). 
In addition to the impulse responses, we also estimate the variance 
decompositions for all the estimated VAR models. Variance decompositions 
help us to determine the source of variation in a series. In time series, a 
variable/ sequence may fluctuate overtime partly due to its own shocks and in 
part due to shocks to other variables. Variance decompositions, as such, help to 
determine the sources of economic fluctuations. 
6.4 The Identification Procedure 
The main objective of our study is to identify the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Botswana, i. e., we seek to determine how actions of the 
monetary authorities in Botswana impact on real economic activity. In other 
words, we want to establish the effects, in an economy, of a monetary policy 
change. Monetary authorities in Botswana indicate their monetary policy stance 
through changes in the short-term policy interest rate, the Bank Rate. An 
increase in the Bank Rate indicates contractionary or tightening of monetary 
policy while a reduction is an indication of expansionary monetary policy. 
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Bemanke and Blinder (1992) argue that, "one alternative to measuring the true 
structural effects of a policy change, is to try and isolate a direct measure of the 
monetary authorities' policy". Their main argument is that, if it were possible to 
"identffy a variable whose innovations could be interpreted as policy shocks" 
and that this variable does not respond to current economic disturbances, then 
"the reduced-form responses of the economy to observed policy shocks would 
correctly measure the dynamic structural effects of a monetary policy change". 
From our representative VAR system in (6.4) above, we can think of ), as a 
vector of non-policy variables and X, as a vector of policy variables. For 
identification, we can set either y, 2 =0 or Y2, = 0' 
According to Bernanke and Blinder (199ý in o tI 1), setting 72, =01 -ier words, 
excluding Y, from the X, equation means "assuming that there is no feedback 
from the economy to policy actions within the period". That being the case, the 
policy variables are placed first in the ordering. Alternatively, setting 7,, =0 or 
excluding X, from the Y, equation means that policy actions affect real variables 
with a lag. This makes more economic sense since empirical research has 
established that monetary policy affects real variables with a time lag because 
prices do not adjust quickly in the short run (see chapter 1 for the effects of 
monetary policy in an economy). Arguments put forward by Bernanke and 
Blinder sound more appealing and it is on this basis that we adopt their 
approach and order the policy variable (the Bank Rate) last in the system, 
meaning that policy changes affect the real economy with a time lag. However, 
in this VAR models, a change in the ordering did not affect the results in that the 
impulse response functions and the variance decompositions remain relatively 
unchanged, which strongly suggests that correlations among the various 
innovations are small and hence tbe identification problem is not likely to be 
especially important. This also indicates that the results are robust. I 
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6.5 Empirical Results of the VAR analysis 
Real output is only available on quarterly basis and as such, quarterly data are 
used for estimating our VAR models. The models are estimated over a period of 
eighty-four (84) quarters, from the first quarter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 
2004. 
6.5.1 The Basic Model - VAR1 
The basic model includes real output, domestic price index, money supply and 
the policy interest rate arranged in that order. All the variables are in logs except 
the policy rate. The Johansen test for cointegration indicates that there are two 
cointegrating relationships in the model at the 5 percent significance level. The 
choice of the appropriate lag length was based on a number of considerations. 
First we were guided by the available lag selection criteria in Eviews (being the 
LR, FPE, AIC, HQ and the SC20). Second, we had to take into account the fact 
that there is a time lag between policy action and its impact on the real economy, 
which would suggest that a longer lag length could be the most appropriate. 
Finally, we were also guided by the behaviour of the response functions. That 
being the case, the lag length suggested by one or more of the selection criteria 
and also produces relatively good or well behaved response functions was 
selected. This procedure was used for all the VAR models estimated in this 
chapter. 
20 LR is the sequential modified Likelihood Ratio test statistic; FPE stands for Final Prediction 
Error; AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion; HQ is Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion and 
SC is the Schwarz Criterion Information Test. 
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For the first VAR model (VAR1), a leg length of two suggested by the SC was 
selected. All the roots of the estimated model lie witlift-I the unit root circle (see 
figure 6.1 below), which suggest that the model passes the stability test. The 
stability condition is important because, "if the VAR is not stable, certain results 
such as the impulse response standard errors are not valid", (Eviews Manual). 
The impulse response functions of VAR1 are shown in figure 6.2 below. TI-ie 
solid central lines trace the response of real output, the consumer price index, 
money supply (ni") and the policy rate or the Bank of Botswana lending rate to a 
policy shock, while the lighter outer lines are the standard errors and represent 
95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure 6.2 below, indicates that following a policy shock, real output remains 
slightly unchanged for a little more than two quarters before declining to reach 
its minimum point after 4 quarters. Domestic prices also remain a little 
unchanged, and start to rise to reach a maximum point after six quarters. This 
would suggest that monetary policy or interest rate shocks lead to an increase in 
domestic prices. However, it is worth noting that these impulse responses are 
not statistically significant except for the response of money supply between the 
third and seventh quarters; the response of real income between the third and 
sixth quarters and the response of the policy rate to its own shocks up to the sixth 
quarter. The significance or otherwise of the responses is given by the standard 
error bands, i. e., in the case where both the top and bottom error bands lie in the 
same region, either positive or negative, then the response is statistically 
significant In that case we can say with 95% confidence that the responses are 
either negative or positive and are statistically significant. But overall, the 
standard errors are narrow, which is an indication that the responses are not too 
far off the mark. 
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Figure 6.1: The Stabilit)7 Condition - VAR1 
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The positive response of domestic prices to a policy shock is not a new 
phenomenon in the analysis of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
One of the first papers to reveal this kind of behaviour was that of Sin-is (1992), in 
which this price behaviour to policy shocks has come to be known as the "'price 
puzzle" in the literature. Sims' explanation of the price puzzle was that it is a 
result of misspecification of the VAR model in that, "monetary policy authorities 
have information about inflationary pressures better than what can be obtah-led 
from the variables in these models". In Sims model, the inclusion of commodity 
prices in the system solves the price puzzle. I 
Meanwhile, Eichenbaum (1992), commenting on Sims findings argues that, 
"Sims' puzzle, if we accept it as such, is an important one which poses an 
obvious challenge to Keynesians, Monetarists and Real Business Cycle analysts 
alike". He further argues that "... I know of no business cycle theory which is 
consistent with the notion that monetary contractions lead to prolonged periods 
of inflation. A more plausible interpretation of the "puzzle" is that it simply calls 
into question Sims' measure of the shocks to monetary policy". Hanson, M. S., 
(2004) does not support the view that the commodity prices resolve the price 
puzzle because they contain information that helps monetary policy authorities 
forecast inflation. Hanson considered other variables "with the same or even 
better inflation forecasting power than commodity prices" and found "no 
evidence that suggest a significant role for these variables for the resolution of 
the price puzzle". Hanson however, argues that the price puzzle is a sample 
specific event or a regime-specific phenomenon and that the price puzzle is due 
to the fact that the estimated VAR models cover periods during which there is a 
change in the monetary policy rule. On the other hand, Barth and Ramey (2000) 
argue that the price puzzle is not a puzzle after all, but that it is a result of the 
supply side channel of monetary policy. Barth and Ramey present evidence 
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"implying supply-side channels as powerful collaborators hi transmitting the 
real effects of monetary policy shifts in the short run". Barth and Ramey specify 
an industry equilibrium model and use it to interpret the results of a VAR 
analysis and find that, "following a monetary contraction, many industries 
exhibit periods of falling output and rising price-wage ratios, consistent with a 
supply shock in (their) model". Their conclusion is that prices tend to rise in the 
wake of a monetary policy tightening because an increase in interest rates gives 
rise to higher production costs reflected in higher inflation rates. Kim and 
Roubini, (2000) are of the view that for small economies, the price puzzle is likely 
to arise if the nominal exchange rate is not included in the VAR. 
In the face of all these contradicting views on the price puzzle, we took all the 
suggestions presented in these papers cited above to try and resolve the "price 
puzzle" in VAR model 1. First, in the spirit of Sims, we included the oil price 
index and the diamond price index, which represent commodity prices. We also 
have the foreign (South Africa) price index, which is an important information 
variable for expected inflation in Botswana. The nominal exchange rate was also 
included as suggested by Kim and Roubini (2000). The inclusion of all these 
information variables did not resolve the price puzzle. We also tried different 
sub-samples to take into account structural breaks due to change in policies as 
suggested by Hanson and still there was no change to the results presented in 
figure 6.3 above. However, in this VAR, the price puzzle is slightly reduced by 
the replacing the broader money supply variables (m2 or m3) with narrow 
money supply (ml) as indicated in the impulse response function in figure 6.2(a) 
below. 
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Table 6.1 above shows the variance decomposition of real output and domestic 
prices from VAR1 and indicate that interest rate shocks play a very limited role 
to the variation in real output and domestic prices. Interest rate or monetary 
shocks account for only 5.6 (2.9)21 percent of the variation in real output four 
quarters after the shock and this rises to 7.9 (5.9) percent after eight quarters or 
t, "?, o years. 
Money supply and domestic price shocks also have a limited contribution to the 
variation in total output. Real output's own shocks account for 91 (95.7) percent 
for the variation in real output, and this declines to 86.6 (88.8) percent after eight 
quarters. TI-ie importance of policy shocks is expected to differ across countries 
and their limited role in the evolution of real activity in Botswana is to be 
expected given the structure of the Botswana economy (see chapter 4 for more 
details). Sims (1992) analysed data from five developed countries (i. e., France, 
Germany, Japan, UK, and USA) and found that policy shocks are more important 
in Germany and the USA and they are the least important in Japan. Compared 
to Botswana, the responses to policy shocks in the countries covered in Sims 
analysis, i. e., France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA, are statistically significant. 
This is clearly an indication of the developed nature of these economies and their 
financial markets compared to Botswana whose economy is dominated by 
primary commodity exports with a very small and underdeveloped financial 
sector with limited financial assets. Meanwhile, the decomposition of domestic 
prices in table 6.1 indicates that real output shocks are the most important in 
explaining the variation in domestic prices compared to interest rate and money 
supply shocks. Real output shocks account for 16.8 (8.0) percent of the variation 
in domestic prices after four quarters and this increases to 18.7 (8.9) percent after 
eight quarters. During the same period, interest rate shocks account for only 1.9 
2'Figures in parenthesis are decompositions from the model with mi. 
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(0.8) and 8.7 (. '). 1) percent of the variation in Lioiii(,,, ti(: prices, foul. , j, cj 
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Figure 6.3(b): Turkey - Growth in money supply (in)) and inflation 
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Figure 6.4(b): Botsý, %, ana - gi-oiý-tll in Money Supply (m1) and Inflation 
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6.5.2 The Monetan, Policy Framework based VAR Model - NIAR2 
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monetary Policy framework di,, cu,; s(, d in chapter 2. The VAR) model therclorc, 
includes real incorrie, the price level, private Sector Credit and thc pollc\ l"itc, 
arranoed in that order ind all ill lo"s ewept the policy ratc. IA1,111"ell te"tý' Iol. 
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indicates that the VAR model satisfies the st, ibilitv condjition. 
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significant up to six quarters follmvim, a shock. 00 
Figure 6.5: The Stability Condition - VAR 2 
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chapter 5, whereas the first monetary episode, which was more severe compared 
to the second, induced a decline in private sector credit growth. As noted by 
Bemanke and Gertler (1995), there is also a tendency for credit to rise following a 
monetary shock as people and firms borrow more to sustain their consumption 
and investment at the pre-policy shock levels. However, the sluggish response of 
credit to policy shocks in Botswana is more than what could be explained by the 
behaviour of firms following a policy shock as suggested by Bernanke and 
Gertler. There are more factors at play to explain this behaviour (see an intensive 
coverage of this in chapters 4 and 5). Variance decompositions in table 6.2 below 
indicate how insignificant policy shocks are in explaining variations in income, at 
least during the first year after the shock; the same goes for their contribution 
towards domestic price developments. For instance, policy shocks explain only 
0.5 percent of the variation in income one year after the shock and 3.8 percent 
after two years. About 1.3 percent of the variation in the price level comes from 
the policy shock one year after the shock and this improves to 2.3 percent after 
two years. The contribution of credit shocks to domestic price developments is 
much better than that of policy shocks. Credit shocks account for 15.0 percent of 
the variation in the price level one year following the shock and this improves to 
only 17.9 percent after 2 years. Meanwhile, real output shocks account for 8.7 
percent of the variation in domestic prices after four quarters, which increases to 
10.4 percent after eight quarters. 
The decomposition of domestic credit indicate that policy shocks are important 
in explaining private sector credit developments compared to both real output 
and domestic price shocks. For instance, policy shocks account for 11.8 percent 
of the variation in private sector credit after one year and 12.8 percent after two 
years. This compares to 0.8 percent and 4.0 percent for real output during the 
same period. 
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Figure 6.6: Impulse Response Functions - VAR2. 
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As noted in chapter 4 and 5, Botswana's inflation is mostly imported; income is 
generated mainly from mining and mineral exports, and finally with the parallel 
operation of some Government investment financing schemes, commercial banks 
are not the most important (or the only) sources of investment finance, hence 
their role as financial intermediaries is undermined. That being the case, 
commercial banks may extend credit at below market rates, as has happened 
before, in order to attract the few borrowers who are deemed/regarded over 
qualified to access loans from the Government schemes. In addition, the general 
belief that households/ individuals in Botswana are not sensitive to interest rate 
changes might be true and could explain why household credit does not 
respond, significantly, to increases in interest rates. 
6.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we estimated a number of VAR models22 with an intention to 
determine how monetary policy in Botswana impacts on real output and 
inflation. The conclusions we reach from the VAR results in this chapter are 
similar to those of the narrative approach considered in chapter 5. The material 
covered in chapters 2 and 4 also provide a basis for understanding and 
interpreting the results in this and the preceding chapter. Just like in the 
narrative approach, the two main VARs estimated in this chapter indicate that 
income is less responsive to policy shocks and that the contribution of policy 
shocks to changes in real income is very small, at least for the period under 
review. 
2-'Only results from the two key VARs are shown. 
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These results are not surprising given the structure of the Botswana economy. 
As noted in chapter 4, output or income in Botswana is dominated by the mining 
and government sectors which are not interest rate sensitive and to that extend, 
are considered largely, exogenous. The first VAR also indicates that domestic 
prices seem to rise with policy shocks, a phenomenon known as the price puzzle 
in the literature. However, the prize puzzle is reduced when the broad money 
variables (m2 and m3) are replaced with the narrow money supply variable (ml). 
It is further reduced in VAR2 which uses just a part of the domestic component 
of money supply, i. e., private sector credit, instead of any of the money supply 
variables (ml, m2 and m3). 
The VAR analysis in this chapter indicates that policy shocks are not that 
important in explaining real output and price developments. This is in line with 
the results of the narrative approach of chapter 5. Impulse response functions 
from both VAR1 and VAR2 also indicate that money supply and credit shocks 
explain only a limited part of the variation in inflation. TI-lis is to be expected 
since Botswana inflation is subject to various exogenous shocks. For example, in 
addition to foreign prices, Botswana inflation is also subject to movements in 
administered prices, which are beyond monetary policy control. Administered 
prices include tariffs set by government parastatals such as Botswana Housing 
Corporation (BHC) for rent, Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (BTC), 
Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) and Water Utilities Corporation (WUC) for 
telephone, electricity and water tariffs, respectively. Tariffs set by these public 
enterprises also include an element of imported inflation as wen. For example, 
rent by the BHC is based on, amongst others, construction costs including those 
of building materials. Most of the building materials are imported from South 
Africa. Some of the electricity supplied by BPC is also imported from South 
Africa; this explains why South African inflation has such a considerable impact 
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on Botswana's inflation. Meanwhile, real output shocks are important in 
explaining the variation in private sector credit. 
The relationship between policy shocks and credit developments is not a straight 
forward one. As indicated above, there are episodes where there is a clear 
negative relationship between policy shocks and credit groWth and some where 
credit does not respond to policy shocks. Meanwhile, what is needed for private 
sector credit to be a good intermediate target or for the interest rate to be a good 
and effective policy instrument is a strong and clear negative relationship 
between credit and interest rate. However, impulse response functions in table 
6.1 indicate a positive relationship between the policy rate and credit. 
Furtherm6re, the narrative approach in chapter 5 produced mixed results as well. 
For example, the first and more intensive monetary episode of August 1990 led 
to a decline in credit growth, while the less intensive monetary episode of June 
1998 did not lead to a decline in credit growth; instead credit continued to rise 
despite the increase in the interest rate. This means that the negative relationship 
is only obtainable if the increase in the policy rate is considerably big as was the 
case during the first episode, but it is argued that "if policy is tightened sharply 
with short-term interest rates rising by a large amount, the inflation rate will 
return to target quickly, but the economy will slow down and perhaps go into a 
recession", Taylor (1996). 
Meanwhile, given the limited influence of policy shocks on both real output and 
inflation in Botswana, one might be tempted to think that Taylor's arguments 
may not hold in Botswana. However, we have to be careful because such actions 
also have serious implications in as far as market expectations are concerned. 
Sharp policy tightening might have negative effect on expectations, especially 
amongst the business community. The very few firms relying on commercial 
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bank loans for their operations may be adversely affected and could relocate to 
more business friendly environment in other countries, which would be a major 
setback to Botswana's bid to attract foreign investment and economic 
diversification. 
Finally, our VAR analysis raises the same questions as raised from the previous 
chapters. For example, from these results, one is inclined to question the extent 
to which monetary policy in Botswana is independent from exogenous 
influences, especially, the South African price developments? From these 
results, together with those from the previous chapters, indications are that 
monetary policy in Botswana is less effective; policy shocks have a small effect on 
real activity and inflation is driven mainly by imported inflation and other 
exogenous shocks such as administered prices and exchange rate changes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A Small Structural Model for a Developing Country - the case of Botswana 
7.1 Introduction 
The use of macroeconomic models in economic analysis dates back several 
decades. According to a brief history of macroeconomic modelling provided in 
Whitley (1994), the first macroeconomic model is said to be that of Timbergen in 
1936 for the Dutch economy. Other names that feature prominently in this 
literature include Keynes, Lawrence Klein, Goldberger, Ball, as well as the 
modelling work at institutions of higher learning such as Cambridge University, 
London School of Economics, to name just a few. Whitley states that Keynes 
criticised Timbergen's work and went ahead to "stimulate further modelling 
activity by his efforts in formulating the system of national accounts and his 
work on the national accounts still provides much of the backbone to current 
modelling activity". 
Even though modelling in developed countries dates back quite a number of 
years, the same is not true about developing countries. Modelling in developing 
countries faces a number of challenges, which include lack of quality data, 
underdeveloped and segmented markets often with no meaningful links 
between certain key variables, as well as lack of resources and capacity. There 
are also issues of structural changes/breaks in developing countries that 
modellers should contend with. To this end, Klos, B., and Ewa Wr6bel (2005) 
note that "on-going structural changes in agents behavioural patterns and a 
shortage of data are the main obstacles to the structural modelling of a transition 
economy". However, this has not stopped researchers from facing up to these 
challenges. But currently, much of the macroeconomic modelling work for 
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developing countries is found at international organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). 
The IMF, amongst others, monitors economic and financial developments 
worldwide (surveillance) and provides policy advice aimed especially at crisis- 
prevention Oittp: //www. imf. org/extemal/work. htrn). This role calls for the 
IMF to develop tools for assessing economic developments in their member 
countries. Many IMF and WB member countries prone to economic crisis are the 
less developed countries, hence the importance of macroeconomic models at 
these institutions to help them. assess their policy assistance programs. 
Some of the empirical macroeconomic models for developing countries 
developed by the IMF staff around the 1980s are discussed in Mohsin Khan, 
Peter J. Montiel, and Nadeern U. Haque (edit) (1991). According to Haque, P. J., 
Lahiri, K., and Montiel, P. J., (1991), macroeconomic models for developing 
countries at the IMF are motivated by their continued "external and internal 
imbalances that have contributed to the slowdown in growd-i, balance of 
payments difficulties, and high inflation". Another attempt to design and 
develop macroeconomic models suitable for the developing countries of Africa 
was undertaken at the Economic and Social Policy Analysis Division of the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). However, according to Osakwe, P, N., 
(2002), "various models have been used at the ECA but were abandoned in 1996 
due in part to resource constraints". 
Modelling has also become very popular with central banks (monetary 
authorities). The recent past decades have seen a number of central banks mostly 
from developed countries, focusing their monetary policy directly towards the 
price stability goal in what is commonly known, in the literature, as direct 
inflation targeting (DIT). That is, instead of using direct or indirect tools of 
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monetary policy to target the objective variable (inflation), they have opted for 
explicit inflation targeting. Inflation targeting regime by itself calls for an 
investigation of the transmission mechanism. Consequently, this area of research 
has received a lot of attention by both monetary authorities and academics alike. 
As noted in Coricelli, et al., (1996), "a genuine and precise understanding of how 
fast, and to what extent, a change in the central bank's interest instrument 
modifies inflation lies at the heart of inflation targeting". Some of the central 
banks that have already moved in this direction include the Bank of England, the 
South African Reserve Bank, Bank of Canada, Federal Reserve Board, the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, the Czech National Bank, etc. In Africa, the Reserve Bank 
of South Africa appears to be the only central bank to have adopted inflation 
targeting. Reports from various sources, e. g., Zaidi (2004) indicate that the Bank 
of Botswana appears to be moving towards that direction even though the Bank 
of Botswana authorities could neither confirm nor reject such reports. However, 
the Bank of Botswana had solicited support from the Bank of England to develop 
an inflation forecasting model in 2001. The model was abandoned soon 
afterwards due to lack of capacity at the Bank of Botswana. Recently, the Bank of 
Botswana has revived this idea and engaged the Czech National Bank to provide 
advice; however, details of this project have not yet been published. 
In a DIT framework, inflation forecasting becomes a very important element of 
the conduct of monetary policy. It is mainly for this reason that a considerable 
amount of resources have been devoted to developing macroeconomic models of 
the monetary transmission mechanism (MTlvl). These models assist the 
monetary authorities in several ways. For example, the Bank of England (1999) 
lists three ways in which models assist the monetary policy committee (MPC) of 
the Bank of England. First, the MFC uses models to forecast growth and 
inflation. Second, some models are used to explain the causes of important 
recent events since forecasting the future requires an understanding of the past. 
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Finally, models are helpful in addressing puzzles arising from apparent 
differences between recent economic behaviour and average relationships over 
the past 
The importance of macroeconomic models can, therefore, not be over- 
emphasised. Macroeconomic models are used, amongst others, to "analyse the 
economy, evaluate macroeconomic policies and to make predictions about the 
likely future behaviour of the economy OVhitely). Meanwhile, Klos, B., and Ewa 
Wr6bel (2005), argue that macroeconomic models are "becoming an important 
component of the toolkit of decision-makers". However, authorities may rely on 
a suite of models, rather than a single model, in order to deal with the 
complexities of the economy. In fact, George, E. A. J., (1999) noted that, "In an 
ever-changing economy, no single model can possibly assimilate in a 
comprehensive way all the factors that matter for policy". It is mainly for these 
reasons that more than one macroeconomic models are often estimated for a 
single economy, with a relatively large number of small models feeding into a 
larger one. Furthermore, macroeconomic models do not and cannot provide all 
the answers to all our economic problems; they just assist in the policy decision 
making process. As such, off-model information is a very valuable input. This is 
a point also emphasised by Osakwe, P. N., (2002), that, "although 
macroeconomic models improve our understanding of how economies function, 
they cannot be substitutes for sound economic analysis and judgement. Models 
are best seen as complements rather than substitutes for sound economic 
analysis". 
Macroeconomic models also differ in size and focus. The choice of a large vs. a 
small macroeconomic model has to take into account a number of factors. 
Amongst others is whether one wants to capture all the features of the economy; 
how disaggregated one would want the model to be, etc. Ideallv, small I 
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structural models are more preferable to large scale models in that they are easy 
to handle and are more transparent. Large models may contain a large number 
of equations and identities that, at the end tend to complicate the system and 
make estimation of key parameters a bit complex. Ha et al (2002) noted that "... 
large models are subject to a number of weaknesses. First, the complexity of 
structural relationships and the large number of sources of uncertainty 
embedded in large models sometimes make it difficult to understand why 
certain results are generated. Secondly, simulation or forecasting errors in a 
subject of the system are fed back into the rest of the system and amplify the 
inaccuracy. Finally, construction and maintenance of large models are time 
consuming and financially expensive". Another advantage of smaller models is 
that, since they are highly aggregated and therefore simple, they tend to produce 
more straightforward and easily interpretable results than either VAR or large 
structural models. 
In this chapter, we present a small structural model for Botswana. The chapter is 
structured as follows: section 7.2 provides the structure of the model and derives 
the equations to be estimated. Regression results are given and discussed in 
section 7.3. Flow charts illustrating the most important linkages for the proposed 
model (the transmission mechanism) are also given in section 7.3, while section 
7.4 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 A Small Structural Model for the Botswana Economy 
7.2.1 Model Background 
The model takes into account the fact that Botswana is a small, open and 
underdeveloped economy with relatively underdeveloped financial markets. It 
is, therefore, a small model with eight behavioural equations and two identities, 
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with the main objective of capturing the main channels through which policy 
and other shocks, e. g., supply and demand shocks, affect the Botswana economy. 
For this purpose, the model benefits from, and builds on, the results of the 
previous chapters. A small structural model should make it relatively straight- 
forward to trace and interpret the transmission of policy actions and other shocks 
onto key variables. 
The structure and character of the model are guided by, the following country 
featureS23. 
i) Relatively small or almost non-existent domestic equity or securities 
markets, due to the underdeveloped nature of the economy. This 
means that there are very few financial instruments to choose from. 
The main choice is between money and real assets. This has 
implications for the inflation/price equation. 
Botswana operates a fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate where the 
domestic currency is pegged to a basket of currencies with the South 
African Rand carrying a larger weight. Consequently, the movement 
of the domestic currency against other international currencies is 
dictated, to a very large extent, by the behaviour of the South African 
Rand against other international currencies. The formula for 
calculating or determining the exchange rate in Botswana is given 
below: 
( USD )= 
A(USD). 
'-"r (USD)""d" 
BUT Z4R SDR 
23 Some of these are discussed extensively in chapters 2 and 4. 
(7.1) 
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Where iczar and iisdr are the trade-based policy weights of the Rand 
and the SDR currencies in. the Pula basket and A is a scaling 
coefficient24. 
USD 
I 
USD 
, and 
USD 
are the US Dollar per Pula, US 
BTIT ZIR SDR 
Dollar per Rand and US Dollar per SDR nominal exchange rates 
respectively. The South African Rand weight is said to be more than 
that of the SDR currencies combined, which means that the movement 
of the Botswana Pula against other international currencies is 
determined more by the movement of the Rand against other 
international currencies. Moreover, whenever, there is a need for 
devaluation, for the purpose of export competitiveness, the authorities 
adjust the scaling coefficient accordingly. TIds means that monetary 
policy has no impact on the exchange rate; it is exogenous as far as 
monetary policy is concerned. Monetary policy cannot, as a result, 
impact on the economy through the exchange rate. 
The Government is a dominant force in economic development in 
Botswana. This is borne out of the fact that the Government is the 
major recipient of mineral export earnings, which means that fiscal 
policy plays a more important role than monetary policy in influencing 
economic activity. Modelling the Government sector is, therefore, very 
important given its role in the economy. 
iv) There is free capital mobility even though capital flows could be 
restricted by the relatively small and underdeveloped financial 
markets with very few short and long-term financial instruments. 
24 The weights and the scaling coefficients are highly confidential and only known to a few 
individual in the exchange rate committee. 
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This means that domestic and international interest rates can diverge 
without triggering a massive capital outflows or inflows and also 
provides room for the interest rate charu-iel of the transmission 
mechanism. Even though the Bank of Botswana has stated that the 
objective of monetary policy, relating to the interest rate, is to "attain 
positive real interest rates prevailing in the international capital 
markets", the data does not show any relation between real interest 
rates in Botswana and its trading partners, especially South Africa 
which is Botswana's most important and closest trading partner. If 
there is any influence of South African or foreign interest rates on 
Botswana interest rates, such influence should be very small or almost 
negligible. 
The above features of the Botswana economy point towards the IMF type 
monetary model such as that of Khan, M. S., and Knight, M. D., (1991). The Khan 
and Knight model has very interesting features that are suitable for developing 
countries, including Botswana. But there are some features that differentiate 
Botswana from other developing countries, especially in Africa. For example, 
Botswana has never had Balance of Payments (BoP) problems which are common 
in most developing countries. For example, the Klian, et al model assumes that 
"most developing countries have at one time or another faced the twin problems 
of a high domestic inflation and a deficit in the BoP". They attribute the cause of 
such problems to what they call "a situation of government fiscal deficits that 
result in excessive monetary expansion that feed domestic demand". In such 
cases, modelling the Balance of Payments is a matter of necessity. Botswana is 
different in that aspect in that in view of the expected mineral revenues from the 
sale of diamonds and other liquidity considerations, the Bank of Botswana 
conducts weekly open market operations to absorb excess liquidity and 
accumulates foreign exchange reserves. Due to mineral receipts in Botswana, the 
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current account has always been in surplus (see table 4.2 in chapter 4). 
Khan and Knight also assume that, "in countries that lack a developed capital 
market, the growth of domestic credit may be closely linked to the government's 
borrowing requirements and hence to its fiscal policy". Consequently, in their 
model, "monetary (cum fiscal) policy is the relevant means by which the 
authorities seek to achieve their objectives, and it is the domestic component of 
the money stock that is the instrument to be used to this end". The situation in 
Botswana is different in many respects. For example, the Government of 
Botswana is a net saver (see table 7.1 below). That being the case, domestic credit 
is not directly linked to the Government's borrowing requirements. Instead, in 
Botswana, credit to the private sector is directly linked to Governments spending 
activities (more of this is covered in chapter 4). Therefore, instead of focusing on 
the domestic component of money supply as is the case with the Khan et al 
model, our model focuses on one component of domestic credit, i. e., private 
sector credit or credit to the private sector, hence the inclusion of the private 
sector credit equation. 
The other feature that distinguishes Botswana from other developing countries is 
that Botswana does not operate a dual exchange rate system. The existence of 
two parallel exchanges could arise in at least two ways: first, there could be an 
official exchange rate which is often overvalued and operates alongside an 
unofficial and illegal exchange rate that operates in illegal exchange rate markets. 
Second, it could be as a result of policy decisions where the two exchange rates 
are meant for different transactions in the economy. This feature has also been 
embedded in the Haque, et al., model for a typical developing country. The 
model differentiates between two exchange rates; there is one that is "fixed and 
is used for current account transactions and public capital floWs". This exchange 
rate is said to be determined by policy. There is also the market determined 
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exchange rate that is applied to the private capital account transactions on the 
assumption that the authorities do not supply foreign exchange at the official rate 
for capital transactions. n-ie models by Khan, et al., (1991), Haque, et al (1) and 
Haque et al., (2) have these feature embedded in them. Green and Murinde 
(1998) "applied conventional macroeconomic theory to develop a model that 
captures the special features of developing economies". The Green-Murinde 
model assumes "financial market segmentation as characterised by the co- 
existence of official and curb markets in developing countries" hence the use of 
both the official and curb-market interest rates in the model. 
The Green-Murinde model also assumes that credit is rationed to the private 
sector; another feature that is uncharacteristic of the Botswana economy, but very 
common in most other developing countries. 
The structural model for Botswana in this chapter uses annual data covering the 
period from 1974 to 2004 and the model is estimated in log linear form. This 
approach is more appealing in that it makes solving the model and interpreting 
the results a lot easier. We also adopt a single equation approach to avoid 
problems usually associated with models with multiple behavioural equations. 
The advantage of single equation methods is that misspecification of one 
equation doesn't contaminate estimates of others. It also appears that adopting a 
single equation procedure is the most preferred option. For example, Whitley 
suggests that "... in most cases equations are estimated by single-equation 
methods rather than whole system methods", and that "this is to avoid the need 
to re-estimate the entire model when one or more single equation is re-specified". 
Whitley also points out to what he calls "the formidable technical problems in 
estimating very large models as a system". Furthermore, with a short time series 
like ours, estimating a simultaneous equation system could be very problematic. 
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Table 7.1: Composition of Domestic Credit (Millions of Domestic 
Currenc 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Botswana* 
Domestic Credit -4709.2 -5463.3 -13498.5 -16128.2 -15961.4 -19204.6 -22319.9 -9869.6 -3459.7 -1264.0 
Claims oil G071t. -64853 -7259.2 -15395.9 -19086.5 -20137.3 -24130.4 -27778.5 -16490.7 -10661.8 -9704.6 
Claims oil notif 
pub enterprises 94.7 70.5 61.4 266.7 527.6 458.1 479.9 462.0 381.1 433.3 
Cla int .4 oil 
Priva te sector 1681.4 1723.5 1835.9 2691.6 1648.2 4467.7 4978.8 6159.1 6821.0 8007.3 
Zambia 
Domestic Credit 1921.1 2324.6 2316.9 3963.3 4491.3 7164.4 6774.3 7594.0 7841.0 9083.7 
Claims on G071t. 1630.3 1899.8 1863.6 . 1412.7 3679.5 5943.8 5386.7 6481.5 6334.3 
68,14.9 
Claims oil nonf 
pub enterprises 36.9 51.0 42.2 124.4 256.9 338.8 441.8 93.5 121.7 174.3 
Cla ini s oil 
Priva te sector 254.0 373.9 411.1 426.2 534.9 861.8 945.8 1018.9 1385.1 2074.6 
Zimbabwe 
Domestic Credit 20.5 26.0 47.6 67.2 71.8 119.5 219.9 503.1 3040.6 11048.3 
Chibits oil GoN. 4.3 6.1 17.9 26.8 24.5 44.6 89.0 142.7 614.4 5440.5 
Claiiiis oil uoiýf 
pit b cii terpriscs 0.8 1.1 1.3 2.5 3.3 8.2 19.4 47.7 227A 435.5 
Claillis oil Private 
sector 15.5 18.8 28.4 38.0 44.0 66.7 111.6 312.6 2198.8 5172.3 
Slovenia 
Domestic Credit 811.5 917.7 1039.6 1301.2 1579.9 1901.7 2261.5 2425.5 2866.8 3451.6 
Claiiiis oil Govt. 188.9 172.1 197.1 214.2 228.5 311.1 373.9 276.9 374.2 457.4 
Clabus oil Private 
sector 635.3 754.9 854.9 1107.3 1389.2 1642.1 1946.6 2229.7 2599.2 '4122.2 
Note: These are credit figures as at the end of the period (year) 
*Total credit figures for Botswana are negative because of claims on Government which are negative and 
larger than claims on other sectors in absolute terms. This indicates that the Botswana Government is a net 
saver (hence the negative credit), i. e., the Government saves more than it borrowers. Since Government 
savings (negative credit) are larger than credit to other sectors (positive credit), total credit is negative and 
that is why in ouranalysis we focus on credit to the private sector to the exclusion of Government. 
The other option to macro modelling, that we do not adopt in our model, is 
calibration of the model coefficients as opposed to econometric estimation. Klos, 
B., and Ewa Wr6bel (2005), argue that "calibration is a standard method of 
including non-sample information in the estimating process" and that 
"calibrated models may not paint a precise picture of the real economy and are 
not very precise forecasting tools as far as short-term predictions are concerned 
but can be used to build medium-term scenarios and detect the possible effects of 
external and internal shocks". 
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7.2.2 Model Structure 
The expenditure part of the model follows the structure of a simple Keynesian 
Income Expenditure model. There are four expenditure equations relating 
private consumption, private investment, stocks and imports to income and 
interest rates. Given the importance of Government in Botswana, the model has 
two equations representing the government sector. There is the government 
revenue and government consumption spending equations relating government 
revenues and government spending to mineral production and real income, 
respectively. Relating government revenues to mineral production is important 
mainly for two reasons. First, mineral revenue accounts for the largest 
proportion of total government revenue (see table 4.2 in chapter 4), and second, 
mining is the largest sector in the economy, so that including mining production 
in our model should help us in assessing the impact that shocks to the mining 
sector would have on the economy. We also have a monetary sector, which is 
represented by the private sector credit equation for the reasons discussed above 
and under the private sector equation below. To enable the analysis of how 
shocks to the economy impact on the price level or domestic inflation, the model 
also includes the price equation which relates domestic prices to both supply and 
demand shocks. Finally, there is the policy rule that relates how interest rates are 
set Modelling the interest rate is also important in that the interest rate, here 
given by the Bank of Botswana lending rate (bobIr) is the policy instrument that 
should help us simulate monetary policy shocks in the model. 
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7.2.3 Derivation of the Equations. 
Expenditure Equations 
The expenditure equations in the model relate private consumption and 
investment to real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is in fine with the simple 
textbook IS/LM macroeconomic model. Private investment is therefore, 
assumed to be a linear function of real incomeo-), its own lagged 
values (ini, (-1)), and the nominal interest rate (bohh-). An increase in income 
should lead to an increase in investment, therefore, yielding a positive 
relationship between the two. Since nominal interest rates represent the 
opportunity cost of capital, one would expect a negative relationship between 
nominal interest rates and private investment. This means that an increase in the 
opportunity cost of capital leads to a decline in investment. Real private 
consumption (cons) is assumed to be a positive function of real income, meaning 
that an increase in real income increases private consumption, and a negative 
function of the interest rate. Likewise, a change in inventories (sb) is assumed to 
be a positive function of real income. Finally, total imports (in) are assumed to be 
a positive function of real income and relative prices. Relative prices are defined 
as a ratio of domestic prices (cpi) to foreign (South Africa) prices(sap), 
i. e. jcpilsap). An increase in South African prices, relative to Botswana prices 
should lead to a fall in imports. An increase in domestic prices relative to foreign 
prices makes imports cheaper compared to domestic goods, and therefore, leads 
to an increase in imports. Meanwhile, we expect imports to increase with the 
increase in real income. Our expenditure equations are given below: 
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i) Investment: 
As indicated above, investment is assumed to be a function of income, interest 
rates and its own lag. The investment equation can be written, in log linear form, 
as: 
log(invi) =c+p, log(y) + p2boblr + p., log(inv(- 1)) + p, (7.2) 
Where O<pl<O; P2<0; and p, >O. 
ii) Consumption: 
Private consumption is assumed to be a function of income and its own lag and 
in log linear regression equation form, the consumption equation is given by: 
logcons = c., + p4 logCy) + p, log(cons(- 1)) + p6boblr + p2 Z-1 (7.3) 
We expect O< P4 <1, and p5 
A. 
iii) Imports: 
Imports are a function of real income (y), relative prices (cpi /sap) and the lagged 
imports variable (in,, ); i. e. 
log(m) = cý, + p, logCv)+p. log(cpi1 sap)+ p, log(n7(-l))+, u., (7.4) 
WhereO<p6<1, P7<0 and p8>0. 
iv) Stocks: 
Change in stocks is assumed to be dependent on income and its own lag and in 
linear regression equation form, the stocks equation is given by: 
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sb = c, +p, 0Av+pjsb(-1)+, "4 
25 
From (7.5) above, we expect O<p<l and p>O. 
B) Other Sectoral Equations 
V) Exports 
(7.5) 
Botswana trade statistics indicate that close to 90 percent of the exports are 
classified as traditional exports and consist of diamonds, beef, copper and nickel 
and 90 percent of traditional exports consists of diamond exports. This therefore, 
means that modelling exports in Botswana will be determined more by what we 
understand about the behaviour of diamond exports in particular and diamond 
market in general. Our discussion in chapter 4 points towards complications that 
may arise if one is to successfully model diamond exports. For example, in 
relation to the sale of diamonds, Magang, (1997)., noted that, "to maximise the 
aggregate value over the long-term, it is necessary to even out the peaks and 
troughs of the free market spot price in order to bring stability and predictability 
to the downstream segments of the diamond jewellery industry. " Magang 
further noted that, "History has shown that at particular times and for particular 
reasons, it is necessary to withhold certain quantities or types of diamonds from 
the market. There are times when it is desirable, in the long-term interest of the 
strength of the industry, for producers to agree not to flood the market with 
diamonds, which cannot be absorbed into the manufacturing pipeline to feed the 
jewellery markets. Similarly, it has been found to be useful to categorise and 
combine certain types of stones for sale, in the interest of expanding the total size 
25 This equation is estimated in levels because change in inventories is sometimes negative, and therefore 
can not be estimated in log linear forni. 
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of the gem diamond market". It is evident from these quotes that the diamond 
market is highly regulated such that any efforts to estimate the demand for 
diamond exports by way of a regression analysis would be frustrated. Another 
important export commodity in Botswana is beef. Botswana exports beef to the 
European Union through a quota system at an agreed price. Since the price is set 
by the authorities and not determined by market forces and since the amount 
that could be sold to the European Union is also set by the authorities, world 
demand for beef is not an important factor in determining Botswana beef prices 
and production. Likewise, prices (i. e., prices at which farmers sell their cattle) to 
the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) are also set by the authorities. For 
example, recent reports from Botswana indicate that prices for cattle have been 
revised. It was reported that, "The BMC has decided to match South Africa's 
buying prices with effect from April 23,2007. In addition, the BMC is also 
offering attractive bonuses for cattle weighing above 250 kg, " Millegi: April 27, 
2007. All these considered and to avoid complications in modelling and 
estimating the exports equation, exports are considered exogenous to the model, 
i. e., they are determined outside the model. 
vi. The Government Sector. 
Modellirig the government sector in Botswana is also very important. However, 
the role of government in Botswana is different from that of other governments 
in many other developing countries. Whereas in other developing countries, 
governments play a crucial role in the money supply process through huge 
deficit financing, in Botswana the Government is a net-saver and also plays an 
important role in economic activity (this is covered extensively in chapter 4). The 
government sector in this context is modelled because of the potential 
destabilising impact that its spending may have in the economy. To that extent, 
we have two equations for the government sector and these are; the government 
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consumption spending and revenue equations. 
a. Government Consumption Spending. 
Government consumption spending (gs) is assumed to be a function of 
desired/target spending (gs*)and past period's actual spending (gs(-I)). The 
desired or target government spending is assumed to be a function of income (y). 
Overall, government spending becomes a function of income and past period's 
actual spending and in log linear regression equation form, this becomes: 
109(gs) = Cýo + Cýl 10 cy(Y) + Cý2 lotl(gsl-l )+ Pi (7.6) 
However, equation (7.6) can be modified such that government spending 
becomes a function of government revenue, instead of total income. Such a 
modification allows for the introduction of the influence of the mineral 
production in the economy via its influence on government revenue. We have 
noted in chapter 4 and elsewhere in this thesis that mineral production is very 
important in Botswana. With this arrangement, we can trace the impact of 
mineral production on the economy through government revenue, then from 
government revenue to government consumption spending and from 
government consumption spending to total output. Modifying (7.6) accordingly 
gives the following regression equation: 
109(gs) ý-- Cý3+ a4 109(91') + Cý5 109(gst-I )+ P6 (7.6a) 
From (7.6a), we expect (X4 to be positive, but less than 1, i. e., 0<(X2<1 and (x5>O. 
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b) Government Revenue 
Government revenue is derived mainly from taxes. Table 2 in chapter 4 indicates 
that tax revenue accounts for close to 90 percent of total government revenue, 
while non-tax revenue and grants accounts for a little more than 10 percent. 
Focusing on the tax revenue, government revenue (gr)is assumed to be a 
function of the desired tax revenue and past period's actual tax revenue. TI-ie 
desired tax revenue is a function of real income(y). This gives real government 
revenue as a function of real income and past period's actual revenue, which in 
log linear regression equation form can be written as: 
log(gr) = a6 + Ct7 
1090') + a8 loa-'(gr, 
-, 
) + 
JU7 (7.7) 
From regression equation (7.7), we expect the long run income elasticity 
( 
ýX7 
) 
I 
-ag 
to be positive as government revenue is expected to increase with the increase in 
income. Meanwhile, ct, is expected to be positive, a8 
A. 
In addition to equation (7.7), we may also consider an alternative equation, 
where, instead of real income as one of the determinants of government revenue, 
we have mineral production. This is to acknowledge the fact that a larger 
proportion of Government revenue in Botswana is derived from mineral 
revenues (refer to table 4.7 in chapter 4) and mining constitutes the largest 
economic activity in Botswana (refer to table 4.1 in chapter 4). Accordingly, we 
have government revenue being a function of past period's actual revenue and 
current mineral production (nmprod) and in log linear regression equation form, 
we have26: 
26 Because of the importance of mining in Botswana and the need to simulate how mining shocks could 
affect the economy, equation (7.7a) is preferred over (7.7); we cannot include both. 
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log(gr) =a, +a,, log(ninprod) + a, , lo-(gr, 4-1 -- Z-- -1 
)+ (7.7a) 
Similarly, we expect the long-run mineral production elasticity to be positive, i. e., 
we expect a,,, >0. I-all 
vii) Inflation Equation 
By definition, the price level, P, is a function of tradable goods prices, and non- 
tradable goods prices. Prices of traded goods are determined in the 
international/ world market, with their price in the domestic economy being a 
function of foreign currency price, (sop), and the exchange rate (C). The 
exchange rate is expressed as the amount of foreign currency per a unit of the 
domestic currency (meaning that an increase in e reflects an appreciation of the 
domestic currency). The price of foreign goods in domestic currency terms is 
given by the foreign price divided by the nominal exchange rate. The non- 
tradable goods prices are determined in the domestic money market; and are 
assumed to be a function of excess demand for money (Af d) over supply (, Nf '). 
Meanwhile, the demand for money balances is assumed to be determined by the 
level of real income (y) and the opportunity cost of holding money represented 
by the interest rate (bobb). We can modify this assumption so that real money 
balances is determined by real income and the expected rate of inflation (; r") 
given that financial markets in developing countries, including Botswana, are 
underdeveloped. Tlie choice in developing countries is mainly between money 
and real assets such as land, houses, etc. In that case, the best measure of the 
opportunity cost is the expected rate of inflation, and not the interest rate. The 
interest rate is more appropriate in developed countries with developed financial 
markets. Therefore, the demand for money is expressed as a function of real 
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income and expected inflation, which makes the price of non tradable goods a 
function of money supply, real income, and interest rates or expected inflation. 
The above functions can be modified further. First, instead of focussing on total 
money supply (M), we may focus on the domestic component of money supply, 
i. e., domestic credit. Second, instead of using total domestic credit, we may use 
the most dominant component of domestic credit, which is, credit to the private 
sector. We use private sector credit for two reasons. First, total domestic credit 
(which includes government credit is negative since the Botswana Government is 
a net saver). Second, results of the VAR analysis in chapter 6 indicate a strong 
positive relationship between inflation and private sector credit, no such 
relationship exists between inflation and total money supply (see also figure 4 in 
chapter 4). Third, private sector credit is the intermediate variable in the Bank of 
Botswana's monetary policy framework. All these considered, the domestic 
price level is assumed to be a function of private sector credit, real income, 
foreign prices, expected inflation, here given by A Iog(cpi, -, 
), and the nominal 
exchange rate. Expressing the price equation in terms of inflation rate rather 
than the price level and in log linear regression equation form, we have: 
A log(cpi, ) = SO +(5, log(cpi, -, 
)+t5, log(psc, 
_, 
)+6ý, log(sap, 
_, 
)+(34 logo, ], 
-, 
) +S, log(nrp, _, 
) 
+ (56Alog(CP'I-#) + 0, A log(psc, -, 
) + 02Alog(sap, _, 
) + Oý, A logCvl, _, 
) + 04 A log(nrp, _, 
) +, U, 
(7.8) 
Regression equation (7.8, where i=1,2 .... ii) suggests that 
domestic inflation is 
determined by the growth in credit to the private sector, change in the foreign 
price level or foreign inflation, change in real income, expected inflation and 
change in the nominal exchange rate. Private sector credit is an indicator of 
domestic demand; hence an increase in private sector credit indicates an increase 
in domestic demand and therefore an increase in domestic inflationary pressures. 
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An increase in foreign prices should also lead to an increase in imported 
inflation, hence an increase in domestic inflation. Figure 4.7 irl chapter 4 
indicates a strong correlation between Botswana and South African inflation. An 
increase in real income should also lead to high domestic demand and therefore, 
an increase in domestic inflation. Meanwhile, an appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate should make imports cheaper and therefore lead to a decrease in 
imported inflation, hence a decline in domestic inflation. That being the case, we 
expect 51,821 83, and 65 to be positive and 54 to be negative. 
This model captures both the domestic and foreign influences on domestic 
inflation and is similar to the P-Star approach to domestic price determination 
(see for example, Kool and Tatom (1994), Frait, et al (2000), Tatorn (1992) and 
Moosa (1997)). The P-Star model, which is based on the quantity theory of 
money, stipulates that, in a closed economy, current inflation is a function of the 
past gap between the price level (P) and its long term value (P*). According to 
Moosa, "The P-Star is the equilibrium price level as defined by the quantity 
theory". In an open economy, the price gap is a weighted average of the 
domestic gap and the foreign gap, where, in a fixed exchange rate regime, the 
price gap is determined abroad. In the case of Botswana where the exchange rate 
is pegged but the Pula has a room to fluctuate in relation to the South African 
Rand, which has a larger weight in the currency basket, the P-Star model would 
predict that the foreign variables in equation 7.8 above should outweigh the 
domestic factors. In accordance with the predictions of the P-Star model, we 
would expect the domestic price gap to be of limited importance while foreign 
monetary conditions would be the major determinants of current domestic 
inflation developments. 
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viii) Domestic Credit 
Total domestic credit, DC, is composed of claims on the Government (GC) and 
claims on the Private Sector (PSC). That is: 
ADC, = AGCI + APSC, (7.9) 
In Botswana, APSC is the dominant component of ADC since Government 
sector is generally a net saver (see table 7.1 above). This, as discussed above, is 
the main reason why the Bank of Botswana has chosen credit to the private sector 
as its intermediate variable, instead of total credit. Credit to the private sector 
serves as an indicator for domestic demand and therefore, inflationary pressures. 
As a result, we can, without any loss of generality, focus on private sector credit. 
However, Khan et al. (1991), argue that "... any model for a developing country 
must recognise the linkage that exists between government fiscal operations and 
the demand for money". The linkage referred to by Khan et al., is that of 
credit/money creation due to government financing of fiscal deficits. This is 
further confirmed by Haque, et al. (1991), who also notes that "fiscal policy 
choices are made to obey an intertemporal budget constraint in recognition of the 
solvency condition imposed by external creditors". In Botswana, the linkage is of 
a different nature in that the concern is not much about deficit financing from 
excessive government borrowing, but rather government spending financed by 
mineral revenues. 
In other developing countries, claims on the government sector account for the 
largest proportion of total domestic credit, which makes it a very important 
factor in credit analysis. Therefore excluding government borrowing, private 
sector credit is considered a function of real income, interest rate and past credit 
levels. An increase in real income should lead to an increase fi-i both the demand 
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for and supply of credit, while the increase in interest rates should lead to the 
decline in both the supply and demand for credit. As discussed in chapter 3, 
monetary policy tightening increases interest rates and this has implications for 
both the borrowers' credit worthiness and the availability of commercial banks' 
loanable funds (these are covered under the credit channel of the transmission 
mechanism discussed in chapter 3). In log linear regression form, the private 
sector credit equation can be expressed as follows: 
log(PSC) = ro + 71 log(PSCt-1) + -Y2 
loS'I(Y) + V3boblr +, ujO (7.9) 
As indicated above, income elasticity (71) is expected to be positive, while the 
interest rate semi-elasticity(73) is expected to be negative. The magnitudes of the 
two elasticities could take any value between zero and one. 
ix. Domestic Interest Rates 
In setting their interest rates, central banks in developing countries may not be as 
systematic as their counterparts in developed countries. Nevertheless, one 
would still assume that they (developing country monetary authorities) follow 
some kind of rule or are guided by some kind of rule in setting their policy rates. 
A policy rule "guides policy makers in setting the policy instruments so as to 
bring the inflation rate close to target, and keep it close to the target, while taking 
account of short run tradeoffs that impinge on output, employment, and 
exchange rate variability", Taylor (1999). Taylor also observed that, "alternative 
monetary policies are characterised by monetary policy rules that stipulate how 
instruments of policy (usually short-term interest rate) react to observed 
variables in the economy". A number of models assume a policy rule in which 
the nominal interest rate changes each period in response to a weighted average 
of the departure of inflation from target and the deviation of output from 
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potential (see for example Bank of England, 1999). Such rules are commonly 
referred to as the Taylor rule following a conference paper by Taylor in 1993. 
These rules are of the form: 
r* ++ p2 yf. (7.10) 
Where R, is the nominal interest rate (the instrument) at time/; r* is the target 
real interest rate; ; r, ', and ; r* are the average inflation over the last four quarters 
before time t and the target inflation, respectively. y, is the output gap 
and p, and JU2 are policy 
feedback parameters. Ball (1999) noted that policy 
rules such as in (7.10) above are suitable for closed economies and suggested a 
policy rule that he believes is most suited to an open economy. The open 
economy approach, as a result, brings in the exchange rate into the policy rule. 
Without going into the algebraic manipulations, Ball suggested the following 
policy rule: 
wr + (1 - -o, )e = ay + b(; 7 + 7v, -1) 
(7.11) 
In this kind of policy rule, the policy variable is a weighted average of the 
nominal interest rate (r)and the nominal exchange rate(e) with the respective 
weights (ii, )and (I -it-) determined by the monetary authority and the policy 
instrument constructed in this manner is known as a monetary conditions index 
(MCI). ;r is inflation, and (y)is output. 
In our model, there is no reason to believe that mone", authorities in Botswana 
follow any of the two policy rules for the following reasons; first, output data in 
Botswana is recorded with a time lag of about two years, making it difficult to 
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use the output gap for policy purposes; Second, it is inappropriate to apply the 
output gap concept in a developing country like Botswana where output consists 
mainly of natural resources which are not determined by (domestic) demand but 
rather by supply. Third, monetary policy in Botswana does not have an impact 
on exchange rate. Exchange rate movements are determined by the basket 
mechanism and the occasional tinkering of the exchange rate by the authorities 
for export competitiveness. In this set-up, the monetary authorities have no 
control over the exchange rate. In this model we therefore assume a policy rule 
in which the monetary authorities adjust the policy rate according to die desired 
real interest rate and deviation of inflation from the target. The suggested policy 
rule also allows for inertia in the interest rate. The proposed policy rule is given 
below: 
i, =o -P)l + pi, -, where 
i, .= [Cto + ; T, + a, (; r, -, - ; r, 
. )] 
(7.11) 
And i, and i, -, are current and past period's nominal 
interest rates, respectively, 
while i, * is the real interest rate. ; r, and ; r, -, are current and past period's 
inflation rates, respectively, while ; r, * is the target inflation rate. The parameter 
p allows for some inertia in interest rates. A change in monetary policy stance 
involves changing p, or oto or a, or a combination of any two of them or all of 
them. According to the Bank of Botswana Monetary Policy Framework and the 
Monetary Policy Statements, the Bank of Botswana looks at movements in credit 
growth in setting their policy rate. Unfortunately, including credit growth in the 
policy rule above led to implausible model simulations resulting from the erratic 
behaviour of the interest rate. Consequently, credit growth was excluded from 
the policy rule. 
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7.2.4 The Complete Model 
Investment: 
log('17'V'): --Ci +P1 log(j')+P2bobll-+PI 109"1"(-')+Pi 
Consumption: 
lo-(cons) = e, + p, loo(3, ) + p, lo-(cons(-1» + pboblr + JU2 c 
Imports: 
log("') = CýI +A log(Y) +A lo-(CP'lSaP) +A log("'(-')) + P. 1 
Stocks: 
sb= C4+p,, Ai, +p,, sb(-])+P4 
Government Consumption Spending: 
lo, o,, (gs) -,, ý L, 43 + a4 log(gr) + a, log(, gs, -, 
) + el 
Government Revenues: 
log(gr)=Oý6+Cý7 log(nniprod) +a, log(gr, -, + C, 
Total Income: 
y =cons+ inv+ gs+sb+ x- in+ neo 
Where neo is net errors and omissions and ensures that the income identity 
holds. 
Inflation: 
A log(cpi, ) = (5o +(5, A log(cl7i, -, 
)+, 5,109(psc,, )+. ý, log(sap, 
-, 
)+(3, log(l,, 5, log(e, 
-, 
) 
+02 A log(sap, -, 
) + 04Alog(nrp, ) + C3 
Private Sector Credit: 
log(psc) = ro + r, log(psc, -, 
) + r2 log(y) + r., bobh- +64 Zý L, 
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Domestic Interest Rates 
i, =0- P)i, * + pi, -, 
where 
I. I. = [aO + ýT, + a, (; T, -, -; r, 
* 
Exogenous Variables: 
The exogenous variables to the model include: South Africa prices (sap), mineral 
production (ninprod), the nominal exchange rate (nrl)), exports (x), and net errors 
& omissions (neo) and the dummy variables. 
7.3 Regression results and the transmission mechanism 
7.3.1 Regression results 
The equations above are estimated by simple single equation ordinary least 
squares (OLS). However, there are cases where the equations have real income 
(y) appearing on the right hand side as an independent variable, while the same 
variable (y) is endogenous to the system as a whole. In that case, OLS estimation 
for such equations may not be strictly valid since (y)may be correlated with the 
error term. This is the simultaneity problem that renders OLS inconsistent and 
requires that we use instrumental variables estimation which is considered both 
consistent and efficient in the presence of simultaneity. The equations with 
(y) on the right hand side are the consumption, investment, imports and private 
sector credit equations. These equations are, as a result, estimated by both OLS 
and the Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation methods and results are 
presented alongside each other in table 7.3 below, while regression results for the 
remaining equations are presented in tables 7.4 and 7.5 below. Some equations 
are estimated in log levels (long-run equations). Since each equation has at least 
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one cointegrating, relationship (Johansen's cointegration tests results are shown 0 
in table 7.2 below), we do not have a problem of spurious regressions. 
Regression results in table 7.3 indicate that parameter estimates from the OLS 
and TSLS regressions differ' only slightly; there is no significant difference 
between the two in most cases. For example in the private investment equation, 
all the coefficients are very close so much that if they were to be rounded to one 
decimal place, there will exactly equal to each other. TI-ie same applies to the 
other equations; if ever there are exceptions, they will be very few. The closeness 
of these results to each other mean that model simulations from these set of 
results will not differ to any significant amount, i. e., whether we use the OLS 
estimates or the TSLS estimates, our model simulations will not differ. In all the 
estimates above, except one, i. e., the OLS estimation of private consumption, the 
null hypotheses that the income elasticity equal to unity were not rejected. 
Finally, economic theory suggests that it is the real interest rate that matters for 
investment and private consumption, not the nominal rate. However, the 
inflation rate or the real interest rate variable in these equations turned out to be 
insignificant, which is an indication that it is the nominal rate that matters for 
investment and consumption decisions in Botswana. We should also take note of 
the fact that we have used the short-term interest rate, while theory suggests that 
it is the long-term real rate that matters. Since we do not have a representative 
long-term interest rate in Botswana, we had no other option but to use the short- 
term rate. 
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Table 7.2: Johansen Cointegration Tests. 
Private Consumption Equation- Series: Log(cons) log (y) boblr 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized Trace 0.05 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob. " 
None * 0.578170 37.33171 29.79707 0.0056 
At most 1 0.340459 14.02659 15.49471 0.0822 
At most 2 0.098136 2.788884 3.841466 0.0949 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
ImRorts Eguation - Series: lo&(m) Iog(y) log(cpVsap) 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob. " 
None * 0.518927 21.22035 21.13162 0.0486 
At most 1 0.124660 3.861132 14.26460 0.8737 
At most 2 0.017073 0.499396 3.841466 0.4798 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
Investment Equation - Series: log(inv) log(y) boblr dml 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized Trace 0.05 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob. " 
None * 0.827200 90.84388 47.85613 0.0000 
At most 1*0.633793 43.44219 29.79707 0.0008 
At most 2*0.390674 16.31915 15.49471 0.0375 
At most 3 0.103279 2.943293 3.841466 0.0862 
Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
Private Sector Credit Equation - Series: log(psc) Iog(y) boblr 
Lags interval (in first differences): No lags 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized Trace 0.05 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob. ** 
None * 0.567810 31.93043 29.79707 0.0280 
At most 1 0.254440 8.441492 15.49471 OA195 
At most 2 0.007832 0.220157 3.941466 0.6389 
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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All the expenditure equations and the private sector credit equations in table 7.3 
below are well specified as they pass all the relevant diagnostic tests and all the 
coefficients have the expected signs. The only exception is the imports equation 
under the TSLS which failed the LM serial correlation test. Again, with the 
import equation, whereas the relative price (cpi, -, 
/ sap, -, 
) coefficient is of the 
correct sign, it is nevertheless statistically insignificant irl both OLS and TSLS 
regressions. 
These results imply that imports from South Africa are price inelastic. This is not 
a surprising result since imports from South Africa are a matter of necessity since 
there are no or not enough imports substitutes available domestically. 
Furthermore, given the proximity of South Africa to Botswana and the trade 
arrangements within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), most 
imports are sourced from South Africa even if the), could be available from 
outside the SACU region. The price relative variable is lagged by one period 
(one year) to take into account the fact that changes in the relative prices may not 
be reflected instantly in imports partly due to menu costs. Importers may also 
have entered into contracts with the suppliers and may have accumulated goods 
at some relative price prevailing in the past, which may take time to clear. 
However, the time lag may not be as long as one year; it could be six, seven or 
eight months or something slightly less than twelve months. But since we are 
using annual data, the lag is captured as a one year lag. Using the Pula/Rand 
exchange rate as a measure of price relatives does not improve the results either. 
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Table: 7.3: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares 
(TSLS) Rearessions - Annual data from 1974 to 2004. 
(i) Private Investment 
Structural Parameters and OLS TSLS 
regression variables 
-0513 -0.559 C1 constant (-1.981) (-1.947) 
A Real output Qy) 
0.451 0.475 
(5.167) (4.360) 
P2 Interest Rate (boblr) -0.045 -0.045 (-6.278) (-6.276) 
Lagged private 0.607 0.585 P3 
investment (1inv(-1)) (7.018) (5.535) 
-0.205 -0.202 DM1 Dummy variable (-4.387) (-4.237) 
List of Instruments 
C; log(yl(-l)); log(invl(-l)); bobIr, 
and DM1 
2 
0.986 0.986 R 
LM Serial F=2.489 Obs *R6.395 
Correlation Test p=0.129 P=0.094 
; r' = 0.5 39 
2=0.532 
Jarque-Bera. test for normality P=0.764 P=0.766 
' Obs*R 
2= 11 387 Obs * R2 = 11.889 White s heteroskedasticity test . P=0.123 P=O. 1 04 
LonS-Run Income Elasticity 0.451/(1-0.607)=1.148 0.475/ (1-0.585)=1.145 
(ii) Private Consumption 
0.931 0.534 C2 constant (2.612) (1.355) 
P4 Real output (1j)) 
0.260 0.174 
(4.658) (2.696) 
Lagged consumption 0.614 0.762 
P, (Icons(-I)) (6.035) (6.547) 
The interest Rate 0.008 -0.011 
(boblr) (-1.467) (-1.933) 
List of Instruments 
Log(gc); log(xl); log(consl(-l)); 
log(yl(-l)) and bobIr 
2 
0.988 0.988 i? 
LM Serial F=0.120 Obs*R 2=1 . 2271 Correlation Test P=0.733 P=0.260 
Jarque-Bera test for normality ; r2 = 
1.711 X2 = 0.2)64 
P=0.425 P=0.876 
Obs *R2=9 332 Obs *R2= 13 335 White's heteroskedasticity test . . P=0.156 P=0.05 
Long-Run Income Elasticity 0.260/(1-0.614)=0.674 0.174/ (1-0.762)=0.731 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics. 
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(iii) Imports Equati n 
Structural Parameters and 
regre sion variables 
OLS TSLS 
C 3 constant 
0.645 0.724 
(0.950) (1.031) 
P7 Real output (1)) 
0.37/ 0324 
(3.711) (2.142) 
Relative prices 0.244 0.183 P, (cpilsqj)) (1.074) (0.702) 
A Lagged imports (Ini) 0.516 0.567 
- L 
(4.282) (3.539) 
List of Instruments c; 
I og (ml (-1)); log (yl (-1)); and 
log(cpi(-l)/sap(-l)) 
2 
R 0.979 0.979 
LM Serial F=2.756 Obs *R2= 12.160 
Correlation Test p=0.084 P=0.000 
z2=1.400 X2=1.145 Jarque-Bera test for normality P=0.497 P=0.564 
White's heteroskedasticity test 
2 Obs*R =10.54-3) 
2= 10., ) 0 Obs*R 
P=0.104 P=O. 1 16 
Long-Run Income Elasticitv 0.377/(1-0.516)=O. 7/9 0.324/(1-0.567)=0.748 
(iv) Private Sector Credit 
YO constant 
0.085 -0.726 
(0.066) (-OA42) 
@trend 0.063 0.051 (2.141) (1.553) 
Lagged private sector 0.653 0.671 Y1 credit (lpsc(-l)) (5.330) (5.332) 
Y2 Real output (1j, ) 
0.173 0.264 
(1.284) (1 A87) 
Lagged interest Rate 0.037 -0 034 (boblr(-3)) (-3.071) . (-2.688) 
List of Instruments c; @trend; log(psc(-l)); log(yl (-1)); 
and boblr(-3) 
2 
A 0.995 0.996 
LM Serial F=1.014 Obs *R2=4.142 
Correlation Test P=0.326 P=0.126 
Jarque-Bera test for normality x2=1.005 x2=1.542 
P=0.605 P=0.462 
White's heteroskedasticity test Obs *R2= 13.717 Obs * R-' = 11.546 
P=0.089 P=0.173 
LonE-Run Income Elasticity 0.173/(1-0.653)=0.499 - 0.264/(1-0.671)=0.8 2 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics. 
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Rearession results in table 7.4 bolow Ind icatc tha t the Governnicii t RO\ ('11LIC d 11"I 
chan, ge in Stock-,, equations are Nvell specified and pao, all the 
With the government revenue equation, ill] the ol, isticities aiv ()I the c\pok tcd 
sians and are also statistical1v sl(mific-ant. The lom-run mineral pi-oduction 
cla,; ticitv, (0.449/ (1-0.581)) =1.072 and vve cannot reject the 111,111 that 
the longo-run mineral production clastiticitY 1" equal to unity. I'llis lllcall'ý 01,11 
OM'(11,111711ent reventle rise'; proportionately vvith mineral production. Ilwtll 
CLILlatiollS haVe a dU111111V Valiable as one of the c\pIdl1dt0l'V I'll'IC 
(11'Clplis for stocks and government revellue (shown Ill fiý, 11 re 7/. 1 helow) Ind it I te 00 
that there are break-; in the series. For example, theiv \Va', 0 11.11111) Ill A()Cki, 
(, %/))in 21001; therefore the roglVS'; l0l1 OL111,16011 MCILld(", d LiL111111I. V \, 11-idbIC HIM 
Uikeý the value of 0 from N-14 to 2000 mid the VOILIC Of I hVill 2001 011WOYdS. 
Table 7.4: 01-S Regression Results for Government 11% 'evemic and change in Itocks 
Lq uations - Annual data from 1974 to 2004. 
hange ill 'ýtocks ( Ah )I quation CfllfliCllt Rek V1111C 
Rcgrc.,, ýion x ariable,, Structural Paiameters Rc,, rcýýion ariableý 1,11(loill. 11 1"11.1111clefý 
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100) (2 
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1 
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. 
WO 
tl ond 
1,, l'4gck1 change ill -1('ýk s 011 N1111'. 7-ol tioll 011 
(0.097) (4 ', 1,1) 
I Wmim arwhIC 
V/ = 34 ', 0. 
QIII) 
I Itillinn \I 
Y', -0 (",; 
0 Q4 R 
I %I ', (, I wI i I =0 olb I \1 "i'l I'l I 
colTulation Itst j-0 440 ,11 elatioll I (, I 
p 
est tor Z =4-48(., I'tique-14,1.1 I (-SI lilt o 81; 
Normal itN \o1malm 
Ob. ý R 12.1 
0 Hit 
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II () 
For government revenue, there was a deep in 1994,1998 and 2001; thus the 
government revenue regression equation was modified to include a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 in 1994,1998 and 2001, and takes the value 0 
otherwise. The inclusion of these dummy, variables has improved the overall 
performance of the equations and the model in general. For example, the static 
simulations performed with the model that had these equations without dummy 
variables performed very poorly, in predicting these two variables (see figure Al 
in the appendix). The improved predictions are shown in figure A2 in the 
appendix. 
Figure 7.1: Stocks (sb) and Government Revenue (gr). 
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Tab Ie7.5: OLS Rel-ression Results tot the Inflation and Gm el-11111(, lit ( ()ljý-'jjjjjptjOlI 
Spending Lq uations - Annual data from 1974 to 2004. 
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Thc numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. A ll the ill bo th equation" '11v ill 
The results Of the regression equation above are as e\pected: ill the coefficloiltý' 
have die correct signs and the model passes all the di'l'ý"Ilo"tic te'ýt". I or the 
inflation equation, in order to estimate a more parsimonious equ, ition, from 
rearession equation (77.8j) all the statisticalk, insignifiCallt VCH'i'Ible" were 
dropped. The I'CSLI]ts are as e\pected and the equation paswý, ill thc di, iýo, no, ýtj(, 
tests. The long-run elasticities are as folloxvs: income (0.2217), priv, ite "ector crcd it 
(0.283), I-South African prices (0318), and 110111111,11 rdtes (4). S5()). I 
long run elasticities, tooeffier \vith the short-ruil coefhclentý' il)dk"Itc Llmt the 
impact of Soudi African prices and dle ewliang'o r'lle Oil 
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more than that of income and private sector credit and this is consistent with the 
predictions of the P-Star model of inflation. 
This leads to the same questions raised in the previous chapters; that if factors 
beyond the control of the monetary policy authorities fi-I Botswana (i. e., South 
African prices and nominal exchange rates in this case) contribute more to 
domestic inflation, compared to those that the monetary authorities can possibly 
influence throucrh their monetary policy actions (private sector credit and 
income); how effective is monetary policy in Botswana. The other question is 
that; if these exogenous variables have such a heavy influence on Botswana 
inflation, how independent is Botswana's monetary policy especially with regard 
to South Africa? These results, just like in the previous chapters, seem to suggest 
that monetary policy in Botswana is not that effective, at least in as far as 
inflation and income is concerned. The results also indicate that changes in the 
exchange rate have an immediate impact on domestic inflation, while changes in 
South African prices take up to one year to be fully reflected in the domestic 
priceS27. 
7.3.2 Botswana's Transmission Mechanism 
Chart 7.1 below highlights the important links captured in the macroeconomic 
model above. The idea is to highlight the salient features of the transmission 
mechanism and indicate how the various sectors are linked together. For 
example, mineral production affects total income through its impact on 
government revenue. Government revenue impacts on government 
consumption spending, which in turn has a direct impact on output. Through its 
indirect impact on income, mineral production will therefore have an impact on 
27 It is possible that the lag could be a little less than one year, but since we are using annual data, 
the lag is reflected as one year. 
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investment, private consumption and private sector credit. We should note that 
private sector credit also goes towards financing private consumption and 
private investment In our model, we have modelled private sector credit 
separately in order to highlight the importance that the Bank of Botswana 
attaches to credit in its monetary policy framework. All the endogenous factors 
appear above the dotted line in the chart, while the exogenous and foreign 
factors appear below the dotted line. From the monetary policy point of view, 
chart 7.1 is modified in order to separate those factors that are not influenced by 
monetary policy (factors below the dotted line) from those that can be influenced 
by monetary policy actions (above the dotted line). 
The modified chart below, (Chart 7.2), captures the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Botswana. The upper part of the chart captures both the 
interest rate channel and the credit channel. As mentioned in chapter 3, the 
credit channel should not be seen as a separate and independent channel but 
rather a reinforcing mechanism behind the interest rate channel. Accordingly, 
the interest rate channel works through private consumption and private 
investment and feeds through to income, domestic demand and then inflation. 
Unlike in a typical small open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime 
where the exchange rate channel is fully operational, in our model the exchange 
rate is considered exogenous and the exchange rate channel is not operational. 
There is no link between the policy rate and the exchange rate. Put differently, 
the exchange rate movements are independent of monetary policy actions and 
the exchange rate policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, not the Bank of Botswana. There is therefore, no direct 
link between the policy rate and the exchange rate. We also have supply shocks 
(such as increase/ decrease in oil prices) that also have implica tions for income as 
well as domestic inflation. 
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Results from the previous chapters and the regression results above indicate that 
the exogenous and foreign factors tend to be more powerful in explaining 
movements in income and inflation. For example, in chapter 4, we saw that the 
mining sector contributes more than any other sector to total income as well as to 
government revenue, and coming second to the mining sector is the government 
sector. Also, in relation to inflation, foreign and exogenous factors dominate 
domestic or endogenous factors. Regression results indicate that South African 
inflation and the changes in the exchange rate contribute more to domestic 
inflation than income and private sector credit. The long-run exchange rate 
elasticity is -0.859, followed by the South African price elasticity of 0.318. This 
compares to 0.227 for income and 0.285 for private sector credit. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Although macroeconomic modelling dates back several decades in developed 
countries, the less developed countries are still lagging too far behind. Because 
of the role they play in international economics, organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are two of the few 
organisations that have macroeconomic models for developing countries. 
However, such models are general and do not relate to any particular country 
and since they are designed to provide guidance to policy making relating to 
developing countries in general. Country specific models, which take into 
account country specific factors in developing countries, especially Africa, are 
still to be developed. It is in recognition of this that this chapter seeks to fill this 
gap, with a focus on the Botswana economy. Botswana is a small developing 
country that however, has experienced high economic growth rates and has, as a 
result, not been bedevilled by chronic balance of payments problems that 
characterise many other developing countries of Africa. 
2 17 
The model is part of the overall theme of this thesis of understanding or 
estimating the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Botswana. As 
such it builds on, as well as benefits from the results of the previous chapters. 
The model is small and has eight behavioural equations relating to private 
investment, private consumption, and change in stocks or inventories, imports, 
government consumption spending, government revenue, inflation and private 
sector credit. The model is appealing in that it recognises the differences that 
exist between the Botswana economy and other developing countries and as 
such does not strictly follow the structure of models used by the IMF, for 
example, to assess and address balance of payments problems of their less 
developed member countries. All the estimated equations are well specified and 
pass the diagnostic tests. 
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Appendix 
Figure Al: Initial Predictions for stocks (sb) and government revenue (gr). 
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FigureA2: Predictions for Stocks (sb)and Government Revenue (gr) - 
Modified Equations. 
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Chapter 8 
Model Performance and Policy Simulations 
8.1. Introduction 
The macroeconomic model in the previous chapter (chapter 7) is based on sound 
economic theory and the regression results appear consistent and robust. This 
chapter carries the modelling work of the previous chapter a step further. In this 
chapter, we want to assess how useful our model could be. For that purpose, we 
subject the model to different tests that include solving the model under different 
assumptions or scenarios in order to assess its predictions of the economy under 
those assumptions. This exercise is also important in that it provides the only 
way of assessing the effects of external disturbances such as foreign price shocks, 
shocks to the mining sector, exchange rate shocks, etc., on the economy. Section 
8.2 assesses the predictive power of the model, i. e., model simulations are 
compared to the historical data (static simulation). 
With a small model like this, we expect the static simulations to be relatively 
good; model simulations becomes poorer as more and more equations are added 
to the model, hence the number of endogenous variables to be predicted 
increases. In section 8.3, we subject the model to various shocks or assumptions 
to assess its prediction of the economy; and finally, conclusions and policy 
implications are a subject of section 8.4. 
8.2 Static simulation 
First, we examine the model's ability to provide one-period-ahead forecasts of 
the endogenous variables. This is done by comparing the model's predictions to 
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the historical daLa (,, tatic simulation). 
Fi(,, ure 8.1: Static Simulation 
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8.3 Policy Simulations or Response to shocks 
This section looks at the model predictions under different assumptions or 
scenarios. This is conducted by changing the path of at least one of the 
exogenous variables at a time and comparing the model predictions to those 
under the baseline scenario. The estimation period for the model is from 1979 to 
2004 (even though the data range is from 1974 to 2004, some variables are only 
available from 1978 and to cater for lagged values, the model is solved from 
1979). For the baseline solution, we assume that some of the exogenous 
variables (the dummy variables: dl, d3, and dml; net errors and omissions (neo), 
the nominal exchange rate (nrp) and foreign price index (sap)) take their 2004 
values and remain unchanged up to the end of the solution period, while mineral 
production and exports are assumed to grow at a constant rate during the 
simulation period. After solving for the baseline solution, the model is subjected 
to (a) a monetary shock, i. e., an increase in the policy rate or monetary tightening; 
(b) devaluation of the exchange rate; (c) an increase in foreign (South African) 
prices; and (d) a fall in mineral production. 
8.3.1 A Monetary Shock or Monetary Tightening 
We assume that monetary policy authorities adjust their policy instrument as per 
the policy rule given by equation 7.11 in chapter 7 and for ease of reference, the 
policy rule is given below: 
i, = (I -, O)it* + pi, -, where 
i, . =[a(, +; r, +a, (; r, -, -; r*)] 
(8.1) 
As already discussed in chapter 7, i, and i, are current and past period's 
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nominal interest rates, respectively, while i, * is the real interest rate. r, and 7r, _, 
are current and past period's inflation rates, respectively, while ; r, * is the target 
inflation rate. The parameter p allows for inertia in interest rates. A change in 
monetary policy stance involves changing p, or ao or a, or a combination of an), 
two of them or all of them. In our baseline solution, p=0.9, ao = 4.8 and 
a, = 0.5. 
For monetary tightening, we assume that monetary authorities increase a,, from 
4.8 to 5.8, which means an increase in the real interest rate by one percentage 
point. The model predictions under this assumption are discussed below. 
Following a monetary policy tightening, inflation falls in relation to the baseline, 
i. e., inflation is lower than under the baseline scenario. Figure 8.2 below 
indicates that a one percentage points increase in the policy rate leads to a over 
0.2 percentage points deviation of inflation from the base after 15 periods and the 
impact is felt after about two years following the shock, i. e., inflation appears to 
respond to a monetary policy after about 2 years. What is more interesting, 
which also contradicts results from the VAR analysis is that the structural 
approach eliminates the price puzzle completely. This could be due to the fact 
that the structural approach allows for the introduction of man), other variables 
that are important in the transmission mechanism and also allows for die 
interaction of different sectors of the economy and therefore provides 
simulations which are intuitively more plausible. It is worth noting that die 
structural approach is based on sound economic theory, while other approaches 
such as VAR are purely statistical. 
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Figure 8.2: Responses of Inflation and Private Sector Credit to a Monetary Policy 
Shock 
The response of private sector credit appears to be much quicker even though it 
also remains subdued for a while following a shock. A one percentage point 
increase in the policy rate leads to a little less than one percent deviation of credit 
from base. Meanwhile, figure 8.3 indicates that following a monetary policy 
tightening, investment, consumption and income all decline. 
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8.3.2 Devaluation of the Exchange Rate. 
The responses of private sector credit and the price level to a devaluation of the 
exchange rate are shown in figures 8.3 below. 
Figure 8.4: Responses of Private Sector Credit and the price level to devaluation 
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Figure 8.5: Responses of Investment, Consumption, Imports and Income to 
Devaluation 
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reflected in a reduction in private sectow credit shown in figure 44. Me ww"T, 
indicate diat, contrary to We popular Keynesian open-emnorny mav Nit, outimi, -, 
that devaluathm is expanskinary, devaluakmi in Fi(itswaila appcars to he 
contractionary. It could also be due to the fact that the interest rate rule is 
causing sufficient increase in interest rates in response to increase in inflation to 
completely offset the expansionary effects of the devaluation. It would have 
been interesting to see how the real exchange rate effects in the import equation 
affect these results. Unfortunately, the exchancre rate variable (either real or 
nominal) was statistically insignificant and was as a result dropped out of the 
equation in favour of the relative price variable expressed as the ratio of domestic 
price index to South African price index (cpil sap), which though also statis fically 
insignificant, is far mush better than the exchange rate variable. Therefore, 
devaluation increases the price for South African goods in domestic money terms 
(the denominator increases), which leads to a rise in imported inflation, hence an 
increase in domestic prices (the numerator). Whether the ratio increases or falls 
depends on the relative magnitudes of an increase of the denominator compared 
to that of the numerator. In our case, the ratio increases, meaning that the 
increase in domestic prices more than offsets the domestic price value of South 
African prices, resulting in an increase in imports. 
The belief that devaluation is expansionary is based on the thinking that 
devaluation makes exports cheaper and imports expensive, which then 
stimulates aggregate demand and domestic production. However, several 
studies have indicated that that is not always the case. A survey by Bahmani- 
Oskooee and Miteza (2003) indicate that several studies have found mixed 
results and conclude that devaluation is not always expansionary but depends 
on country specific factors. Botswana relies heavily on imports for consumption 
and capital goods and has a very narrow manufacturing base. The 
manufacturing sector also relies more on imported inputs which become 
expensive due to devaluation. This has a tendency to increase production costs 
that eventually leads to a decline in supply. That Botswana relies heavily on 
imports (both consumption goods and inputs) means that imports are price 
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inelastic as indicated in the regression results in chapter 7 and therefore the 
expenditure switching mechanism that is so often cited as the main reason why 
devaluation is expansionary may not apply to the case of Botswana. 
Consequently, devaluation leads to an increase in imports as indicated in figure 
8.5 above. 
8.3.3 A Fall in Mineral Production 
We have noted in chapter 7 and elsewhere in this thesis that mining is a very 
important sector in the economy. Not only does it dominate the economy 
through its contribution to GDP, it is also a major source of government 
revenues. Due to the desire to diversify the economy, the Government uses 
revenues derived from mining to finance other sectors through its grant and loan 
schemes. Figure 8.6 below shows the response of imports, investment, 
consumption, and income to a reduction in mineral production. This simulation 
assumes that mineral production falls by 5 percent for five years between 2003 
and 2009 and then recovers back to base. 
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Figure 8.11: Response of Private Sector Credit to an increase in South African 
Inflation 
8.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the model estimated in the previous chapter was subjected to a 
series a tests to assess how it behaves under different assumptions. On the basis 
of these tests, the model appears to be performing very wen. The static 
simulations results indicate that the model predictions track Ole historical data 
very closely. Of particular importance is the model's ability to predict how the 
economy is expected to respond to various shocks. In this exercise, the model 
was subjected to a monetary shock, which involves monetary tightening; a shock 
to the exchange rate (devaluation); a shock to mineral production (a fall in 
production) which is the mainstay of the economy as well as a shock to the 
foreign price level (an increase in South African Prices). The model's response to 
shocks is as one would expect on the basis of economic theory. 
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The model also reveals something that the authorities may have been taking for 
granted. We noted elsewhere in this thesis that the Botswana authorities rely on 
the exchange rate to promote export competitiveness, which has seen die 
nominal exchange rate devalued on several occasions, the latest one being the 12 
percent devaluation in June 2005. According to Keynesian economics, it is 
believed that devaluation is expansionary because it switches spending from 
foreign to domestic goods, which then stimulates domestic production. Our 
model simulations reveal that devaluation in Botswana is contractionary, which 
could be due to the fact that the anticipated expenditure switching mechanism in 
Botswana is not possible due to over reliance of the country on imports for both 
finished goods and inputs into production. Devaluation leads to an increase in 
the cost of production which reduces supply. And the fact that the country has a 
narrow industrial base and as a result, relies on imports, mean that even when 
the price of imports increase due to devaluation, there is still no alternative but to 
continue importing at a higher price, hence an increase in the import bill. 
just like in the previous chapters, results from the model simulations also raise 
some policy related questions, including the one on contractionary devaluation 
discussed above. It is evident from these results that, in as far as domestic 
inflation and output are concerned; the impact of exogenous factors, i. e., factors 
outside the control of Botswana's monetary authorities or the central Bank of 
Botswana, far exceeds that of the endogenous factors, i. e., factors that could be 
influenced by monetary policy actions. For example, the impact of a policy shock 
on inflation and income is less than that of exogenous and foreign factors. We 
have seen how important mineral production is to the economy so that anv 
efforts by the authorities to stimulate the economy through monetary policy, 
such efforts could easily be frustrated by a shock to the diamond mining sector. 
Alternatively, any attempts to reduce inflation through monetary policy could be 
easily defeated by a rise in South African inflation or devaluation of the currency 
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by Government in an effort to promote export competitiveness. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
9.1 Introduction 
Understanding a country's monetary transmission mechanism is a very 
important step in formulating and implementing an effective monetary policy. 
No twiths tan ding the disagreements between the Monetarists and the Keynesians 
with regard to the effectiveness of monetary policy versus fiscal policy, the 
importance of monetary policy cannot be over-emphasised, for it lies at heart of 
economic stability. We have learnt that, "both economists and politicians have 
been heard to advocate in recent years that stabilisation of output and inflation 
be left to monetary policy and that fiscal policy has lost its lustre since its heyday 
in the 1960s, partly because of concern over persistently large budget deficits and 
partly because of doubts that the political system can make tax and spending 
decisions in a timely way to achieve desirable stabilisation outcomes", Mishkin 
(1995). 
As noted above, and elsewhere in this thesis, the ability of the monetary 
authorities to formulate and implement an effective monetary policy requires a 
better understanding of the transmission mechanism. The transmission 
mechanism is defined by Taylor (1995) as, "the process through which monetary 
policy decisions are transmitted into changes in real output and inflation". 
Meanwhile, it is important for the monetary authorities to understand this 
process because, as Mishkin put it, "monetary policy is a powerful tool, but one 
that sometimes has unexpected or unwanted consequences and that to be 
successful in conducting monetary policy, the monetary authorities must have an 
accurate assessment of the timirig and effect of their policies on the economy, 
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thus requiring an understanding of the mechanism through which monetary 
policy affects the economy". Research on the transmission mechanism has 
revealed that there is a time lag between policy action and its impact on real 
output and inflation (see for example, Taylor (1995 and 1996), Mishkin (1996), De 
Fiore (1998), and Bernake and Blinder (1988)). 
This work on the transmission mechanism, however, acknowledges the fact that 
estimating the transmission mechanism is not an easy exercise, more so in a 
developing country like Botswana where data may be of questionable quality. In 
addition to data problems, there are other more serious problems that result from 
the behaviour of the economy and the interaction between key macroeconomic 
variables. We sometimes have reverse causality between variables so that it is 
difficult to differentiate between cause and effect (the endogencity problem). For 
example, changes in real activity and inflation may prompt monetary authorities 
to react in order to, in turn, influence economic activity and inflation. Under 
such circumstances, it is difficult to disentangle causes and effects of monetary 
policy on real activity and inflation from the influence that real activity and 
inflation have on monetary policy. 
Notwithstanding such challenges, the author is of the view that the Bank of 
Botswana need not lag behind. As a result, the author sees this work as a starting 
point and a challenge to other researchers in Botswana and Africa, in general, to 
take this kind of research work as a matter of priority if Africa is to be an 
effective participant in the global world and not be a spectator. As an attempt to 
finding a solution to some of the problems inherent in estimating the 
transmission mechanism, three analytical methods were adopted in this thesis 
and these are; the narrative approach, vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and 
the structural approach. 
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The narrative approach was first used by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), later 
adopted by Romer and Romer (1989) and De Fiore (1998). This approach 
provided an important first stage in the investigation of the transmission 
mechanism in that it allows for the establishment of the economic history of the 
period under review. Its practical appeal lies in the fact that it identifies 
monetary shocks through non-statistical procedures. For example, the problem 
of reverse causation alluded to above, which is difficult to deal with using 
statistical approaches is dealt with, under the narrative approach, through 
identifying large shifts in monetary policy not prompted by developments on the 
real side of the economy and relies more on historical records of the monetary 
authorities. Accordingly, Friedman and Schwartz define a monetary shock as "a 
monetary movement entirely unrelated to underlying economic developments". 
This definition did not find favour with Romer and Romer who are of the view 
that such a definition is likely to create judgement and unconscious bias because 
"Friedman and Schwartz's judgement is central to their identification of a 
shock". Consequently, Romer and Romer narrowed down a monetary shock to 
mean "only episodes in which monetary authorities attempted to exert a 
contractionary influence on the economy in order to reduce inflation". 
Not much research has been done through the narrative approach. In fact Romer 
and Romer noted that, "despite its significance, however, the narrative approach 
has been largely neglected in formal research in the 25 years since Friedman and 10 
Schwartz's work". As a first step in understanding the transmission mechanism, 
the narrative approach is a very important analytical tool especially for a 
developing country like Botswana where there are lots of data problems. 
The second method adopted in this thesis is the popular vector autoregression 
analysis (VAR), which has been used in a lot of empirical work on the 
transmission mechanism. These includes work by Bemanke and Blinder (1992); 
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Bernanke and Gertler (1995)), Citu (2003), Arnoýtovd and Hurnfk (2005); Bayoumi 
and Morsink (2001); Pattanaik and Kakes (2000); Smal and S. de Jager (2002) and 
others. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) also state that, "vector autoregressions 
have been used in an increasingly wide variety of econometric applications". 
The VAR approach is believed to be flexible and allows for time series analysis 
with ease. Watson (1994) believes that the use of VARs in empirical economics 
was introduced by Sims in 1980 who demonstrated that VARs provide a flexible 
and tractable framework for analysing economic time series. One major 
advantage of the VAR approach over other approaches is that it treats all the 
variables in the system as potentially endogenous, and therefore avoids the 
problem of endogeneity or simultaneity. In that sense, a VAR is defined as "a 
system of ordinary least squares regressions in which each of a set of variables is 
regressed on lagged values of both itself and the other variables in the set", 
Bernanke and Gertler, (1995). 
Finally, we have the structural approach, which involves estimating a small 
structural model for the Botswana economy. This approach benefits from and 
builds on the results of the previous two approaches. The structural approach 
has some advantages over other approaches. For example, Romer and Romer 
argue that statistical tests like regressions of output on money, studies of the 
effects of anticipated and unanticipated money, and vector autoregressions 
cannot persuasively identify the direction of causation. However, Fair (1989) 
argue that this criticism "does not apply to the estimation of structural 
relationships", and also argues that "the structural approach is a clear alternative 
to the narrative approach". Estimating a structural model for a developing 
country like Botswana is a step in the right direction because man), of the 
structural models in use today relate to developed countries only. hiternational 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are 
the only organisations; where one would find developing country models. But 
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even then, such models are a generalisation of developing countries and do not 
relate to any particular or specific developing country. Such an approach ignores 0 
the structural differences that may exist between developing countries. There are 
many country specific factors that need not be ignored in modelling. 
Consequently, the small structural model estimated in this thesis is specific to 
Botswana and takes into account the peculiar nature of the Botswana economy. 
Before embarking on an empirical analysis of the transmission mechanism in 
Botswana, it was important to put certain issues into proper perspective. First, 
from the literature review, it is evident that the importance of the different 
transmission channels differs from one country to the other. It depends oil 
country specific factors such as the level of financial sector development, the 
structure of the economy, exchange rate and interest rate policies, monetary 
regimes, etc. It is in recognition of these factors that this thesis dedicated chapter 
2 to monetary developments in Botswana since independence and their likely 
impact on the transmission mechanism. Likewise, chapter 4 looked at the 
structure of the Botswana economy and its likely impact on the transmission 
mechanism. Chapter 2 concluded that until 1986 the financial sector in Botswana 
was regulated. For example, monetary authorities set floors for deposit rates and 
a ceiling for lending rates. Capital mobility was also inhibited through the use of 
capital controls on current and capital accounts transactions. There was also lack 
of competition and therefore little efficiency in the financial system. Financial 
institutions had no incentives to be innovative and operate efficiently. 
From 1986 Botswana undertook a financial liberalisation programme, which saw 
increased competition and improved efficiency in the financial system. This was 
also accompanied by the adoption of indirect instruments of monetary policy in 
1989. It was also noted that until 1991, the exchange rate was used to fight 
imported inflation in some cases and also used, in other cases, to promote export 
241 
competitiveness. But these are conflicting objectives because export 
competitiveness requires devaluation of the currency, which leads to an increase 
in imported inflation while fighting imported inflation requires appreciation of 
the currency, which erodes export competitiveness. However, from 1992, it was 
decided that the exchange rate should be used to promote export 
competitiveness only. In that sense there have been a series of exchange rate 
devaluations geared towards export competitiveness. Chapter 2 observes that 
such actions go against the objective of monetary policy, which is price stability. 
We also noted in chapter 2 that Botswana operates, at least during our period of 
analysis, a fixed exchange rate system in which the Botswana currency, the Pula, 
is pegged to a basket of currencies comprising the South African Rand and die 
SDR. The currency weights are based on the trade relationships between 
Botswana and her tradino, partners and given the strong trade links with South 
Africa, the South African Rand carries a higher weight in the basket. 
Meanwhile, the larger South African Rand weight in the basket means that 
movement of the Botswana Pula against other currencies is determined more by 
the movement of the South African Rand against those currencies, as well as die 
occasional intervention by the authorities when the basket weights and/or the 
"'adjustment factor" are altered to achieve the export competitiveness objective. 
That being the case, monetary policy has no impact on exchange rate changes, 
i. e., there is no link between changes in the policy interest rate and the exchange 
rate. However, the Pula is allowed to fluctuate within a specified range and that 
allows for the role of the exchange rate channel; but given the less developed 
state of the financial market and the fact that there is a limited range of financial 
assets, interest rates differentials between Botswana and international rates do 
not mean much in as far as attracting foreign capital is concerned. Consequently, 
the exchange rate channel of the transmission mechanism is not operational. The 
monetary authorities cannot use the policy instrument to alter the exchange rate 
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with a view to fighting inflation. This is in contrast to an open economy with a 
flexible exchange rate system and a well developed financial market, where a 
monetary contraction that leads to an increase in domestic interest rates, attracts 
foreign capital and leads to increased demand for the local currency. An increase 
in the demand for the local currency leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate 
and hence a reduction in imported and overall. domestic inflation. In the case of 
Botswana, this mechanism does not work; instead foreign prices have a direct 
impact on domestic inflation. 
It was revealed in chapter 4 that the economy of Botswana relies more on 
traditional exports; defined as diamonds, copper, nickel and beef exports. More 
specifically, Botswana depends on diamond exports, which has forced the 
government into embarking on an economic diversification strategy. This 
strategy has seen the government running quite a number of loan and grant 
schemes to help individuals and business that want to go into other economic 
activities such as tourism, manufacturing, services, etc. However, such actions 
mean that the role of financial intermediaries is undermined; commercial banks 
cease to be the most important sources of investment finance, and hence the 
credit channel becomes less important 
Besides the exchange rate and credit channels, literature also identifies the 
interest rate channel which lies behind the IS-LM framework. According to this 
framework, monetary policy- actions occur through changes in the interest rate. 
For example, a monetary contraction leads to an increase in the interest rate, 
which reflects an increase in the cost of borrowing. As a result, expenditure on 
investment and consumption is reduced, leading to an overall reduction in 
aggregate spending and output. 
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Other transmission channels identified in the literature include the Trade Credit 
channel, which may become the onlý, source of external financing for firms which 
have no credit rating and thus no access to capital markets during credit 
rationing. It provides an escape route for firms facing external financing 
constraints in the wake of monetary tightening. The trade credit channel occurs 
if a firm delays payment to its suppliers or accepts supply of goods with an 
agreement to pay later. There is also the Bank Capital channel, which according 
to Corecelli et al. (2006), is active if: (1) it is costly for banks to raise equity; (2) 
banks assume an interest rate with the maturity of their credit being higher than 
that of their deposits; and (3) if capital regulations influence banks' credit supply. 
9.2 Summary Results 
Results from the various analytical exercises in this thesis tell a consistent story. 
First, it is evident that the economy of Botswana is driven more by exogenous 
factors and most importantly, by diamond exports. The interest rate channel, 
though operational or active, only accounts for a small proportion of the 
variation in real output and inflation. Variance decompositions of the basic 
VAR model, with real output, price level, money supply and the policy rate 
arranged in that order, in chapter 6 indicate that policy shocks have a maximum 
impact of 7.9 percent on real output after eight quarters, i. e., two years, and the 
impact begins to show four quarters, i. e., one year, after the shock. Its 
contribution to price variations or inflation is also minimal. It is only 1.9 and 8.7 
percent after the fourth and eight quarters, respectively. 
Results from the monetary policy framework based VAR model, with real 
output, price level, private sector credit and the policy rate, arranged in that 
order, are even worse, with policy shocks only contributing 0.5 percent and 3.8 
percent of the variation in real output after 4 and 8 quarters, respectively. In as 
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far as the variation in prices is concerned; variance decompositions indicate that 
policy shocks from the monetary policy framework based VAR accounts for only 
13 and 2.3 percent of the variation in prices after the fourth and eighth quarters, 
respectivel). 
The structural approach in chapter 7 indicates that monetary policy affects real 
output through its impact on private investment and consumption. However, 
such an impact is relatively small compared to the impact from shocks to the 
mining sector. Results from the structural approach indicate that, contrary to the 
popular Ke3mesian open-economy macroeconomics that devaluation is always 
expansionary, devaluation in Botswana is contractionary. Among other factors, 
devaluation increases the cost of imported inputs and for a country reliant on 
imported inputs like Botswana, production costs increase, leading to a fall in 
aggregate supply. 
The analysis in this thesis also indicates that exchange rate changes are 
independent of monetary shocks. This is due to the exchange rate regime in 
Botswana and the fact that the exchange rate is used as a policy tool to promote 
export competitiveness. The exchange rate policy is not under the responsibility 
of the Bank of Botswana, but that of the Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning. That being the case, monetary policy can not be used to effect changes 
in the exchange rate in order to achieve the objective of price stability, which is 
the sole responsibilitý, of the Bank of Botswana. TI-ie exchange rate mechanism 
means that changes in South African prices have a direct impact on Botswana 
prices. Meanwhile, changes in the exchange rate, either resulting from the basket 
mechanism or intervention by the authorities, has a big impact on domestic 
inflation. For example, our structural model indicates that devaluation leads to 
an increase in domestic inflation, and as noted above, it also has contractionary 
effects on the economy. Since exports are exogenous to the model, a change in 
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the exchange rate has no impact on exports. Exports are assumed to be 
exogenous because they consist mainly of minerals, or diamonds to be more 
specific, which do not depend on monetary policy changes, but rather on the 
arrangements between the Botswana Government and the Diamond Trading 
Company (DTC) and its marketing strategy. 
The other channel that has been found to be active is the credit channel. 
However, the credit channel is not as strong as one would expect. First, changes 
in the policy rate do not always lead to a corresponding change in credit growth. 
The narrative approach enabled us to identify two monetary episodes for closer 
investigation. The first monetary episode saw the policy rate increased by 800 
basis points from 6.5 percent in July 1990 to 14.5% in January 1993, while the 
second episode saw an increase of '150 basis points from 11.75% in March 1998 to 
14.25 in August 2000. It was during the first episode that credit growth declined 
as one would expect, while the second episode did not lead to a decline in credit 
growth. This could be due to the fact that the first episode was more severe than 
the second and may be an indication that a relatively large or sharp change in 
interest rates is required in order for policy to have the desired impact on credit 
growth. Besides, commercial banks in Botswana had at some point given out 
loans at interest rates below their prime lending rates (Bank of Botswana Annual 
Report, 1998). In such a case, monetary policy is ineffective in initiating the 
desired changes in credit growth. Meanwhile, the impact of credit growth on 
inflation is straight forward; an increase in credit growth leads to a rise in 
inflation. The VAR analysis indicates that credit shocks contribute 15 percent of 
the variation in prices four quarters after the shock and 17.9 percent eight 
quarters after the shock. However, price changes in Botswana are driven more 
by external or exogenous factors. For example, the structural approach indicates 
a long-run credit elasticity of 0285. This is less than both the long-run exchange 
rate and South African price elasticities of -0.859 and 0.318 percent, respectively. 
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The structural approach also indicates that a policy shock takes up to two years 
to effect changes on domestic prices, which supports the popular view that 
monetary policy affects the economy with a time lag and therefore should be 
forward-looking (see for example, MacDonald and Coricelli, 2006; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995; De Fiore, 1998; Mishkin, 1996 to name just a few). 
93 Policy Implications 
Overall, the results indicate that both the interest rate and the credit channel are 
active but weak. The Bank of Botswana monetary policy framework has the 
short-term interest rate (the Bank Rate or the Bank of Botswana lending rate) as 
the policy instrument, while credit growth is the intermediate target and 
inflation is the final objective. Results from the analysis indicate that there is no 
clear relationship between changes in the policy rate and credit growth. A strong 
negative relationship between interest rates and credit growth is required for 
credit to be an appropriate intermediate target or for the short-term interest rate 
to be an effective policy instrument. Our results indicate that such a relationship 
does not exist in Botswana. There are episodes where such a relationship exists, 
especially when interest rate changes are sharp, such as the case during the first 
monetary episode of chapter 5. However, the monetary policy authorities can 
not always initiate such big policy changes because of the dangers such actions 
could cause in the economy. For example, Taylor (1996) states that, "if monetary 
policy is tightened sharply with short-term interest rates rising by a large 
amount, the inflation rate will return to target quickly, but the economy will slow 
down and perhaps go into a recession". However, the case for Botswana is 
slightly different: For example, model simulations indicate that policy shocks 
have a relatively large impact on private investment, private consumption and 
income (figure 8.1) than on inflation (figure 8.2). This means that a large increase 
in the policy rate will not guarantee a quick return of inflation to target, but will 
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definitely impact negatively on economic activity thereby destabilising the 
economy rather that bringing stability. 
That the relationship between credit growth and the policy rate is not always as 
required means that either the short-term interest rate is not a good policy 
instrument for the Bank of Botswana or credit growth is not a good intermediate 
target. However, since credit growth has a relatively strong positive relationship 
with the final objective, i. e., inflation, it appears that it is a relatively good 
intermediate variable. An alternative intermediate target could have been the 
nominal exchange rate, but since the exchange rate policy is such that the 
exchange rate is exogenously determined, it ceases to be an option at all. We 
have also seen that the other possible intermediate targets such as the different 
monetary aggregates, Le., ml, m2 and m3, bear no strong positive relationship 
with inflation, our final objective or target (see figure 6.5 in chapter 6). This 
could only mean that the policy rate is not an appropriate policy instrument for 
the Bank of Botswana. In that case, a possible solution could be a switch from an 
interest rate based policy instrument to quantity-based policies. I 
One of the quantity based policies that could be considered and has been used in 
the past is the reserve requirement ratio. The Bank of Botswana Primer on 
Money and Banking (1998) defines reserve requirements as "funds that the Bank 
of Botswana requires the commercial banks to hold on the basis of the deposits 
they have accepted from the public and the), are held in an account with the 
Bank of Botswana". It further states that "the reserve requirement ratio is an 
instrument of monetary policy which, when varied by the monetary authorities 
influences the extent of credit creation or monetaryexpansion". This means that 
a monetary contraction would require an increase in the reserve requirement 
ratio, while a monetary expansion requires a reduction in the reserve 
requirement ratio. The use of a reserve requirement ratio is equivalent to setting 
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the money stock while letting the interest rate fluctuate accordingly. 
The other matter that raises some policy issues in this thesis is the finding that 
the use of the exchange rate to promote export competitiveness in Botswana 
could be an inappropriate one. TI-ie Government of Botswana holds the popular 
view that the nominal exchange rate is the key to export competitiveness and 
therefore an important tool for economic diversification and growth. Results 
from the model simulations point to the contrary and indicate that devaluation in 
Botswana is instead contractionary. These findings are not only peculiar to 
Botswana. Research has revealed that devaluation is not always expansionary 
(see review of research papers on this issue by Bahman-Oskooee and Miteza 
(2003)). 
Among the factors that make devaluation contractionary in Botswana is the fact 
that Botswana relies on imports for almost all kinds of goods, including inputs, 
which as noted above, increases production costs and eventually reduces 
aggregate supply. Furthermore, for a small country like Botswana hoping to 
attract new investments, devaluation could have devastating effects since new 
investments often consists largely of imported capital goods. A real devaluation 
will render capital more costly which depresses investment and aggregate 
demand. Again, since devaluation leads to an increase in prices, t1lis reduces real 
cash balances and real weald-i and therefore leads to a fall in expenditure and 
thus a fall in aggregate demand. Under tl-iese circumstances, devaluation leads 
to a decline in both aggregate supply and aggregate demand. 
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9.4 Areas for further research and concluding remarks 
We have since established that the Bank of Botswana's intermediate target, credit 
growth, does not always respond to changes in policy, i. e., changes in die policy 
instrument, as one would expect. Consequently, this casts doubts over whether 
the short-term interest rate is an effective policy instrument for the Bank of 
l3otswana or not. The not so clear relationship between the policy instrument 
and the intermediate target suggests that the short-term interest rate may not be 
the best policy instrument and takes us back to the question of what could be die 
best instrument. As noted by Poole (1970), the proper choice of monetary policy 
instruments is a topic which has been hotly debated. It is suggested here that die 
Bank of Botswana should instead revert to the use of quantity based instruments 
such as the reserve requirement ratio. However, as is well known such a choice 
is not as straight forward as one would fliftik. Results of our analysis in this 
thesis point towards two forms of market imperfections in Botswana that all tend 
to diminish the impact of monetary policy. Credit market imperfections may 
rnean that both monetary aggregates and real interest rates are poorly linked to 
consumers and investors' decisions in the short run. In these circumstances, 
there is no particular reason to favour monetary volume instruments over 
interest rate instruments. 
Results indicate that we have at least two forms of market imperfection (the 
bank-lending effect and a bank credit imperfection). A bank lending effect arises 
when firms and consumers have no alternative funds other than bank loans, and 
hence consumption and investment are sensitive to lending rates. On the other 
hand, a bank credit imperfection means that banks have market power enough 
not to alter their loan rates in response to policy rate changes. If these market 
imperfections co-exist, they act to cancel each other out. Credit market 
imperfections, such as the bank-lending effect, act to heighten the impact of 
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monetary policy, while others, such as the bank credit act to diminish it. 
The analysis has so far revealed that businesses in Botswana do not relysolcly oil 
commercial bank loans. There are some grant and loan sclienicsadininistered by 
the Botswana Government that provide subsidised loans to new and existing 
businesses in a bid to promote economic diversification. The parallel operation 
of these loan schemes tends to weaken the bank lending channel, and hence die 
impact of monetary policy. The Government of Botswana does not only operate 
loan and grant schemes, but also acts as a guarantor for civil servailLs seeking 
motor vehicle and mortgage loans from commercial banks. This further Weakens 
the impact of monetary pol-icy via die credit or bank lending channels. In fact 
Coricelli et al (2006) argue that, "die government's involvement in the banking 
sector either as an owner or via public guarantees can partial])' offset the effects 
of monetary policy on loan supply, ". The), further argue that, "government's 
involvement may mean soft budget constraints for firms and flic soft budget 
constraints may be due to open subsidies or implicit subsidies from government 
or easy access to new credits from state owned banks". Furthermore, whereas 
commercial banks do change their lending rates in line with die change in die 
policy rate, it was revealed in chapter 4 that commercial banks have, sometimes, 
extended credit to their customers at rates below their prime lending rates, which 
basically amounts to not changing the rates at all. Such actions definitely 
diminish the impact of monetary policy. The possible existence of die trade 
credit channel could also work against the impact of monetary policy oil die 
economy. Collectively, the two market imperfections in Botswana rcnder the use 
of the interest rate instrument ineffective, lience our suggestion for die Bank of 
Botswana to revert to quantity instruments. 
The use of a quantity based instrument such as the reserve requirement ratio as 
suggested above could help avoid situations where commercial banks do not 
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change their lending rates in accordance with the change in the policy rate or 
even when the), change their lending rates, the), still charge their customers 
interest rates that are lower than their prime lending rates. It will also help the 
Bank of Botswana cut down on their interest expenses on the Bank of Botswana 
Certificate sirice required reserves do not earn interest while held at die Bank of 
Botswana. Although this approach could be criticised for being, more of a 
controlled kind of an economy, it should also be noted that any country's 
monetary policy framework including die policy instruments should be guided 
by economic and financial conditions prevailing in die country. It appears that 
the current economic and financial conditions in Botswana do not allow for the 
use of an interest rate based monetary policy instrument. However, further 
research on this issue is necessary before adopting an alternative policy 
instrument and such a research could focus on die following. First, we know 
estimating the transmission mechanism requires high frequency data, which are 
not always available in developing countries. For example, a forensic 
investigation of the credit market imperfections requires high frequency firm 
level data. One would need to find out the financing patterns (liabilities) of firms 
in Botswana, i. e., do firms in Botswana rely more on internal funds, bank finance, 
non bank financial intermediaries, government finance, new equity, trade credit, 
etc. This could possibly re-enforce arguments put forward in this thesis with 
regard to credit market imperfections. One may also want to find out the main 
assets of firms in Botswana and their relationship with commercial banks. 
Second, it would also be helpful to have an idea of die market value of firms, 
many of which are not registered in the stock exchange. The ratio of die firms' 
market value to their replacement costs of capital (Tobirls q) could tell us how 
firms respond to policy changes. The other issue related to the transmission of 
monetary policy that is worth investigating is how asset prices (e. g., prices of 
houses, land, etc. ) respond to policy changes. It is unfortunate that such data are 
not available in Botswana and provide a major challenge for future research 
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work. 
The other area that provides challenges for further research is die use of the 
exchange rate to promote export competitiveness. Results from the anal), sis in 
this thesis indicate that devaluation in Botswana is contractionar), and not 
expansionary, as authorities strongly, believe. Currently die use of nominal 
devaluations for export competitiveness does not oill), frustrate efforts of the 
monetary authorities to fight inflation but also appears to be harmful to 
economic growth. However, in order to understand this issue even better, a 
focused research on this matter could be a welcome development. Even Illough 
the structural approach in this thesis suggests that devaluation in Botsivana is 
contractionary, it nevertheless does not address some of the important issues 
regarding the impact of devaluation in an econom),. For example, Bahmani- 
Oskooee and Nliteza cite several factors that could lead to a coil tractionar), 
devaluation and some of these factors could be applicable to the case of 
Botswana. These include the following: (a) Since now investment often consists 
largely of imported capital goods, a real depreciation will render capital more 
costly, in terms of home goods, which is likely, to depress new investment and 
aggregate demand; (b) A higher price level resulting from devaluation reduces 
real cash balances and real wealth and leads to a decline in expenditure in order 
to restore real balances; (c) Devaluation leads to an increase in prices of imported 
inputs, which leads to increased production costs that in turn reduces supply. 
These factors are not addressed in this thesis but provide a good starting point 
for further research on devaluation and its impact on the Botswana economN,. 
Gylfason and Risager (1984) also conclude that, "... although devaluations are 
typically expansionary for developed countries, they are likel), to be 
contractionary in developing countries". 
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